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ARTIFICIAL MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE OF
EMPLOYEES: THE FINE LINE DIVIDING THE
PRUDENTLY MANAGED ENTERPRISE
FROM THE MODERN SWEATSHOP
Robert G. Boehmer*
I. INTRODUCTION
The vast arsenal of technology now available to employers for the day-to-
day gathering and analysis of information about their employees is impressive,
as well as frightening. Except for outrageous conduct and the use of one of a
discrete group of techniques that Congress has chosen to regulate, the law
supplies employees with precious little protection from the assault on work-
place privacy. Similarly, the law provides employers with little guidance con-
cerning the permissible depth of their intrusions. Legislation designed to plug
this gap in workplace privacy law is now pending before both the United
States Senate1 and House of Representatives.' The primary purpose of this
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Terry College of Business, University of Georgia. B.S.
(Business Administration), University of Oregon (1974); J.D., University of Oregon (1977). The
author is a member of the Oregon State Bar.
1. S. 516, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter Senate Bill]. This bill was introduced on
February 27, 1991, by Senator Paul Simon. 137 CONG. REC. S2430 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1991).
Senator Simon, in introducing this bill, stated that "[it is an unfortunate irony that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation is required to obtain a court order to wiretap a telephone, even in cases of
national security, but that employers are permitted to spy at will on their own personnel and the
public." Id. The bill was referred to the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee on Feb-
ruary 27, 1991. 137 CONG. REC. S2404 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1991). Hearings were held on the bill
on September 24, 1991, before the Subcommittee on Employment and Productivity. 137 CONG.
REC. Dl 137 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1991). The bill, originally sponsored by Senator Simon, is now co-
sponsored by Senator Paul Wellstone. A similar proposal was introduced by Senator Simon the
prior year, S. 2164, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), but died in committee. A recent report describes
the likelihood of passage as "far from a sure thing." Louise Fickel, Don't Look Now, But... : A
New Crop of Network Products Is Forcing a Debate Over Workplace Monitoring, INFOWORLD,
May 13, 1991, at 50, 54; see also John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson, Electronic Monitoring
in the Workplace, N.Y. L.J., July 6, 1990, at 3 n.3 (discussing prior legislative proposals concern-
ing this subject matter by Senator Simon).
2. The Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, H.R. 1218, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)
[hereinafter House Bill]. The bill was introduced on February 28, 1991, by Rep. Pat Williams,
137 CONG. REC. E709 (daily ed. March 4, 1991), and was referred to the House Education and
Labor Committee, 137 CONG. REC. H1325 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1991). Hearings on the proposal
have been held before the Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations. Hearings on H.R.
1218, The Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Manage-
ment Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). That
subcommittee approved the bill, as amended, for full committee action. 137 CONG. REC. D1474
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Article is to make a small contribution to the debate concerning those legisla-
tive proposals.
The legislation pending before Congress is certainly not a panacea for the
problem. For example, some workplace privacy concerns, such as worries
about genetic testing, must remain beyond the scope of legislation at this time.
In addition, increased flexibility is needed in certain aspects of pending legisla-
tive proposals.3 However, those proposals represent an important first step to-
wards a long-term solution.
A thorough analysis of each of the many technological devices available to
employers and the patchwork quilt of laws regulating the use of those devices
is beyond the scope of this Article. However, the need for federal legislation
cannot be communicated without some understanding of the current technol-
ogy4 in the American workplace and the laws that now regulate it., This un-
derstanding of technology and law reveals the delicate nature of the balance
(daily ed. Nov. 21, 1991). A revised version of H.R. 1218 was recently issued as a committee
print. See The Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, H.R. 1218, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)
(as reported by the Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations on November 20, 1991)
[hereinafter Revised House Bill].
On September 16, 1991, Rep. Douglas K. Bereuter, introduced a separate proposal by the same
name, The Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, H.R. 3340, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991),
and it was referred to the House Education and Labor Committee. 137 CONG. REc. H. 6601. It is
similar but not identical to H.R. 1218. See H.R. 3340, supra, § 9(b) (concerning the monitoring
of telephone calls). A proposal similar to H.R. 1218 was introduced in 1989 by Representative
William Clay but died in committee. H.R. 2168, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). At that time,
Representative Williams estimated that approximately 26 million workers were subject to com-
puter monitoring. See Telco Practices Hit; New Drive Launched in House to Protect Workers
from Electronic Monitoring, COMM. DAILY, June 12, 1991, at 3. Representative Clay was desig-
nated the sponsor of H.R. 2168; Representative Williams was a cosponsor. Id. Representative
Clay is now listed as a cosponsor of H.R. 1218. Id. On May 22, 1989, a letter was sent by
Representatives Clay, Williams, and Don Edwards to the other members of the House concerning
the introduction of H.R. 2168. That letter made reference to H.R. 1950, which had been intro-
duced but did not pass in the prior Congress. That proposal focused strictly on telephone monitor-
ing. See Frank C. Morris & Thomas R. Bagby, Possible Dangers in Tape Recording or Other
Monitoring of Employees, EMPLOYEE REL. TODAY, Summer 1987, at 173, 178 (summarizing
H.R. 1950, which would have amended the federal wiretapping law to prohibit employers from
list'ening in on employee work phone conversations without some warning (e.g., audible tone) to
the employee).
Rep. Ronald Dellums introduced a bill on June 6, 1989, called The Privacy Assurance Act of
1989, H.R. 2551, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). That bill, which died in committee, would have
amended the federal wiretapping statute to require consent of all parties to a conversation before
interception and would have required that all voice-activated tape recorders include beep tone
warning devices and a warning label. Finally, Rep. Pat Collins introduced a bill on January 3,
1989, called The Individual Privacy Protection Act, H.R. 126, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). That
proposal, which also died in committee, would have amended The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §
552a (1988), by establishing a permanent privacy protection board.
3. See infra part V (discussing inadequacies of legislative proposals pending before Congress).
4. See infra part I1.C (discussing the wide array of technologies available for employee moni-
toring and surveillance).
5. See infra part Ill (reviewing the patchwork quilt of statutory and common law remedies
available to employees for employer intrusions into the employee's privacy).
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that must be struck by Congress. As stated in a recent report on workplace
privacy, "Reconciling the need for increased information about employees
with expanding privacy rights is a problem of increasing importance in manag-
ing the changing work force of the 1990s. ' '6
In addressing this delicate balance, this Article first presents an overview of
the current state of artificial monitoring and surveillance in the American
workplace. The Article discusses competing employer and employee interests,
available technology, the extent of the current use of that technology, the dis-
tinction between that technology and human supervision, and the resulting im-
pact of technology on employees. Next, the Article presents an overview of the
existing regulatory maze governing artificial monitoring and surveillance of
employees in the private sector. To illustrate the inadequacy of the existing
legal structure, the Article examines federal and state law on eavesdropping
upon employee telephone calls and shows how an exception to the prohibition
on unauthorized "listening" virtually can swallow the rule. Other federal and
state limitations, such as those placed on polygraph examinations, are
presented in summary fashion in order to illustrate the myriad and inconsis-
tent laws affecting artificial monitoring and surveillance of employees, none of
which effectively and fairly regulates it.
In conjunction with this overview of the law, the Article examines the ade-
quacy of these existing legal limitations in light of the rapidly expanding role
of artificial monitoring and surveillance in the American workplace. Techno-
logical advances have occurred simultaneously with major changes in the na-
ture of the workplace. These changes include the erosion of the employment-
at-will doctrine, the decreasing unionized segment of the workforce, and in-
creasing demands for productivity, caused in part by competitive demands re-
sulting from international competition.
The Article then addresses the central question: Do these changes in tech-
nology and in the workplace warrant the enactment of a federal statute
designed to appropriately balance legitimate employer needs with the privacy
rights of the employee? It argues that the time has come to take on this legis-
lative task. The pace of technological development has clearly outstripped the
pace of legal developments,' and it is time to catch up.
6. RONALD E. BERENBEIM, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, INC., RES. REP. No. 945, EMPLOYEE PRI-
VACY, at v (1990) (quoting Preston Townley, President and CEO of The Conference Board); see
also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, PUB. No. 333, THE ELECTRONIC SU-
PERVISOR: NEW TECHNOLOGY, NEW TENSIONS, at 22 (1987) [hereinafter THE ELECTRONIC SU-
PERVISOR]. ("A major decision for Congress is whether the present balance between worker rights
and management requirements is reasonable, and, if not, if it can be satisfactorily accommodated
through stakeholder agreement, e.g., negotiations between labor and management in government
and the private sector. If the use of new technology is seen as weakening the voice of employees in
such negotiations, Congress may choose to take action to ensure a reasonable balance.").
7. See Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., The Surveillance Society: Information Technology and Bureau-
cratic Social Control, 39 J. COMM. 61, 61 (1989). As stated in that article, "The current legal
system is hopelessly inadequate to the challenge of controlling the 'technologies of control'." Id. at
62 (citing KEVIN G. WILSON, TECHNOLOGIES OF CONTROL: THE NEW INTERACTIVE MEDIA FOR
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
Finally, the Article examines legislative proposals now pending before the
United States Congress and presents recommendations for change.
II. ARTIFICIAL MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE OF EMPLOYEES IN
AMERICA-LEGITIMATE CONCERNS OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES
A. An Illustrative Hypothetical
Visualize a human resources director for a major retailer contemplating a
few among the multitude of personnel problems facing her employer in 1991.
Everything except profits seems to be escalating. Inventory shrinkage is up
markedly-the auditors say it is the employees, not shoplifters, who are the
primary source of the problem. Telephone expenses are increasing at a rate
not explainable by a corresponding increase in business activity. Employee
medical insurance premiums are on the rise-the underwriters say a plan to
decrease employee smoking might be a means to reduce premium costs. Law-
suits by injured customers are a growing concern-in one lawsuit, a customer
was injured by an escalator malfunction and the employee who serviced the
escalator may have been under the influence of cocaine. There has been a
surge in customer complaints about slow or inadequate service.
Management, as recommended by our human resources director, then im-
plements a comprehensive plan designed to turn the tables on these vexing
problems. The plan includes a system of video surveillance of employees at
work, biometric identification of employees entering and leaving the premises
in order to reduce theft loss, and a telephone accounting system to reduce
unauthorized personal calls. An employee "wellness" plan is implemented, in-
cluding a policy prohibiting smoking both at work and away from work. Com-
pliance is monitored by periodic pulmonary exams. A program to reduce em-
ployee drug abuse is a high priority of management and includes the testing of
all new employees, and testing for cause of existing employees. In order to
evaluate concerns about customer service, random monitoring of employee
telephone calls is undertaken in conjunction with another system to monitor
the computer keystrokes of catalog department employees.
In this era of corporate downsizing,8 our hypothetical human resource direc-
tor ultimately loses her job as part of a reduction-in-force. She applies with a
competitor of her old employer and her new employer thoroughly reviews her
background, including credit history and criminal record. She is hired after
successfully completing a battery of personality evaluations, pen and pencil
THE HOME (1988)); see also Robert W. Kastenmeier et al., Communications Privacy: A Legisla-
tive Perspective, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 715, 716 (arguing that the "legal protection against the unrea-
sonable use of modern surveillance techniques has not kept pace with technology"); Gary T.
Marx, Communications Advances Raise Privacy Concerns, CHRISTIAN SCi. MONITOR, Jan. 2,
1992, at 14 (A professor of sociology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology points out that
"[w]eak or inefficient technology is no longer an unplanned ally of liberty. The technology is
evolving faster than our laws, policies and manners can control it.").
8. Cindy Skrzycki, The Drive to Downsize; Trimming Is a Corporate Fact of Life-But There
Are Hazards, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1989, at HI.
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honesty exams, and drug tests.
She is delighted to have the opportunity to travel as required by the new
position but is bothered by the fact that the location and fuel consumption of
all company-owned vehicles is monitored by computer. Her office includes the
latest personal computing equipment but she is dismayed to learn, after having
been employed for a significant time, that software installed on the personal
computer network has allowed her immediate superior to review the contents
of her electronic mail and fax messages, and to call up her computer screen
onto his-without her knowledge of the intrusions. Her new position pays well
but the corresponding demands on her personal time are greater. Her em-
ployer expects to be able to reach her at all times and provides her with a
voice-activated paging system, a cellular phone in her company car, and a
personal computer with a modem for home use.
The resulting increased stress level for our human resources director soon
begins to cause health problems. She, as well as anyone, understands the de-
mands that have caused her employer to implement these systems for monitor-
ing and surveillance of its employees. Now, however, she questions whether
the decrease in her motivation and productivity caused by these monitoring
and surveillance techniques outweigh any potential benefits inuring to her
employer.
B. Compelling Reasons for Monitoring and Surveillance of Employees
This hypothetical illustrates the plethora of legitimate, yet competing, de-
mands that now raise a compelling question for Congress and the courts. Al-
though it is possible that there will be illegitimate use of modern technology to
carry out artificial monitoring and surveillance of employees, the compelling
question at this time is, assuming legitimate employer reasons, whether our
society is prepared to leave that process substantially unregulated.9
It is, of course, inevitable that some illegitimate use will occur. However,
that abuse does not now appear to be occurring on a large scale. A 1987 gov-
ernment report considered the possibility of such abuse of computer-based
monitoring of employees." The report specifically recognized the possibility of
illegitimate uses, such as frustration of union organizing efforts, circumvention
of employment discrimination laws via intensified scrutiny of protected em-
ployees, and identification of whistleblowers. That study concluded that there
is no significant evidence that these abuses are occurring on a large scale or
that artificial monitoring and surveillance lends itself more to illegal retalia-
9. See generally Jeffrey Rothfeder & Michele Galen, Is Your Boss Spying on You?, Bus.
WK., Jan. 15, 1990, at 74 (describing the "wide latitude for prying" given to employers by state
and federal law and describing some of the many legitimate reasons employers have to engage in
that prying, and labeling that scenario as "hottest employment law topic of the 1990s"); Michael
A. Verespej, How Much Can You 'Bug' Your Employees?: It's Becoming Increasingly Difficult to
Monitor Activity On or Off the Job, INDUSTRY WK., Aug. 7, 1989, at 65 (stating that "[r]ight
now the hottest of the privacy issues is electronic surveillance and monitoring").
10. THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 102-04.
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tion than other forms of technology.1" To the contrary, the most commonly
cited employer reasons for implementing artificial monitoring and surveillance
systems appear to be legitimate and are well within the acceptable scope of an
ordinary employer-employee relationship. 2
The efforts of employers to reduce losses caused by the shocking levels of
employee theft in the United States's provide a persuasive example of one
legitimate reason for the artificial monitoring and surveillance of employees.
Studies are not in complete agreement as to the exact total amount of cash
and merchandise lost each year to employee theft. Although some estimates
are as high as $200 billion per year, 4 $40 billion per year appears to be a
more common estimate.15 In any case, the losses are enormous, and employer
efforts to recoup those losses can be cost effective. In a study of the 1989
experience of a large group of major retailers, it was determined that the aver-
age value of merchandise recovered per apprehension was $1350 in the case of
employee theft compared to $196 in the case of customer theft. 6
Theft of tangible property, however, is not the only aspect of the employee
theft problem. A study by a nationwide personnel consulting firm indicates
that employees of American business stole $170 billion in employer time in
1989.17 In addition to the efforts of employers to protect their tangible prop-
erty and time, employers increasingly must take affirmative steps to protect
their interests in intangible property, such as trade secrets.18
11. Id.
12. See generally Elinor P. Schroeder, On Beyond Drug Testing: Employer Monitoring and the
Quest for the Perfect Worker, 36 KAN. L. REV. 869, 873 (1988) (recognizing that it is "axio-
matic" that employers have legitimate interests in production, discipline, and safety, which may
serve as a basis for monitoring).
13. See, e.g., John W. Jones, Megatrends in Integrity Testing, SECURITY MGMT., July 1990, at
27A, 29A (reporting on a 1989 study indicating that 60% of fast-food employees and 43% of
supermarket employees admit to stealing cash or property from their employers).
14. E.g.. David W. Arnold et al., Evaluating the Integrity Test, SECURITY MGMT., Apr. 1990,
at 62 (citing the results of a 1988 study of the National Business Crime Information Network on
American business losses due to employee theft).
15. E.g., June P. Schafer et al., The Ways and Means of Screening. SECURITY MGMT., July
1990, at 20A (citing a United States Commerce Department study).
16. An Ounce of Prevention, CHAIN STORE AGE EXECUTIVE, Jan. 1991, § 2, at 4, 5 (presenting
the results of an Ernst & Young annual study for the International Mass Retail Association); see
also Jack Hayes, Employee Theft Is No. I Problem Facing Today's Busy Retailers, DISCOUNT
STORE NEWS, Sept. 17, 1990, at 108 (estimating that employee theft may account for 38% to
43 % of retail store inventory shrinkage and opining that this may be a low estimate); Edward M.
Parker, An Inconvenient Problem, SECURITY MGMT., July 1990, at 26, 29 (reporting that the
primary cause of convenience store inventory shrinkage is employee theft).
17. Arnold et al., supra note 14, at 63 (reporting a study conducted by the consulting firm
Robert Half International).
18. See THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 103 n.58 (noting the necessity of moni-
toring the flow of information to protect employer's rights under the law of trade secrets); Chris-
tian Q. Dubia, Q & A: Christian Dubia; Attorney, McCauley & Dubia, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 1991,
at D4 (reporting the rising number of unfair competition lawsuits by employers against their
former employees). See generally Note, Addressing the New Hazards of the High Technology
Workplace. 104 HARV. L. REV. 1898, 1899-1902 (1991) (discussing the vulnerability of corpora-
[Vol. 41:739
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Although theft prevention may provide the most striking example of a legiti-
mate reason to conduct monitoring and surveillance, there are many addi-
tional, legitimate reasons that commonly are advanced. In an era of increasing
competitiveness, 19 particularly from foreign business, the demands on employ-
ers to increase the "bottom line" renders artificial monitoring and surveillance
particularly enticing.
In such an atmosphere, employers naturally seek to use technology to in-
crease employee productivity.20 Monitoring and surveillance technology may
increase productivity through enhanced ability to efficiently schedule personnel
and equipment."' Productivity increases may result from more effective evalu-
ation of employees for periodic pay increases, promotion, termination, or
transfer 2 or by providing prompt, objective feedback to employees.22 Or it
may result from minimizing substance abuse, both at the workplace and away
from the job. 24
tions to computer crime). Employees are the most common culprits in computer crime cases. Id.
at 1900 n.l 1. Congress has already enacted legislation aimed at curbing computer crime. See
generally Dodd S. Griffith, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986: A Measured Response
to a Growing Problem, 43 VAND. L. REV. 453 (1990).
19. E.g., Christopher Power et al., Value Marketing: Quality, Service and Fair Pricing Are the
Keys to Selling in the 90s, Bus. WK., Nov. 11, 1991, at 132.
20. THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 91. This reason may become even more
compelling in an era when many employers may perceive that the overall quality of available
employees has decreased. See, e.g., Peter T. Kilborn, Unseen Sentinels in the Workplace, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 1990, § I, at 1. Despite this perceived need to monitor for productivity reasons,
studies have not clearly determined whether these monitoring systems have a positive or negative
effect on productivity. See Rebecca Grant & Christopher Higgins, Monitoring Service Workers
via Computer: The Effect on Employees, Productivity, and Service, NAT'L PRODUCTIVITY REV.,
Spring 1989, at 101, 102 (stating that "[s]ome studies suggest favorable effects on productivity
while others indicate negative results"). An example of the use of artificial monitoring and surveil-
lance to enhance productivity is the practice of sharing computer screens in a network of personal
computers between the supervisor and the subordinate in order to allow training and coaching. See
Fickel, supra note 1, at 50.
21. THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 91.
22. Id. Evaluations arguably can be less tainted by human bias when based on results of artifi-
cial monitoring. Kilborn, supra note 20, at 1. Also, computerized monitoring systems may be
better at delivering negative information in a nonthreatening manner than a human supervisor.
Grant & Higgins, supra note 20, at 101.
23. Grant & Higgins, supra note 20, at 101. Feedback may arguably be given more regularly
and in closer proximity to the evaluated event when computer based systems rather than direct
human observations are utilized. Id. The process of monitoring employee keystrokes and providing
immediate feedback via computer is called coaching. See Marilyn Gardner, A Heroine-But Not
Full Time, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 18, 1991, at 13.
24. See PAYTON B. SCHUR & JAMES F. BRODER, INVESTIGATION OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE IN THE
WORKPLACE 11 (1990). In an "unscientific study" by the authors of approximately 6000 employ-
ees of firms that have been clients of the authors, it was determined that approximately 29% had
committed company policy violations over a five-year period. Id. These violations increase workers'
compensation costs, losses due to inventory shrinkage, quality control costs, absenteeism, and liti-
gation. Id. at 12-14. Problems of this nature led to the testing of approximately 8 million workers
in 1989 and an expectation that this number will triple by 1992. Cindy Skrzycki, Drug Testing
Industry Shows Its Wares; 100 Vendors Take Part in Conference on Checking Job Applicants,
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
Another attractive use for monitoring and surveillance technology is to em-
ploy it as one tool to meet increasing consumer demands25 for improvements in
product and service quality. 6 American business is so haunted by consumer
perceptions that it lags behind its foreign counterparts in this area. Again,
monitoring and surveillance technology is an attractive tool to repair this
perception.
Still another enticing attribute of the technology is its potential to reduce
costs. These costs run the gamut from the mundane, such as the control and
proper allocation of telephone expenses, to the more esoteric, such as control of
employer' liability under many liability theories. In addition to liability based
upon the common law principle of respondeat superior,2 7 employers now are
frequently sued by persons injured by employees based on negligent hiring,
retention, and referral theories. 28 First, an injured person may prevail under
these theories without proof that the employee of the defendant caused injury
to the plaintiff in the course and scope of that employee's employment. 29 Sec-
ond, these theories impose a continuing duty in the sense that they apply if the
employer was negligent in either the selection process or in the ongoing em-
ployment process." The availability of these theories substantially increases
WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1990, at Fl. In fact, 85% of those companies with more than 500 employ-
ees have implemented drug testing policies, according to the president of a national consulting
firm. Id.
25. Michael N. Cantwell, Global Competition: U.S. Industry's Hidden Advantages; The Tide
of Offshore Competition Is by No Means Irreversible, INDUSTRY WK., Oct. 7, 1991, at 45.
26. E.g., Fickel, supra note I, at 50 (reporting on a major airline using screen-sharing capabili-
ties in a computer network to monitor service quality without notification of employees); Gary T.
Marx & Sanford Sherizen, Monitoring on the Job: How to Protect Privacy as Well as Property,
TECH. REV., Nov./Dec. 1986, at 62, 66 (quoting an official of a credit card division of a major
bank who claims, "I monitor everything that moves").
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957).
28. See Donald J. Petersen & Douglas Massengill, The Negligent Hiring Doctrine-A Growing
Dilemma for Employers, 15 EMPLOYMENT REL. L.J, 419, 419 (1989/1990) (referring to a "dra-
matic increase" in the number of lawsuits based on negligent hiring); Cathie A. Shattuck, The
Tort of Negligent Hiring and the Use of Selection Devices: The Employee's Right of Privacy and
the Employer's Need To Know, II INDUS. REL. L.J. 2 (1989); Janet Swerdlow, Negligent Refer-
ral: A Potential Theory For Employer Liability, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1645 (1991). Twenty-nine
states now recognize this theory of recovery. Petersen & Massengill, supra, at 419 n.l. Most of
the lawsuits based on this theory have been filed in the last eight years. Id. at 419 n.2.
The essence of negligent hiring or retention liability stems from knowingly hiring (or
retaining) an individual who is incompetent and/or possesses unreasonable risk to
others. Hence, the primary way to avoid such liability is to conduct proper screening
and investigation of prospective employees (or to discipline or discharge an employee
who has been hired, but is clearly incompetent or poses a danger to others).
Id. at 428-29; see also James W. Fenton, Negligent Hiring/Retention Adds to Human Resource
Woes, PERSONNEL J., April 1990, at 62 (reporting that, although this is not a new theory, its
"prominence is growing"); John Hoerr, Privacy, Bus. WK., Mar. 28, 1988, at 61 (reporting on a
1985 verdict of $750,000 against a car rental agency whose employee assaulted a customer and
the evidence showed the rental agency had ignored information about its employee's irascibility).
29. See Petersen & Massengill, supra note 28, at 420.
30. See Fenton, supra note 28, at 62.
[Vol. 41:739
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the impetus for employers to be meticulous in both the hiring and evaluation
of employees through the use of screening and monitoring technology. In addi-
tion to potential civil liability, employers have an additional motivation to
screen and monitor employees to avoid criminal responsibility. Such criminal
liability may, in limited circumstances, be based on the failure of that man-
ager to adequately supervise another employee; 3 in the case of a corporate
employer, the criminal acts of the employee may be imputed to the
employer. 2
The possible methods of cost control offered by this technology are seem-
ingly endless. In an era of soaring insurance premiums, consider the additional
potential savings derived through monitoring worker safety. 3 A thorough
monitoring of worker safety may reduce insurance premiums," ' worker's com-
pensation claims, medical premiums, and fuel costs
3 5
Artificial monitoring and surveillance is also a tool used to comply with
many recordkeeping duties imposed by law. Many statutes place affirmative
duties upon employers to collect information about employees and to maintain
records of compliance with those requirements. 6 Also, the legal obligation of
an employer to protect the confidentiality of employee records," in certain
31. United States v. Parks, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (holding that the manager of a corporation, as
well as the corporation itself, may be criminally prosecuted under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301(k) (1988), for introducing misbranded, adulterated foods into
commerce).
32. See F. LEE BAILEY & HENRY B. ROTHBLATT, DEFENDING BUSINESS AND WHITE COLLAR
CRIME-FEDERAL AND STATE § 338 (1969) (stating that a corporation "may be criminally liable
for the acts of its officers or agents done by them while exercising authorized powers").
33. See THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 34-36 (illustrating the beneficial as-
pects of employee monitoring).
34. See Janet Novack, Abuse Control, FORBES, June 10, 1991, at 98. The article reports on a
database developed by one major corporation that integrates the personnel, medical, and disability
records of its many employees. This integrated approach to monitoring the medical experiences of
its employees is designed to enable it to identify those employees who abuse medical benefits and
those physicians who prescribe unnecessary tests.
35. See Rothfeder & Galen, supra note 9, at 74 (reporting that a major grocery chain places
dashboard computers on its trucks to record speed, oil pressure, engine RPM, idling time, and the
fact and length of stops).
36. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (1988) (mandating that employers keep
employee records); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 657(c) (1988)
(mandating that employers keep employee records); 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (1988) (establishing employment verification system); see, e.g., THE ELEC-
TRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 103 n.55 (reporting reliance by American Express on its
computerized monitoring system to ensure compliance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act); Tony
Mauro & Julia Lawlor, Do Workers Have Private Lives? More Bosses Set Rules for After
Hours, USA TODAY, May 13, 1991, at IA (reporting on certain companies, such as transporta-
tion companies, which are required by law to test employees for drug use). See generally KURT H.
DECKER, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE 18-20, 455-58 (1987) (discussing these affirm-
ative duties and providing an appendix of examples of federal statues containing record and re-
porting requirements that affect employee privacy).
37. See THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 94 (noting that "leakiness is a factor in
determining the legality of certain information practices").
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circumstances, may be furthered by monitoring and surveillance.
C. The Nearly Irresistible Menu of Artificial Monitoring and Surveillance
Options Available to Employers
There is not a precise meaning given by the law to the term "artificial moni-
toring and surveillance" 8 that this Article uses to describe its subject matter.
However, the menu of space-age artificial monitoring and surveillance options
now available to serve the plethora of legitimate employer purposes described
above is impressive in both its breadth and rate of growth. As stated in a
recent news story:
To hear it from the mavens of commercial surveillance, there is no such
thing as paranoia; your worst fears are probably true. If you think someone
is taping your phone calls, bugging your office or reading what's in your
computer, you are probably right. The fire sprinkler in the ceiling could be a
camera; the person on the phone who says she is "Judy from accounting"
could be an imposter; the janitor could be a private investigator ready for a
session of "dumpster diving." 9
38. Grant & Higgins note:
There is no widely accepted definition of computerized performance monitoring.
Terms like "worker monitoring," "electronic surveillance," "performance monitor-
ing," and "worker surveillance" have all been used to describe various systems. Ac-
cording to the Office of Technology Assessment, there are three broad categories of
monitoring systems: those that focus on performance, such as measuring keystrokes,
use of computer time, or the content of telephone conversations; those that focus on
behaviors, such as measuring use of resources, tracking of worker location via identifi-
cation badges, testing predisposition to error (e.g., drug testing); and those that focus
on employee characteristics, such as state of health and truthfulness.
Grant & Higgins, supra note 20, at 102. Although not limiting itself to the workplace, a recent
article conveys well the breadth of the capabilities of the technology potentially falling within the
scope of the term "artificial monitoring and surveillance." The author states:
These devices serve a variety of purposes, from noting the presence or absence of
persons or objects to determining their identity or status, including their state of
mind. Cameras now require little or no light, and microminiaturized versions can be
easily hidden from sight; listening devices can hear conversations in rooms hundreds
of yards away; and scientific instruments can examine bodily fluids and genetic mate-
rial at the molecular level. We include here the scanners that read the Universal
Products Code ("UPC") on commercial products in the supermarket as well as the
infrared detectors that count the number of patrons for museum exhibits. The com-
mon quality is that these devices are more sensitive than ever before and overcome
previous limits on time, space, and distance in gathering information about individu-
als. Associated technologies also allow for the storage, retrieval, and processing of
these data gained through surveillance of the environment.
Gandy, supra note 7, at 62; see also THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 14 (stating
that "all these information-gathering techniques are on a continuum with no clear boundaries").
39. Megan Rosenfeld, At Surveillance Expo, Sneak Peeks at the Sweet Spy and Buy; Helpful
Hints for Those Who Snoop to Conquer, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1989, at F5 (reporting on some of
the devices available to thwart employees trying to sell intellectual property, retaliate against a
superior, or embezzle).
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One result of browsing through this impressive menu is a nearly irresistible
temptation to deal with the resulting legal issues by selecting one category of
technology offered on the menu and addressing it in isolation. Unfortunately,
this is the approach our legal system has generally taken in the past.'0 The
undesirable result has been that technology remains at least one step ahead of
the law. Another disadvantage of a device-specific approach is that, as illus-
trated below, the categories overlap in so many respects that it becomes un-
duly confusing to determine what practices properly fall within the scope of
the category chosen. For example, is genetic screening a medical testing tech-
nique appropriately governed by federal statutes applicable to discrimination
against disabled persons, or is it properly within the scope of legislation, such
as that advocated by this Article, regulating artificial monitoring and
surveillance?
One common method of breaking down this complex menu into manageable
categories is to distinguish between the terms "monitoring" and "surveil-
lance."' 1 In the workplace, the term "monitor" generally connotes observation
undertaken to determine whether an employee is completing an assigned func-
tion in an appropriate manner." For example, did the sales clerk handle the
transaction in an efficient and courteous manner? By contrast, other types of
technology are designed primarily for surveillance purposes. The term "sur-
veillance" generally connotes observation to determine employee behaviors and
personal characteristics,' 3 such as whether an employee violated a work rule.
For example, did the sales clerk pocket part of the cash proceeds of the trans-
action? Although distinguishing the terms may be useful for some purposes,
the meaning of "artificial monitoring and surveillance" for purposes of this
Article encompasses systems designed for monitoring purposes as well as sys-
tems designed for surveillance purposes. It includes but goes beyond electronic
monitoring or computer-based monitoring, which is often used to refer to the
electronic observation and recording of the work performed by employees on a
computer keyboard.
Another frequently cited distinction in discussions of these technological de-
velopments is between work monitoring and worker monitoring.", The broad
definition of artificial monitoring and surveillance used in this Article includes
both work monitoring (work measurement)' and worker monitoring (worker
testing)."' Work monitoring focuses on the events that actually occur in the
workplace and are related to performance of services for the employer. For
40. For example, the federal statute regulating the use of polygraph examinations in the work-
place is known as the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009
(1988). See infra part II.A.6 (discussing the protections for employees offered by this act). This
type of legislation is often referred to as "device specific legislation."
41. See Grant & Higgins, supra note 20, at 108-09.
42. Id. at 108.
43. Id. at 109.
44. THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 13.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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example, computer software used to count employee keystrokes is commonly
described as work monitoring. By contrast, worker monitoring focuses on de-
termining the individual characteristics of the employee in order to determine
the employee's suitability to perform a particular function.' 7 Thus, informa-
tion gathering techniques in this worker-monitoring category include poly-
graph tests, drug tests, genetic tests, and brain-wave scanning.' 8
There is obviously an overlap between work monitoring and worker monitor-
ing in even the most basic forms.' 9 For example, a supervisor personally ob-
serving work performance and recording the results on a sheet of paper has
the opportunity to both record actual output, such as the number of transac-
tions processed, and to form opinions about characteristics of the employee
likely to effect the employee's future productivity. Therefore, any comprehen-
sive legal solution designed to deal effectively and fairly with the multitude of
issues raised by artificial monitoring and surveillance in the workplace must
consider forms of technology labeled as a work monitoring device or a worker
monitoring device.
A distinction is also frequently made between content monitoring and trans-
actional monitoring. Once again, aspects of both terms must be taken into
account in any comprehensive solution. Monitoring may merely be undertaken
to identify the specific transactions completed by an employee, but modern
techniques often allow experts to use this kind of transactional information to
create a personality profile or dossier concerning that individual.5" In other
words, a sufficient quantity of transactional information may become content
information."
The types of artificial monitoring and surveillance that fall within the scope
of this broad definition, and that are now commonly used in the workplace,"
extend nearly as far as your imagination will carry you. 53 For example, a re-
47. Id.
48. Id. at 14.
49. Id.
50. See John Markoff, Ideas & Trends; Remember Big Brother? Now He's a Company Man,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1991, § 4, at 7.
51. THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 5 (pointing out that the common practice
of telephone call accounting has the potential to be used to build a "profile" of an individual
employee, which could then be used to harass that employee).
52. See generally BARBARA GARSON, THE ELECTRONIC SWEATSHOP ch. 8 (1988) (describing
the reactions of both managers and their subordinates to various types of electronic surveillance);
SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, IN THE AGE OF THE SMART MACHINE: THE FUTURE OF WORK AND POWER
322-37 (1988) (describing the danger that various forms of modern technology will be used simply
to control employees rather than to make jobs more rewarding to employees).
53. A frightening scenario of the potential of the combined use of a large number of these
various techniques is presented by a hypothetical personnel policy discussed in a recent issue of
the Harvard Business Review. See Gary T. Marx, The Case of the Omniscient Organization,
HARV. Bus. REV., Mar./Apr. 1990, at 12. In that case the fictional employer, competing in a
global market and facing the possibility of layoffs, adopts the recommendations of an employee-
relations firm and implements personnel policies designed to improve productivity and quality
while reducing employee turnover, health-care costs, workplace accidents, employee theft, em-
ployee drug use and leaks to competitors. Id. The policy includes multiple techniques to screen
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cent news report indicates that some employers are even using special chairs to
measure worker wiggling,54 presumably based on the premise that more wig-
gling means less working. Another report indicates that some employers are
using subliminal messages on video display terminals to motivate workers. 55
It is not the purpose of this Article to advocate inclusion, at this time, of all
of these techniques within the scope of the proposed legislation. Given the cur-
rent status of the law, that is simply not feasible. Rather, the purpose of dis-
cussing these techniques is twofold. First, the legislation should include as
many of these techniques as possible while providing flexibility to cover those
we have not yet imagined. Second, review of these techniques serves to remind
us that we need to consider comprehensive workplace privacy legislation en-
compassing all of these techniques.
When the term artificial monitoring and surveillance is used in this broad
sense-any form of observation, collection of information, or analysis of data
not accomplished through the sensory perception of the individual supervi-
sor-the array of techniques in this category borders upon the overwhelming.
Many of these techniques, when undertaken with the consent of the employee
potential new employees and monitor existing employees. Potential and actual employees are in-
formed of the use and the reasons behind these techniques, which even extend to employee activi-
ties away from the employer's business location. The techniques include medical and psychological
testing at the entry level combined with database searching for educational, credit, automobile
driving, health, military, and worker's compensation information in order to create a "predictive
profile" of the potential employee; comparison of that profile to the features of the best employees;
periodic pulmonary exams, urinalysis, and other medical tests to monitor long term health; sub-
liminal messages on personal computers combined with aromatic and musical enhancement of the
workplace; keystroke monitoring; video and audio surveillance; telephone call accounting and call
blocking; building access systems; computerized vehicle monitoring; and the use of pagers,
beepers, personal computers with modems, and fax messages to keep in contact with the employee
away from the employers place of business. Id. It is tempting to think of these techniques as
futuristic. However, as one of the, experts who evaluated this hypothetical noted:
Dominion-Swann Industries sounds like a futuristic workplace, where life is saturated
with computers that measure everything from your productivity to your heartbeat,
where dreams of a perfectly ordered, clockwork world, shorn of human conflict, can
come true. But DS already exists. Its technology strategy is widely adhered to. Some
elements of its organizational strategy have been practiced for over 100 years. Others
have been implemented and perfected throughout the 1980s.
Id. (emphasis added) (comments of Shoshana Zuboff, associate professor at the Harvard Business
School and author of In the Age of the Smart Machine: The Future of Work and Power (1988)).
As another of the experts evaluating that hypothetical noted, "DS's policies are discriminatory,
invasive and counterproductive. And though few companies implement such an impressive pack-
age of organizational and technological measures, all of these policies exist in one form or an-
other in American businesses-with poor results." Id. (emphasis added) (comments of Karen
Nussbaum, Executive Director of 9to5, National Association of Working Women). See generally
Leslie Papp, Working Under the Electronic Eye-Is It Big Brother or a Necessary Management
Tool?, TORONTO STAR, July 27, 1991, at DI (providing an analysis of recent technology and its
importance to employers).
54. See Rothfeder & Galen, supra note 9, at 74.
55. Gary T. Marx, The Company Is Watching You Everywhere, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1987, §
4, at 21.
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or prospective employee, should not be within the scope of the legislative pro-
posal analyzed by this Article. Examples include substance-abuse testing,"
psychological testing techniques 57 (such as personality testing), 58 "paper and
pencil honesty examinations,' 59 polygraph examinations,60  medical screen-
56. See THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 14 (referring to the testing of "millions
of private employees"). See generally Eric R. Greenberg, Workplace Testing: Who's Testing
Whom?, PERSONNEL, May 1989, at 39 (reporting on a survey by the American Management
Association Research Reports in December 1988 of 1005 firms demonstrating a "dramatic" in-
crease in drug testing, i.e., 48% used drug testing in 1988 as opposed to 21 % in 1986 and 37% in
1987). Most employers who test appear to test all newly hired employees and to test existing
employees only for cause, but there are many variations in policies. Id.; Paul L. Blocklyn, Preem-
ployment Testing, PERSONNEL, Feb. 1988, at 66 (reporting on a survey to which 142 human
resources managers responded indicating that 18 % used some form of preemployment alcohol or
drug test in their business). Note that all the artificial monitoring and surveillance techniques
described in this section can theoretically be used at any stage of the employment process. For
example, although drug testing is more common for newly hired employees, it might also be used
in the case of an application of an existing employee for a promotion.
57. See Schafer et al., supra note 15, at 23A. The financial cost to an employer of an error at
the hiring stage is illustrated by the cost of replacing employees. It is estimated that it can cost
from $5000 for an hourly employee to $75,000 for a managerial-level employee in lost productiv-
ity and training time when an employee leaves his employer after a few months of employment.
Marlene Brown, More Than a Gut Feeling, SECURITY MGMT., Sept. 1990, at 105, 105. Similarly,
other experts estimate that replacing a competent employee will cost 300 to 700 hundred times
that person's hourly pay. Kate Bertrand, Hiring Tests: Sales Managers' Dream or Nightmare?,
Bus. MARKETING, July 1990, at 34.
58. See Blocklyn, supra note 56, at 66 (reporting a survey to which 147 human resources man-
agers responded, the results indicating that 20% used some form of personality or psychological
testing in their business). Similarly, a 1990 survey by American Management Association Re-
search Reports using a much larger sample reported that 20.6% of employers use psychological or
behavioral testing. Justin Martin, Workplace Testing: Why Can't We Get It Right?, ACROSS THE
BOARD, Dec. 1990, at 33, 35.
59. There has been an upsurge in the use of "paper and pencil honesty tests," or "integrity
tests." The reasons for this increase include increasing liability concerns of former employers in
conveying information to new employers and the passage of the Employee Polygraph Protection
Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. § 2001-2009 (1988), and similar state legislation. See Robert Moore &
Robert M. Stewart, Evaluating Employee Integrity: Moral and Methodological Problems, 2 EMP.
REsPs. & RTS. J. 203, 204 (1989); see also, e.g., Martin, supra note 58, at 66 (1990 survey by
American Management Association Research Reports drawing from a sample of 1021 companies
in eight industries showed that 16.4% use pencil and paper honesty testing). However, some test-
ing experts express serious concern about the predictive capability of these tests. Id. at 213-14.
See generally Robin Inwald, Those "Little White Lies" of Honesty Test Vendors, PERSONNEL,
June 1990, at 52, 52 (arguing that properly designed written tests are one of the best sources of
data upon which to base hiring decisions but also pointing out their limitations, the potential for
unfairness, and the excessive claims as to their reliability being made by vendors). By contrast,
other experts argue that they are highly reliable and that the upsurge in use has occurred because
they are a nondiscriminatory and reliable device that may be used by employers as an effective
response to increasing losses due to employee dishonesty. Arnold et al., supra note 14, at 63-64;
Bertrand, supra note 57, at 34.
60. See THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 14 (reporting 2 million exams annually
by 1990); Blocklyn, supra note 56, at 66 (reporting a 1988 survey to which 147 human resources
managers responded, indicating that I I % used some form of lie detector, psychological stress
evaluator, or honesty test for employment applicants in their businesses). But see Martin, supra
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ing,61 screening of employees for high cholesterol levels,62 genetic screening6"
and mapping,64 brain wave testing,65 credit reports (including "investigative
note 58, at 35 (reporting a 1990 survey by American Management Association Research Reports
indicating that only 3.7% of employers now engage in polygraph testing). The use of the poly-
graph is expected to decline dramatically following the passage of the Employee Polygraph Pro-
tection Act of 1988. See Greenberg, supra note 56, at 41.
61. See Frank Swoboda, Ripe for Discrimination: Medical Risks, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1990,
at H3. A substantial number of employers use medical screening. Some reports estimate that as
many as nearly one-half of all employers use medical screening. Id. It is, however, relatively rare
for employers to test for HIV antibodies. E.g., Greenberg, supra note 56, at 43 (reporting a survey
of 1005 firms by the American Management Association Research Reports in December 1988,
which found that testing for the presence of HIV antibodies, commonly called AIDS testing, is
relatively rare, with only 7.5% of the respondents indicating that they utilize such tests).
62. Paul Thiel, Brave New Medicine, GEORGIA TREND, Dec. 1990, at 44.
63. These tests are designed to identify specific genetic traits that render the individual tested
particularly susceptible to certain diseases, such as cancer. In other words, they do not test
whether an individual has a disease or has chosen to engage in behavior likely to cause them to
contract a disease but instead test whether that person's particular genetic makeup renders it
likely that they will be stricken. See Ellen Pierce, The Regulation of Genetic Testing in the Work-
place-A Legislative Proposal, 46 OHIo ST. L.J. 771 (1985) (proposing a specific federal statute
to regulate this practice); see also THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 14 (reporting
that this type of screening was only being used in a "few workplaces" in 1990); Hoerr, supra note
28, at 61 (reporting the potential of these tests to indicate a prospective employee's genetic predis-
position to certain diseases but concluding "that as far as anyone knows, no companies now use
the tests to deny employment"); Genetic Check for Jobs, NEWSDAY, Oct. 13, 1991, at 16 (report-
ing a range of $200 to $1000 for tests and that few employees are using them, but pointing out
that rising health-care costs could change that pattern). Legislation is pending in Congress that
would regulate this area in a limited manner. See H.R. 2045, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). This
proposal, introduced by Rep. John Conyers, is known as the Human Genome Privacy Act. It has
been referred to the House Government of Operations Committee. 137 CONG. REC. H2534 (daily
ed. Apr. 24, 1991). The proposal is similar to the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1988),
in the sense that it would apply only to genetic information maintained by the federal government
and would protect the privacy rights of individuals with respect to genetic information in the
hands of the federal government.
64. The "human genetic landscape" is known as our genome. Robert A. Weinberg, The Dark
Side of the Genome, TECH. REV., Apr. 1991, at 44, 45. Scientists have undertaken the process of
mapping this landscape and identifying variations known as polymorphisms. Scientists then look
for associations between these polymorphic markers and specific traits of individuals. Id. at 45.
For example, researchers have already identified the polymorphic marker leading to Huntington's
disease. Id. What dangers does this create in the workplace? See generally Tom Fennell, Nearing
the Final Frontier; Science Can Re-Engineer the Embryo, MACLEAN'S, July 15, 1991, at 37 (rais-
ing the possibility that discrimination based on genetics could occur in the workplace); Daniel F.
Jennings, Is Genetic Testing Legitimate Screening or Discrimination, AM. PAPERMAKER, Sept.
1991, at 56; Jennifer Landes, Sides Drawn Up on Genetic Testing, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Dec.
10, 1990 (Life & Health/Fin. Services ed.), at 2 (discussing the potential for discrimination on
prohibited bases due to genetic testing). Experts predict that this decade will bring the ability to
predict by routine tests the predisposition of individuals to certain diseases (e.g., cancer,
Alzheimers, diabetes) and the likelihood that individuals will develop certain traits (e.g., intelli-
gence, moodiness). Weinberg, supra, at 45.
This sort of information has enormous potential economic value to employers who are worried
about the skyrocketing costs of employee health insurance plans, the susceptibility of individual
employees to dangers such as chemicals in the workplace, and maintaining the most qualified
workforce possible. Experts, however, do not agree on the likely accuracy of these genetic screen-
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reports"), 6 testing for specific job-related skills, 67 pulmonary capacity testing
ing devices. E.g., Employers Shouldn't Use Gene Tests: AMA Report, NAT'L UNDERWRITER
PROP. & CASUALTY, Oct. 14, 1991 (Risk & Benefits Mgmt. ed.), at 49 (reporting on an American
Medical Association report advising employers not to use genetic tests as a condition for employ-
ment); Rochelle Green, Discrimination by DNA; Possible Consequences of Genetic Testing,
HEALTH, Jan. 1990, at 86 (reporting the opinion of a geneticist that genetic information is an
unreliable predictor of risk). Therefore, the possibility exists that workers will be excluded from
employment, treated less favorably on the job, or terminated due to their genetic predisposition,
which may or may not be an accurate predictor of future performance. Apparently, this dire
scenario has not yet materialized. A recent study by the United States government shows little
current use of genetic testing in the workplace and little change in use since 1982. OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, PUB. No. 455, GENETIC MONITORING AND SCREEN-
ING IN THE WORKPLACE 22-23 (1990); see also David Brown, Individual 'Genetic Privacy' Seen
as Threatened; Officials Say Explosion of Scientific Knowledge Could Lead to Misuse of Infor-
mation, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1991, at A6 (discussing Office of Technology Assessment Report);
Thiel, supra note 62, at 44 (reporting that there is little evidence to date that employers are
abusing this technology); Few Employers Use Genetic Screening or Monitoring, Despite Improved
Tests, GENETIC TECH. NEWS, Feb. 1991, at 3. However, some employers are now using genetic
testing. E.g., Richard Saltus, Bias Issue Looms over Insurers; Creating Another Underclass, BOS-
TON GLOBE, Nov. 12, 1990, at 33 (reporting on an employee excluded from his employer's health
insurance plan because of a mutant gene carried by both the employee and his son). Further, it is
likely that a surge in use by employers will take place as the tests become more affordable. See
Mary Sit, Will Genetic Mapping Threaten Workers' Privacy?, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 21, 1990, at
23 (reporting that genetic tests for inherited illness now cost $2000 to $3000 per test, but the cost
per test will soon be lowered to about $100 for certain tests).
The wide spread use now by United States employers of medical screening examinations for
potential employees is likely a precursor of the widespread use of genetic testing. E.g., Swoboda,
supra note 61, at H3 (reporting that nearly one-half of United States employers now require
medical screening examinations for job applicants). The use of these tests is limited by some state
laws. Id. (reporting on a New Jersey statute prohibiting employment discrimination based on
atypical hereditary, cellular, or blood traits). A statute prohibiting the use of genetic testing to
deny employment or insurance was recently passed by the California legislature and vetoed by
Governor Wilson. See Gov. Wilson Vetoes Measure To Bar Use of Genetic Testing To Deny
Insurance, Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 1907 (Oct. 21, 1991). Furthermore, some limits on the
use of these tests may exist under federal law in the case of employers who are federal contractors
by virtue of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, 794 (1988). Additional limitations
may apply when the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1988
& Supp. 11 1990), becomes applicable to many private employers in July 1992. The Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission recently issued final regulations effective July 26, 1992, as
required by section 106 of the Americans With Disabilities Act. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1991). How-
ever, those regulations do not expressly bar discrimination based on genetic testing. See Thomas
H. Maugh, Discovery of Alzheimers Gene Stirs Ethics Debate, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1991, at Al;
House Panel Considers Job Bias Due to Genetic Characteristics, Daily Rep. For Executives
(BNA) No. 202, at A14 (Oct. 18, 1991). However, the extent to which these federal statutes limit
genetic screening and testing is far from clear.
65. See THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 14 (although in the research stage at
the time of that report, predicting that mapping could be used to predict illness or to determine an
employee's concentration ability).
66. See Mauro & Lawlor, supra note 36, at IA (reporting that the limitations in federal law on
the use of polygraphs in employment decisions has increased reliance on the use of credit checks).
See generally Jeffrey Rothfeder, Is Nothing Private? Computers Hold Lots of Data on You and
There Are Few Limits on Its Use, Bus. WK., Sept. 4, 1989, at 74 (discussing the lack of effective
limits on the use of credit reports).
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to monitor smoking habits,68 monitoring of employee weight, 9 criminal record
checks,70 and reports concerning an employee's history of prior worker's com-
pensation claims.71 These techniques are beyond the scope of this legislation
because it simply is not practical to envision such comprehensive workplace
privacy legislation in the immediate future. However, it is possible to envision
such legislation being enacted in the long term, and sight should not be lost of
the fact that all of these techniques are elements of a single workplace privacy
problem.
These numerous exclusions do not, however, leave an insignificant number
of common practices to be regulated by the proposed law. Telephone monitor-
ing is perhaps the most obvious inclusion. It includes both call accounting and
service observation. Telephone call accounting72 involves monitoring of the
time, duration, destination, and cost of telephone calls for many purposes, in-
cluding limiting personal phone use by employees. Such monitoring has been
made possible on a large scale by the proliferation of new communication
technology such as digital private branch exchanges, known as PBXs.7 Tele-
67. See Blocklyn, supra note 56, at 67 (reporting a survey to which 147 human resources man-
agers responded, indicating that 55% of the respondents use some form of simulated work-activity
testing in the preemployment screening process in their business). Similarly, a 1990 survey by
American Management Association Research Reports indicates that 44.9% of employers use job-
competency testing such as typing and spelling tests. Martin, supra note 58, at 35. These high
usage rates are likely the result of the acceptance by human resources experts of these tests as
accurate predictors of job performance. See Brown, supra note 57, at 105.
68. See Marx, supra note 53, at 13 (reporting on a company using periodic pulmonary exams
to measure lung capacity); Mauro & Lawlor, supra note 36, at IA (reporting on the termination
of a payroll clerk when a routine urine examination revealed nicotine in connection with a pro-
gram to reduce health care costs); Thiel, supra note 62, at 44 (reporting on the no-smoking policy
both at work and away from work of a major broadcasting company).
69. See Stop Bosses' Invasion of Workers' Privacy, USA TODAY, May 13, 1991, at 6A (re-
porting on a major United States corporation fining overweight workers).
70. The practical necessity for an employer to verify the information on a job applicant's re-
sume or application is demonstrated by the large percentage of employees who falsify this infor-
mation. Sixty percent of university and college registrars report that they regularly experience
attempts to document false credentials. See Schafer et al., supra note 15, at 20A. Similarly, it is
estimated that approximately one-third of job applicants falsify their applications. Id. at 21A. In
fact, some employers are going as far as using private detectives, often armed with an arsenal of
high technology information, to check on the background of job applicants. See Aurora M. Arm-
strong, Private Eyes, Private Lives; Detectives: As New Privacy Laws Restrict Access to Personal
Information, Technology Has Become More Important, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1990, at JIO.
71. See, e.g., John Kamp, Preemployment Screening Can Cut Employers' Losses, NAT'L UN-
DERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY (Risk & Benefits Mgmt. ed.), Aug. 20, 1990, at 32, 48 (reporting
on the availability of private services that will search workers' compensation records for approxi-
mately $10 per search). But see infra part Ill A.3 (discussing the regulation of this practice by
the Americans with Disabilities Act).
72. See BERENBEIM, supra note 6, at 9 (finding that 15% of the respondents to the survey
described in that report monitored the electronic communications of employees to determine non-
business use); THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 11-12 (reporting that the industry
which produces call-accounting equipment and software is the fastest growing segment of the
telecommunications industry in recent years).
73. THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 87 (PBXs permit standard message detail
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phone service observation,"4 by contrast, refers to actually listening in on the
telephone calls of employees and recording these calls.
Computer-based monitoring, 78 such as counting of the number of keystrokes
by an employee, is also widely used and appropriately within the ambit of the
proposed legislation. The development of software to "integrate" a series of
individual personal computers into one "network" '6 and then to allow the
monitoring of the activities of the individuals working on those computers has
made this feasible on a large scale.7 7 Some of the available software allows
managers to "share screens" with their subordinates, in some cases without
the subordinates' knowledge.7 8
In addition to telephone and computer based monitoring, a wide variety of
additional techniques allow the employer to track employee activity, often
without the employee's knowledge that the surveillance is taking place or that
records are being maintained. Computerized systems are often designed to re-
place manually processed time cards and to allow supervisors to monitor em-
ployee activity, including time spent on breaks.7 9 For example, these systems
recording, which accounts for the telephone that was the source of the call, the access code used to
make the call, the telephone to which the call was made, and the duration of the call).
74. See Merrill Goozner, Phone Monitoring-A Fairness, Privacy Call. CHI. TRIB., Aug. 27,
1990, § 3, at 1 (reporting on the common practice of supervisors secretly listening in on the phone
calls of subordinates); Robert P. Hey, ACLU Says Laws Needed to Ensure US Workers Privacy
On and Off Job, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 28, 1990, (United States), at 4 (reporting on the
common practice of listening in on workers' calls in the telephone and travel industries without
telling the worker).
75. See SHARON DANAAN, 9To5, WORKING WOMEN'S EDUCATION FUND, INC., STORIES OF
MISTRUST AND MANIPULATION: THE ELECTRONIC MONITORING OF THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE
1-2 (1990) (reporting on various types of computer-based monitoring such as nurses who carry
small computers to enter procedure codes with their efficiency level analyzed based on time spent
per patient). See generally THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 27-58 (discussing in
detail the kind of work typically subjected to this monitoring and the extent to which this is now
being undertaken in the American workplace).
76. Often known as local area networks or LANs.
77. Tara Sexton & Bob Enyart, LAN Remotes vs. the Rights of Privacy; Remote Data Base
Servers, PC WK., Mar. 27, 1989, at 56. An advertisement for this type of software in a computer
magazine recently touted this product as follows:
"Close-Up LAN brings you a level of control never before possible. It connects PCs
on your network giving you the versatility to instantly share screens and keyboards...
• You decide to look in on Sue's computer screen .... Sue won't even know you are
there! . . . All from the comfort of your chair."
Marx, supra note 53, at 30 (comments of Karen Nussbaum, Executive Director of 9to5, National
Association of Working Women, quoting an advertisement in the March 13, 1989, issue of PC
Week); see also THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 5 (noting that network systems
provide a broad capacity to monitor work performed at computer terminals); Gene Bylinksy, How
Companies Spy on Employees, FORTUNE, Nov. 4, 1991, at 131 (discussing "Peek," which permits
supervisor access to employee screens with employee approval, and "Spy," which can allow that
access without employee approval).
78. Fickel, supra note 1, at 50 (describing the "notification option" software now commercially
available).
79. See Peter Krahe, Computers Put New Punch in Time Clocks, PERSONNEL J., Feb. 1989, at
46 (reporting that these systems allow the supervisor to simply ask the system "Who's there?" at
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may be programmed to prevent employees from logging in earlier than the
time at which they are scheduled to begin work.80
Similar monitoring devices on employer-owned vehicles permit employers to
determine length and location of stops, fuel consumption, and similar informa-
tion. " Even more sophisticated techniques are becoming available, such as
computerized access control systems for building security 2 and biometric
identification systems.8 s All these techniques are appropriately within the
scope of the proposed legislation. Other techniques appropriately covered in-
clude taking still photographs of employees, video surveillance, 84 reviewing
files maintained by employees in personal computers at work, intercepting
electronic mail or fax messages sent to or received by employees,85 and hidden
any time in order to determine all employees clocked in and all those absent).
80. Id. at 49.
81. See Rothfeder & Galen, supra note 9, at 74 (reporting the use of dashboard computers on
trucks). A recent article indicates that some employers are also using satellite technology to track
company owned vehicles. Marx & Sherizen, supra note 26, at 62.
82. See Dave Jensen, Inside Job: Employers Boost Worker Surveillance with High-Tech
Tools, Bus. J. MILWAUKEE, Nov. 5, 1990, § 2, at 9. These systems not only allow the employer to
control access but also to keep records of employee movements on the premises. A system of this
type with two cameras, a monitor, and a time-lapse recorder capable of 960 hours of tape can cost
as little as $3200. Id.
83. The unique biological characteristics or behavioral characteristics of any individual allow
scientists to identify that individual by reference to those characteristics. These identifying charac-
teristics include retinal blood vessels, hand geometry, fingerprints, and vocal intonation. Although
these biometric identification systems have been technologically feasible for many years, they are
now used more widely in the workplace because the price is dropping. See, e.g., Jon W. Toigo,
Biometrics Creep into Business, COMPUTERWORLD, June 11, 1990, at 75 (discussing how biomet-
ric systems are gaining popularity in the workplace); ASA ClocKeeper Software To Be Integrated
with Software House Security Management Systems, Bus. Wire, Sept. 18, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, BWIRE File (reporting on integrated software now available to control
access and monitor timekeeping and employee activities).
84. See Jensen, supra note 82, at 9 (reporting on the various methods of conducting this sur-
veillance, including a camera disguised as a sprinkler head or a heating duct). At times, the
employer accomplishes the surveillance in a two-step process. The first step is a hidden camera to
detect theft; the second step is a visible camera to deter theft. Id. In a recent study, this practice
was reported to be more common among the United States firms responding to a survey than
among the Canadian and European respondents. However, videotaping away from the workplace
was reported to be less common than videotaping at the workplace. BERENBEIM, supra note 6, at
9.
85. It is estimated that as many as 10 million Americans now use electronic mail on the job.
Jim Simon, Computer Privacy at Issue in Suit, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 17, 1990, at Dl. Some of
those workers are now bringing lawsuits challenging the right of their employers to look into their
electronic mail files. See id. (Washington state employee sued his employer alleging it looked into
his private computer files wrongfully in connection with an investigation of improper use of state
computers); Michael Stroud, Rise of Electronic Mail Raises Sticky Privacy Issues, INVESTOR'S
DAILY, June 22, 1990, at 13 (California lawsuit against a major computer maker). Similar issues
to those being raised in these lawsuits challenging the right of employers to inspect electronic mail
are likely to arise in connection with employer inspection of voice mail and faxes. Alice LaPlante,
Is Big Brother Watching?, INFOWORLD, Oct. 22, 1990, at 58. It is not clear whether privately
maintained electronic mail systems are covered by the protection of the Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act of 1986 or whether the employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
1992]
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microphones. 81 Excluded from the legislative proposal would be the relatively
common practice of conducting physical searches of employees, employee
desks, and lockers and containers in the possession of employees.87 Searches
would not, however, be excluded if conducted by artificial means without em-
ployee consent. Such an example is the use of a remote camera or sensing
device to observe an employee. Finally, the potential exists that all this infor-
mation about employees from various sources may be placed into integrated
databases and used to analyze the employee. 88 If this information is originally
collected in a manner subject to the proposed legislation, its later storage and
analysis should be covered as well.
A comprehensive legal solution is sorely needed to address the use of these
many techniques in the workplace. The solution should not be limited to the
impact of these techniques upon employees alone. Rather, the solution should
consider the impact of artificial monitoring and surveillance activities on non-
employees who may be adversely effected by the monitoring. For example,
these techniques may affect applicants for employment88 or customers.
The legal approach to artificial monitoring and surveillance in the work
place must also address techniques designed to promote certain types of em-
ployee behavior. For example, subliminal messages may appear on personal
computer screens to encourage particular employee activity, music may be
broadcast throughout the workplace to induce a particular mood, or aromas
designed to create particular employee reactions may be released into the
workplace atmosphere. 0 As these examples of subliminal suggestion illustrate,
electronic mail files at the office under common law privacy concepts. See generally THE ELEC-
TRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 11 (reporting that all the employers interviewed believed
that they had the right to search employee diskettes for personal or unauthorized company infor-
mation); Evelyn Richards, Privacy at the Office: Is There a Right To Snoop?; Lawsuit May Set
Limits on Firms' 'Eavesdropping,' WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1990, at HI (discussing the many legal
uncertainties concerning the balance of employer and employee rights in this area).
86. See Marx & Sherizen, supra note 26, at 62 (reporting the hidden use of microphones in the
bathrooms of a large manufacturing company to detect drug sales).
87. See BERENSEIM, supra note 6, at 9. This report indicates that the United States firms re-
sponding to a survey were more likely than their Canadian and European counterparts to search
lockers, desks, or offices or to examine briefcases or handbags when employees enter or leave the
building. Physical searches of employee lockers, desks, or offices was the only practice used by a
majority of the respondents in the United States, Canadian, and European samples. Id.
88. See Novack, supra note 34, at 98 (reporting the use of integrated databases concerning
employee medical experiences).
89. E.g., Bob Dart, 79% of U.S. Workers Say Bosses Asked Them Nosy Questions, ATLANTA
CONST., Jan. 10, 1990, at Al (reporting a survey entitled Whose Business Is It Anyway commis-
sioned by the National Consumers League in which 79% of the respondents indicated that they
had been asked personal questions they considered off-limits during the job interview).
90. E.g.. Marx, supra note 53, at 14 (reporting the availability of a computer program known
as "Subliminal Suggestions and Self-Hypnosis" that enables managers to send messages to work-
ers, such as "work rapidly but carefully," without the employees' knowledge); Gary T. Marx, Do
Scents Make Sense as a Way To Make Us Work Harder?, NEWSDAY, July 6, 1990, at 67, 67
(reporting the availability of aromatic equipment to pump scents through air conditioning and
heating ducts to promote workplace productivity).
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monitoring and surveillance is often undertaken for the most laudable of pur-
poses, say stress reduction. Any good intention does not, in and of itself, argue
for lack of regulation. The employer's intent may be at odds with that of the
employee yet nevertheless imposed without the employee's knowledge.
In designing an appropriate legal solution, it is critical to recognize that
these forms of monitoring and surveillance do not occur only at the employer's
place of business.91 As technology lessens the necessity for many types of work
to be carried out at the employer's place of business, the monitoring might
occur through the use of a beeper or by a computerized monitoring system
controlled by an access code."' This is, in many ways, a logical extension of
the practice of adopting company policies limiting certain dating, political
campaigning, and other employee activity away from the workplace. 93 The le-
gal solution must, therefore, recognize that the workplace is no longer limited
to a specific physical structure, such as a factory. It potentially includes the
employee's car, home, and places of recreation.
The potential reach of the above-discussed artificial monitoring and surveil-
lance techniques presents a strong argument for comprehensive workplace pri-
vacy legislation. However, it is likely impractical to expect the enactment of
such legislation in the near future. Accordingly, a legislative solution to the
problem at this time should address artificial monitoring and surveillance in
the broad sense but should also provide appropriate exceptions for technology
now subject to significant regulation by specific statutes, such as polygraph
exams and credit reports. In addition, further exceptions must be provided for
technologies that, like genetic testing, Congress needs more time to fully eval-
uate. This should be accomplished with the knowledge that it is a stop-gap
measure and that the appropriate long-term solution is comprehensive worker-
autonomy legislation. The most dramatic support for comprehensive worker-
autonomy legislation, however, is the growing presence of this technology in
the workplace.
D. Swelling Ranks of Employees Subject to Artificial
Monitoring and Surveillance
A 1987 report by Congress' Office of Technology Assessment estimated
that, at the time of the report, approximately four to six million office workers
in the United States were being evaluated based on computer generated statis-
tics.94 Although workers performing repetitive tasks were reported to be the
91. E.g., Marx, supra note 53, at 14 (describing the possibility of monitoring an employee who
uses a home computer, or using an electronic transmitter to keep track of an employee's location).
92. E.g., Hey, supra note 74, at 4 (reporting the capability of monitoring workers off the job by
computers, video cameras, access codes, pagers, beepers, and substance tests).
93. E.g., BERENBEIM, supra note 6, at 10 (reporting that the survey found restrictions on inti-
mate employee behavior to be rare but reporting the existence of some company policies in the
United States prohibiting dating of other employees or employees of competitors or banning mar-
riage to those persons).
94. THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 5.
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primary subjects of computer-based monitoring, it is likely that workers at all
levels will soon be monitored in this manner and on a large scale. 95 The Office
of Technology Assessment estimate encompassed only computerized monitor-
ing. It is likely that many millions were at that time already being artificially
monitored through telephone call accounting systems.96 In addition, there were
certainly a substantial additional number of employees then being monitored
by other forms of high technology monitoring, such as video surveillance.
Another estimate of the number of Americans being monitored artificially
in the workplace was prepared by 9to5, Working Women Education Fund, in
a 1990 report. 9 At the time, the organization estimated that ten million work-
ers in America were being evaluated by computer-based work monitoring. 98
Some experts say that the number has likely doubled since the time of that
study."
Another survey was conducted in 1989 by the Massachusetts Coalition on
New Office Technology. 10 0 That was a survey of 686 office workers employed
by forty-nine different employers in the Boston area. The survey reported that
85 % were subjected to computer monitoring, 81 % had supervisors who lis-
tened in on telephone conversations with customers, and 45% had supervisors
with the capability of monitoring conversations among co-workers through mi-
crophones on their headsets.' 01 Only 47 % of those subject to these activities
learned of the existence of the monitoring from their employer. The others
learned from co-workers, unions, or other sources or in the course of discipli-
nary action by their employer. 10 2
Another indication of the widespread nature of these practices is contained
in the Conference Board Report, which is based on a survey conducted by the
Conference Board, Inc.,' 03 a not-for-profit business information service. The
95. Id. ("[l]t is likely that computer-based monitoring will affect a large number of workers at
all organizational levels."); Grant & Higgins, supra note 20, at 101 (reporting that monitoring by
computers has expanded to persons including stockbrokers, pharmacists, and nurses); Marx, supra
note 53, at 30 (according to Karen Nussbaum, Executive Director of 9to5, National Association
of Working Women, "higher professions" are now being monitored artificially); Marlene Piturro,
Employee Performance Monitoring . . . or Meddling?, MGMT. REV., May 1989, at 31, 33
(describing the manner in which management, by using software to maintain their personal sched-
ules, make themselves susceptible to the same sort of monitoring as other workers).
96. According to Rep. Don Edwards of California, in 1987 approximately 14,000 employers
listened in on telephone conversations of approximately 1.5 million employees, and most of those
employees were not aware that they were being monitored. See Rothfeder & Galen, supra note 9,
at 75.
97. See DANAAN, supra note 75.
98. Id. at 1. A recent article quoting the executive director of that organization states that 10
million workers are now evaluated by computer-based systems while 26 million United States
workers have their work tracked electronically. Markoff, supra note 50, at 7.
99. Kilborn, supra note 20, at 1.
100. Simson Garfinkel, Employees' Attitudes About Monitoring, PRIVACY J., June 1989, at 5
(summarizing the results of that survey).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See BERENBEIM, supra note 6.
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survey consisted of 393 United States, Canadian, and European firms. Despite
the fact that a high percentage of the respondents to that survey found the use
of employee searches to be ineffective or counterproductive, the survey con-
cluded that the techniques are fairly widespread, particularly in the United
States.1"4
Further evidence of the widespread nature of these techniques in the Ameri-
can workplace is provided by another 1990 report, The Equifax Report on
Consumers in the Information Age."0 5 Although The Equifax Report ad-
dresses only a few of the techniques discussed above, its findings concerning
American attitudes towards workplace intrusion into the private lives of em-
ployees are relevant to the inquiry of this Article. The findings indicate a rela-
tively widespread assumption that such activity occurs and that there is a rela-
tively high acceptance of that activity under certain limited conditions.
Specifically, despite this acceleration in the use of artificial monitoring and
surveillance in the workplace, the findings of the report indicate that the
American public is cognizant of the legitimate informational needs of employ-
ers and willing to accept certain forms of intrusion if basic fairness is assured.
As stated in an analysis of the survey results by noted privacy expert Prof.
Alan F. Westin, "Though concerned about threats to their privacy and dis-
trustful of institutions in general, the Equifax survey demonstrates that the
public accepts the disclosure of personal information when consumers feel that
the basic principles of fair information practices outlined earlier in this essay
are observed."106 The survey yielded the following results.
(1) Eighty percent of the members of the public and 74% of the human
resources executives surveyed think that it is appropriate for an employer to
check whether an applicant for employment has a criminal record." 7
(2) Fifty-five percent of the members of the public and 38 % of human re-
sources executives surveyed think that it is appropriate for an employer to ask
that an applicant take a written honesty test.'0 8
(3) Forty-six percent of the surveyed members of the public, in contrast to
23% of the human resources executives, think that it is appropriate for an
employer to ask that an applicant take an AIDS test.'09
(4) Twelve percent of the members of the public and 6% of human re-
sources executives surveyed think that it is appropriate for an employer to
check into the applicant's lifestyles or political associations.1 0 In practice, the
actual rate of inquiry during the application process into these off-the-job mat-
104. Id. at 9.
105. EQUIFAX. INC., THE EQUIFAX REPORT ON CONSUMERS IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1990)
[hereinafter THE EQUIFAX REPORT]. This report was based on a survey commissioned by Equifax
and undertaken by Louis Harris & Associates and Dr. Alan F. Westin, professor of public law
and government, Columbia University.
106. Id. at XXIII.
107. Id. at 31.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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ters appears to be relatively low. The human resources executives surveyed
reported as follows: 33% inquire about hobbies, 17% about marital status,
4% about smoking off the job, and 1% or less about unmarried applicants'
living arrangements with persons of the opposite sex who are not family mem-
bers, and about applicants' child bearing plans, elderly parents, and religious
preferences."' Even more rarely do human resource executives report that it
would be appropriate to deny employment or to fire someone for unusual off-
the-job activities. For example, only 6% of those executives think it would be
appropriate to fire or deny employment to someone for such activity as work-
ing in a bar,"' and only 7% of human resources executives think it would be
appropriate to require an employee to quit smoking."'
(5) Eighty-three percent of the members of the public surveyed felt that an
employer should be able to require a drug test in the application process for a
job like that individual's own job. Eighty percent of the human resources exec-
utives surveyed felt this would be justified for management employees, and
82% of those executives felt this would be justified for nonmanagement em-
ployees. However, only 66% of the public felt that a random drug testing
program for all employees would be justified. Fifty-three percent of human
resources executives felt such a program would be justified for management
employees and for nonmanagement employees.""
(6) Both 58% of the members of the public and 78% of human resources
executives surveyed agreed with the proposition that companies should be able
to listen in on phone operators to see if they are courteous and efficient."'
(7) Sixteen percent of the members of the public surveyed felt that they
have been asked for information by their employer about which the employer
had no right to inquire," 6 and 7% felt that personal information about them
had been used by an employer." 7
Despite the existence of the studies discussed above, it is obviously difficult
if not impossible to state the actual number of employees in America who are
subjected to artificial monitoring and surveillance in the workplace, as that
term is used in this Article. It seems certain, however, that the number is very
large and that it constitutes a significant portion of the workforce.
Furthermore, it appears that these estimates represent a relatively recent
surge in this type of activity." 8 Although the reasons for this trend are numer-
111. Id. at 32.
112. Id. at 33.
113. Id. at 36.
114. Id. at 35.
115. Id. at 37.
116. Id. at 41.
117. Id. at 42.
118. Perry Bender, Congress Considering Pulling Plug on Electronic Monitoring, States News
Serv., July 19, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SNS File (reporting estimates ranging
from 25 million to 400 million employees); Goozner, supra note 74, at Cl (reporting that, given
the fact that employers are increasingly concerned about productivity at a time when there are
approximately 50 million computer terminals in use in the workplace, experts believe there has
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ous, the primary cause is evident. The surge can be attributed mainly to the
change of the United States economy from a production-oriented economy to a
service-oriented economy, combined with the automation of the workplace for
these new service workers. The workplace is simply easier to monitor now.
Another factor contributing to this trend toward increased monitoring is the
lack of legal limitations upon employers in this area. Although labor unions
may bargain for such limitations as part of the collective bargaining pro-
cess,'1 9 the number of unionized workers in the United States is small 20 and
decreasing. Furthermore, increased sales efforts of manufacturers of the hard-
ware and software necessary to accomplish artificial monitoring and surveil-
lance of employees has likely played a significant role in increased use of those
techniques. 2'
Despite this trend toward the increased use of artificial monitoring tech-
niques, there are signs that some employers are concluding that the negative
effects of artificial monitoring outweigh its benefits and are consequently re-
ducing its use. 122 Rather than a magic solution to problems such as those
been a significant rise in workplace monitoring); Grant & Higgins, supra note 20, at 101 (stating
that the "use of these systems is increasing"); Rothfeder & Galen, supra note 9, at 74 ("No one
knows exactly how much workplace spying goes on. But it's spreading," according to the president
of a firm that does this type of work for employers.).
119. For example, the union representing the workers at a major United States corporation
recently negotiated a collective bargaining agreement on behalf of those workers, which provided
them with significant protection from the adverse effects of artificial monitoring. This agreement
included a requirement that supervisors notify employees who are to be monitored for purposes of
job assessment and a provision allowing employees the choice of remote monitoring or direct mon-
itoring by a supervisor. See Kilborn, supra note 20. Due to the significant decrease in the union-
ized segment of the United States workforce in recent years, this type of protection is not availa-
ble to a large percentage of the workforce. See infra note 120 and accompanying text (stating that
the number of unionized workers is decreasing).
120. Approximately 12% of United States workers are unionized. Gene Koretz, Why Unions
Thrive Abroad-But Wither in the U.S., Bus. WK., Sept. 10, 1990, at 26, 26; see also THE ELEC-
TRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 5-7, 9 (OTA estimating that 20% of the United States
workforce was unionized in 1987). Fewer office workers, who are now among the most likely to be
monitored artificially, are unionized. Id. at 9. The unionized portion of the United States
workforce in 1990 was one-third of that in the mid-1950s and dropping at a rate far more rapid
than the rest of the world. See Koretz, supra, at 26; THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6,
at 98 (reporting a decline in unionized portion of nonagricultural labor force in the United States
from 35.5% in 1945 to below 19% in 1987, with an expected additional decline over the next 15
years).
121. See THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 98-99 (referring to the tendencies of
some vendors to "puff").
122. See. e.g., Aaron Bernstein, How To Motivate Workers: Don't Watch 'Em, Bus. WK., Apr.
29, 1991, at 56, 56 (reporting that the "search for quality is abridging this trend" toward elec-
tronic eavesdropping); Kilborn, supra note 20, at I (reporting that a federal government agency
has recently changed its eavesdropping practices in response to employee complaints); see also
Bernard Wray, Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 28, 1990 at 2 (reporting
that the Secretary-Treasurer of the Committee on Labor Relations of the New York County
Lawyers Association claimed that "[t]here simply is no credible evidence or factual or statistical
proof that electronic monitoring and surveillance have achieved any positive results for
employers").
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faced by our hypothetical human resources director described in the Introduc-
tion, some employers are finding that artificial monitoring and surveillance is
burdened with its own set of problems, and they are deciding to scale back.12
Reasons for scaling back include worker resistance, resulting in unionization
efforts or loss of key employees to other employers; decreased quality of prod-
uct resulting from lower employee morale; and simple increased management
sensitivity to employee concerns. Additionally, artificial monitoring and sur-
veillance simply may not deliver the promised results. Some employers have
experienced increased employee turnover rates,1"4 increased employee absen-
teeism, increased employee health problems, decreased productivity, 1 5 de-
creased product quality, and poor customer service. 26
For example, the Conference Board Report2 brings into serious question
the effectiveness of the use of these artificial monitoring and surveillance tech-
niques. The report stated that "[m]ore than two-thirds of the respondents said
that searches and electronic surveillance of employee conduct were ineffective
or counterproductive."' 2 8 The reasons cited by those respondents for that con-
clusion were "the harmful impact on employee morale," litigation exposure,
and inconsistency with the philosophy of the business." 9 This apparent aver-
sion to these techniques is stronger, however, for the Canadian and European
firms surveyed than for the United States firms. 3"
Employers should also consider that the use of artificial monitoring and sur-
veillance without adequate advance planning may create significant liability
exposure."' Although there are not to this date a large number of reported
123. A recent article cites a number of examples of major United States businesses that re-
cently have found electronic monitoring to be counterproductive and therefore have eliminated the
practice. See Piturro, supra note 95, at 32; see also Marx & Sherizen, supra note 26, at 64
(pointing out the possibility that the adversarial relationship created by artificial monitoring and
surveillance of employees may cause it to become counterproductive); Wray, supra note 122, at 2
(citing the types of "bad results" from electronic monitoring observed by a labor lawyer in his
practice).
124. See Kilborn, supra note 20 (discussing the connection between high employee turnover
rates and increased surveillance).
125. Employees may, in fact, fight the system by doing less work because the monitoring sys-
tem is in place. Id.
126. See, e.g., Rebecca A. Grant et al., Computerized Performance Monitors: Are They Cost-
ing You Customers?, SLOAN MGMT. REv., Spring 1988, at 39 (concluding that computerized
monitoring may cause workers to place a higher value on production than on customer service and
teamwork, and that this may well decrease significantly the quality of customer service delivered);
Peter A. Susser, Modern Office Technology and Employee Relations, EMPLOYMENT REL. TODAY,
Spring 1988, at 9, 10-11 (arguing that new technology may lead to poor customer service).
127. See BERENBEIM, supra note 6, at 9.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. The survey found that 85% of the Canadian and European firms responded that these
techniques were ineffective or counterproductive. A substantial percentage of the United States
respondents had the same view, but 23% of United States firms said searches could be somewhat
or highly effective. Id.
131. See Hoerr, supra note 28, at 61 (providing examples of "huge jury awards" in recent
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appellate court decisions upholding violation-of-privacy awards for employees,
there has been a dramatic increase in the number of workplace privacy suits
filed and in the size of favorable verdicts for successful plaintiffs. 13 2
Despite these potentially negative consequences, and the possibility that the
most easily monitored jobs may well be automated out of existence, the factors
promoting the use of systems for workplace monitoring and surveillance make
it likely that, absent restrictive legislation, there will be a continued increase in
use of artificial monitoring and surveillance in the workplace.' The relatively
low purchase cost of artificial monitoring and surveillance systems may well be
the largest factor. 3 " Furthermore, the maintenance of these systems is not
labor intensive. In addition to the cost factor, the role of organized labor as a
limiting factor will decrease as labor unionization rates continue to drop. 35
Those rates are particularly low in the areas where monitoring is most likely to
be used, such as office work. Finally, increasing market competitiveness corre-
spondingly increases the incentive to use artificial monitoring and surveillance.
Given the simple fact that many "[c]ompanies find it difficult not to monitor
privacy cases arising in the workplace); Marx, supra note 53, at 30 (quoting Karen Nussbaum,
Executive Director of 9to5, National Association of Working Women: "Not only are employees
rejecting surveillance techniques, but the courts are too. Legal challenges to employer access to
databases of personal information are expected to grow. And workers are filing privacy suits
against their employers in unprecedented numbers."). See generally Mark E. Brossman, Workers
Gain Privacy Rights by Legislation, Judicial Action, NAT'L L.J., April 9, 1990, at 28 (discussing
the change from a legal climate in which employers could monitor employees with impunity to a
climate limiting that authority substantially, and also summarizing the various statutory and com-
mon law bases for those limitations upon employer authority).
132. IRA M. SHEPARD, WORKPLACE PRIVACY: EMPLOYEE TESTING, SURVEILLANCE, WRONG-
FUL DISCHARGE. AND OTHER AREAS OF VULNERABILITY 1-2 (2d ed. 1989). As stated in that
report:
The increasing occurrence of medium to high six-figure damage awards in employ-
ment litigation, which is reflected in these survey results, has fueled the flames of
employee privacy litigation. The movement into the high tech age of computer analy-
sis and supervision of employees will inevitably fan these flames and increase the
workplace privacy issues that may be addressed by the courts and legislatures.
Id. at 2. The report refers to a survey of workplace-privacy jury verdicts that illustrates "the
dramatic increase in workplace privacy cases filed in the 1980s and the astronomical increase in
average jury verdicts against employers in workplace-privacy cases since 1985." Id. at 1. By con-
trast to the 1979-1980 period, in which there were no reported workplace-privacy jury verdicts,
the average verdict in the period 1985-1987 was $316,000. Id. at 1-2. Further, the number of
reported jury verdicts against employers in cases of that type increased twenty-fold from the pe-
riod 1981-1984 to the period 1985-1987. Id. at 2. The second edition of Shepard's book describes
a new survey by the same firm concerning these trends. The new survey found that 72% of work-
place-privacy trials between 1985 and 1988 were won by the employee, with an average award of
$375,307 and a median of $97,000. Id.
133. See THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 97-100 (summarizing the positive and
negative implications of increased monitoring).
134. "[l]n the past, the economics of monitoring tended to work against intensive mass surveil-
lance. But technological breakthroughs have greatly reduced the cost of monitoring." Marx &
Sherizen, supra note 26, at 62.
135. See supra note 120 (stating that only 12% of United States workers are unionized).
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employees,""' 6 the likely outcome of balancing the pros and cons of monitoring
and surveillance seems quite clear. We may anticipate a substantially in-
creased use of artificial monitoring and surveillance in the workplace in the
near future.1 7
E. Distinguishing Artificial Monitoring and Surveillance from Direct
Human Supervision-The Modern Panoptican
It may be argued that all these techniques amount to nothing more than
high-technology methods of allowing the employer to engage in activity in
which employers always have been appropriately engaged. In other words, this
technology simply allows employers to observe employees in the performance
of their work.'"
Furthermore, it may be argued that the existence of "Panoptican" monitor-
ing and surveillance in the workplace is hardly a new development, 3 9 particu-
larly in the workplace, 40 and that it has withstood the test of time in the
absence of restrictive legislation. Frederick W. Taylor, commonly referred to
as the father of scientific management, began his studies of the management
of work in the 1880s. "'4 Taylor's scientific management concepts, which in-
cluded aspects of efficiency and monitoring, were incorporated rapidly by
American industry. An example is the assembly line production process estab-
136. See Piturro, supra note 95, at 32.
137. N. Faye Angel, Evaluating Employees by Computer-Reasons To Appraise Employee
Performance Electronically, PERSONNEL ADMIN., Nov. 1989, at 67. For example, some experts
claim that as many as 30 million visual display terminal users might have their work monitored
electronically by the year 2000. Id.
138. See Marx & Sherizen, supra note 26, at 62 (recognizing in a discussion of the differences
between personal observation and artificial monitoring and surveillance that it has always been the
job of a supervisor to watch his subordinates); Columbia Professor Contends Monitoring Does
Not Breach Employee Privacy Rights, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at A-7 (March 8, 1989)
(reporting the views of renowned privacy expert Alan F. Westin to be that electronic monitoring is
not fundamentally different from traditional supervision and opposing then-pending legislative
proposals to regulate that activity).
139. Gary L. Davis, Note, Electronic Surveillance and the Right of Privacy, 27 MONT. L. REV.
173, 173 (1966). The author points out that wiretapping began shortly after the telegraph was
invented. Id.
140. See DANAAN, supra note 75, at 1. The term Panoptican is derived from the work of Jer-
emy Bentham at the turn of the 19th century. He developed the concept of a polygonal structure
known as the Panoptican for use by the British government as a prison factory. This building,
which the government ultimately decided not to build, would have utilized a central tower from
which rows of glass walls would emanate. Mirrors affixed to the tower would have enabled the
supervisors to observe the inhabitants of the glass cells, but those supervisors would not have been
observable by the inhabitants. Marx, supra note 53, at 22 (comments of Shoshana Zuboff, associ-
ate professor at the Harvard Business School). Inasmuch as the device was designed to be continu-
ous and automatic, it was theorized that it would "ensure desirable conduct." Gandy, supra note
7, at 63.
141. Richard E. Walton, From Control to Commitment in the Workplace, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Mar./Apr. 1985, at 76.
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lished by Ford Motor Company in 1903.142 The early applications of monitor-
ing were often quite pervasive; in fact, they were not necessarily limited to
measurement of the employee's work performance. The monitoring and sur-
veillance frequently extended to very private aspects of the employee's per-
sonal life.1"3
It also may be argued that artificial monitoring and surveillance does not
take place only in the workplace in modern society and that, as a result of the
dizzying pace of modern technological developments affecting all aspects of
our lives, most of us simply expect and accept this activity. All of us do expect
to be watched artificially in the course of our daily lives. 44 We voluntarily
enter into many situations in which we assume that our activities will be artifi-
cially observed. For example, we know that banks are commonly robbed and
we (excluding those with felony in their hearts) rarely object to the omnipres-
ent camera pointed at us from the ceiling in the bank lobby or from the inside
of the automatic teller machine. In fact, we might well be disturbed to find
that it did not exist because of the protection that the camera provides. On the
other hand, we expect monitoring to be limited to observations reasonably nec-
essary to accomplish that protection. For example, we might well feel that our
privacy had been invaded if video surveillance extended to the bank washroom.
Also, the workplace is inherently different because of the amount of time that
most of us spend there and the lack of practical options for most of us not to
be there.
Despite this ordinary expectation of the existence of monitoring and surveil-
lance and its historical pervasiveness in the workplace, the pace of technologi-
cal development has significantly altered the nature of this artificial monitor-
ing. In many cases in which the newer methods are utilized, it is not possible
to detect the presence of the observer."" Detected or not, that observer may
well be a person who has no direct contact with or concern for the person
being observed.146 The observation is likely more pervasive in the sense that it
is often continuous and automatic." 7 Once the results of the observation are
collected, the technology allows for automatic analysis of the information in
ways not possible before. For example, the new information can be matched
142. THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 18.
143. Id. at 19.
144. See Laplante, supra note 85, at 58. LaPlante states, "In George Orwell's 1984, there is no
question that Big Brother is there, always watching, always listening. Indeed, it would be hard for
any inhabitant of that world to be unaware of that fact." Id.
145. See Gandy, supra note 7, at 63 (pointing out that information may be processed by "un-
known and faceless technicians and specialists" without any personal interest in the outcome);
Marx & Sherizen, supra note 26, at 62 (pointing out that the small physical size of much of the
hardware and the ability of the user to activate it from distant locations makes it different from
personal observation).
146. Gandy, supra note 7, at 63.
147. Id. at 64; Marx & Sherizen, supra note 26, at 65 (noting that artificial monitoring and
surveillance can be "omnipresent and tireless").
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by computer with information from other sources. " 8 These analytical methods
then allow the observer to generate information not only revealing what the
observed person did, but what they have the potential to do in the future." 9
Finally, the instruments necessary to conduct the monitoring or surveillance
now are available to a far greater number of people, and it is easier to rapidly
disseminate the results of the monitoring or surveillance to third parties. In
sum, the sophistication of the techniques increases their potential dangerous-
ness to privacy.
One final factor must be taken into account in contrasting the current sce-
nario to the past. Private business plays an increasingly powerful role in the
lives of Americans. As stated in a recent news article:
It has been 17 years since Congress passed the Privacy Act of 1974,
which restricts Government agencies from exchanging information, regu-
lates the information that agencies may collect and gives citizens rights to
inspect their files. But the act doesn't apply to businesses. With the develop-
ment of increasingly powerful computer and communications technologies,
some experts say, corporations may pose a greater threat to privacy than
does big government. 50
Many Americans are apparently more fearful of their employer than the gov-
ernment.1 5 ' Employee awareness and fear of employer monitoring and surveil-
lance will grow as the impact of such monitoring is increasingly felt by the
American worker.
F. Impact of Artificial Monitoring and Surveillance on Employees
The actual effects of this increasingly pervasive monitoring and surveillance
in the workplace are not yet clear. A number of studies are currently under-
way to determine those effects.'9 2 Additionally, there are conflicting opinions
about worker attitudes concerning monitoring and surveillance. A recent study
drew a distinction between surveillance and computer based monitoring in ex-
amining worker attitudes. 5 3 The study concluded that many employees object
to surveillance but a relatively small percentage object to monitoring.
Many articles in the trade and popular press claim or imply that most work-
ers oppose the practice of monitoring. Our survey results do not support
such claims .... Electronic surveillance" uses audio and visual equipment
to examine employee behaviors and personal characteristics. About 52 per-
cent of survey respondents agreed to some extent that all electronic surveil-
148. Gandy, supra note 7, at 64.
149. Id. at 64-65.
150. Markoff, supra note 50, at 7.
151. ACLU Accuses U.S. Employers of Violating Workers' Civil Rights, Daily Rep. for Exec-
utives (BNA) No. 244, at A-13 (July 17, 1990) (discussing a report by the ACLU National Task
Force on Civil Liberties).
152. Grant & Higgins, supra note 20, at 108-09.
153. Id.
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lance should be illegal. This compares to 30.5 percent agreeing with the
statement that monitoring should be illegal. Thus, employees did differenti-
ate between surveillance and computer monitoring. This is an important dis-
tinction. Trade and popular press articles have discussed cases of pervasive
monitor designs that incorporated video or audio taping. The fact that these
monitors included surveillance, rather than that they monitored work, may
be at the root of the vocal opposition to their use.""
Although the actual effects are uncertain, the potential effects may be cate-
gorized into three often overlapping groups: (1) quality of the employee's life,
(2) the employee's right to privacy, and (3) fairness to the employee.
1. Quality of Employee's Life
Monitoring and surveillance may cause an unusual incidence of stress and
stress-related illnesses, both physical and psychological." 5' A report issued by
the Office of Technology Assessment emphasizes that the scientific evidence
bearing on this potential side effect is not conclusive.' 6  As a result of this
uncertainty, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health is
planning to undertake a study, to be completed in 1992, examining the stress
and performance effects of the use of electronic monitoring to set workplace
performance standards.'
Furthermore, artificial monitoring and surveillance has the capacity to elim-
inate worker autonomy. In other words, the ability of the worker to decide
how his job will be done is severely impaired.'58 Why is this an important
consideration?
154. Id.; see also Goozner, supra note 74, at C1 (reporting the Grant & Higgins study as well
as a survey by Louis Harris & Associates for Equifax in which most respondents indicated a belief
that some form of workplace monitoring is necessary).
155. See DANAAN, supra note 75, at 4 (reporting that both the fact of monitoring and the use
of the resulting information are stress-creating events); Ronald E. Roel, Injured by Big Brother?;
Study Shows Monitored Workers Get Hurt More, NEWSDAY, Oct. 5, 1990, at 49 (reporting a
study by a major telecommunications union and an ergonomics expert that concluded that em-
ployees monitored qualitatively and quantitatively suffer a higher incidence of psychological ail-
ments and repetitive strain injuries); Frank Swoboda, Study Links Electronic Monitoring, Stress,
WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1990, at H3 (reporting a study conducted by the University of Wisconsin
for the Communication Workers of America, based on a random group of workers from regional
telephone companies, which concluded that workers whose job performances are monitored by
computer suffer more from job-related stress than those not monitored in this manner). See gener-
ally Jonathan Peterson, New Job Pressures Take Human Toll, WASH. POST, July 15, 1990, at H3
(reporting on the "skyrocketing" stress claims arising from a multitude of modern job pressures,
including electronic monitoring and surveillance); Jonathan Peterson, Feeling Tense? You're Prob-
ably Doing Your Job; Stress: As Competition Grows, So Do Workplace Tensions, from Boar-
droom to Shop Floor, Everyone Frets, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1990, at Dl (reporting the multitude
of factors causing stress in the modern workplace, including monitoring and surveillance).
156. THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 50-55.
157. NIOSH To Probe Effects of Monitoring Office Workers with Electronic Devices, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 110, at A-I (June 7, 1990).
158. See THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 8.
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Control over personal information is particularly important for our sense
of self. When an individual's room, pocketbook, or body can be searched at
will, when conversations and even thoughts are available for instant inspec-
tion by outsiders, openness and honesty lose their value. Distrust becomes
institutionalized and an important and even sacred element of the social
bond is damaged.1"9
Corresponding to the loss of a feeling of autonomy is the possibility that there
will be a reduction in the level of trust in the employer-employee relationship
because the employee feels "spied upon."160 It has the capacity to make the
employee believe that their employer's basic assumption about them is that
they are unproductive or dishonest and that they must struggle to overcome
that assumption. In a 1990 telephone conversation with the legislative director
for the Communications Workers of America, Lou Gerber, he told me that
many employers seem to live by the motto "In God we trust. Others we
monitor.""1 '
All of these detrimental effects have potentially serious consequences for
American society as a whole. Although the simple desire of employees to
maintain an acceptable quality of life is certainly an important factor, Con-
gress and the courts must also consider the reality that failure to maintain that
quality of life is likely to translate into higher costs to society as a whole, such
as decreased product quality and increased burdens on our already overtaxed
health care system.
2. Privacy: "The Right 'to Be Let Alone'"162
Employees may object to the ability of employers to observe their "private"
behavior. It may, of course, be argued that artificial monitoring and surveil-
lance in the workplace is not really an issue of privacy because employees
expect to be observed as part of the normal supervision process; employees do
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the employment relationship.
It is in fact true that an employee impliedly consents by voluntarily entering
into the employment relationship to be subjected to a certain level of supervi-
sion. If the level of monitoring and surveillance exceeds that which the ordi-
nary employee would impliedly accept by taking a job, the employer may then
expressly require consent as a condition of extending a job offer. As discussed
below, these factors do render most common law concepts of privacy an inade-
quate solution to the problems associated with artificial monitoring and sur-
veillance in the workplace. And they do not render the employee's privacy
concerns less important in an inquiry into the design of an appropriate legal
159. See Marx & Sherizen, supra note 26, at 62.
160. See DANAAN, supra note 75, at 5.
161. Telephone Interview with Lou Gerber, Legislative Director, Communications Workers of
America (July 3, 1990).
162. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195
n.4 (1890) (citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)).
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solution to this problem. The nature of the employer-employee bargaining re-
lationship is such that many, if not most, United States employees do not pos-
sess the luxury of simply refusing to enter into the employment relationship
when they learn that intrusive monitoring and surveillance will be one of its
key elements.
Privacy issues of this nature are a significant and growing concern for
Americans. The above-discussed Equifax report indicates that 79% of Ameri-
cans now say that they are very concerned or somewhat concerned about
threats to personal privacy in America today.16 This reflects a significant in-
crease from the level of concern expressed in a similar 1978 study164 and a
small increase over a similar 1983 study. 6' The Equifax study indicates that a
rising percentage of Americans, 30% now as opposed to 14% in 1978, have
decided not to apply for a job, credit, or insurance because they did not want
to disclose certain personal information. 166
Why might an employee have privacy concerns about artificial monitoring
and surveillance? One factor is the above-discussed desire for personal auton-
omy. Another factor is the possibility that artificial monitoring or surveillance
will generate information about an employee that could be used for impermis-
sible purposes, such as identifying and disciplining whistleblowers. Similarly,
the employee may be concerned that the information generated will be used in
a manner that is unfair. Finally, the possibility exists of inappropriate trans-
mittal of the information to third parties other than the employer.
Why do these privacy interests in the workplace deserve protection by our
legal system? The reason lies in the fact that American society values and
thrives on the diversity of its citizenry. To the extent that individual citizens
do not have the right to decide which aspects of their personal lives are to
remain known to them alone, we are in danger of losing that diversity. The
likelihood that individuals will develop their individual and unique characteris-
tics will be diminished and American society will be less diverse, creating a
less satisfying way of life and a less productive economy.
3. Fairness
A part of the concern of any employee about workplace privacy may be
grounded in the fact that the potential for basic unfairness is significant when
artificial monitoring and surveillance techniques are used. In other words, the
potential exists that employee performance will be evaluated in a manner that
does not truly measure that employee's value to the organization. For example,
these techniques may focus on the employee's weak points, failing to observe
the employee's strong points. The employee's pace of work may be accelerated
163. THE EQUIFAx REPORT, supra note 105, at 2 (96% are very concerned while 33% are
somewhat concerned).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 14.
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to a level that, although attainable on occasion, is unacceptably high on a
sustained basis. Errors in measurement may occur that the employee cannot
effectively refute because of the nature of the testing. Some employees may
find ways to "game" the system, resulting in incorrect input and adversely
affecting those who do not "game" the system. The focus may be strictly on
quantity, ignoring the quality factor. Further, an individual supervisor may be
able to manipulate the system to adversely affect an individual worker against
whom he holds a grudge.'67 As a result of these factors, employees are gener-
ally more willing to accept monitoring when they are granted a role in deter-
mining the manner in which it is implemented in the workplace. 168
Despite these potential negative effects of artificial monitoring and surveil-
lance in the areas of quality of life, privacy, and fairness, even critics of moni-
toring and surveillance techniques agree that it has potentially positive effects.
In addition, the critics also acknowledge that many of the negative potential
effects upon employees can be reduced or eliminated through the use of some
common-sense management guidelines. Techniques to reduce the potentially
negative effects of artificial monitoring and surveillance include (1) letting em-
ployees know in advance about the monitoring or surveillance; (2) not using
subliminal messages; (3) evaluating only relevant activity; (4) collecting re-
sults by groups of workers, not individuals; (5) using factors other than the
results of monitoring and surveillance in setting performance standards; and
(6) making sure that those standards allow for variables that the specific mon-
itoring system does not measure. 169
Finally, artificial monitoring and surveillance techniques may well be physi-
cally less intrusive than other forms of monitoring and surveillance. They can
be used to provide a safer workplace, to judge the performance of employees
objectively and fairly, and to protect employees against false accusations.170
In other words, the potential negative effects of monitoring and surveillance
do not argue for its prohibition.171 Instead, they argue for its regulation in a
manner that assures it will be used fairly and will not adversely affect the
quality of the worker's life or her right to personal autonomy.
167. See Kilborn, supra note 20.
168. See, e.g., THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 38-40.
169. See, e.g., Holloway McCandless, Computer Monitoring: Is It "Big Brother" Watching;
Manager's Shoptalk, WORKING WOMAN, Nov. 1988, at 38; see also Angel, supra note 137, at 67
(discussing the key elements in a successful computer monitoring system: reasonable work stan-
dards, appraisal of relevant work only, evaluation at fair and regular time intervals, and employee
access to monitoring records).
170. See Marx & Sherizen, supra note 26, at 62.
171. See Lawrence Edelman, Is This Man Invading Your Privacy? A Solution Is Sought To
Close Gap Between Technology and Law, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 20, 1990, at 25 (listing various
potential privacy abuses of monitoring and surveillance).
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III. AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF
ARTIFICIAL MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE BY EMPLOYERS
IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Assume that our hypothetical human resource director is ultimately termi-
nated from her latest position. She was undergoing extreme stress, caused at
least in part by discovering the full extent of her employer's monitoring and
surveillance policies. Her supervisor then determined that many of her person-
nel decisions were neither soundly based nor adequately documented. She be-
lieves that many of her decisions were reviewed out of context and therefore
were not representative samples, and she also believes that some of her deci-
sions were affected by the stressful working conditions. Do constitutional and
statutory privacy protections offer her a legal remedy? Probably not. Could
the problem have been avoided in the first instance? Probably yes.
A. Constitutional and Statutory Limitations
Although there have been recent proposals to amend the United States Con-
stitution to expand privacy guarantees, 172 the Constitution does not generally
limit monitoring and surveillance in private sector workplaces. The simple ab-
sence of state action generally renders the Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures inapplicable.' As a result, public
employees for the most part have significantly greater protection than employ-
ees in the private sector. 74 Potentially, private employers, who are generally
172. There have been recent proposals to amend the United States Constitution by adding a
Twenty-Seventh Amendment to specify, among other things, that the guarantee in the Fourth
Amendment against unreasonable searches applies regardless of the form of the technological
method employed. See Fickel, supra note 1, at 54. Even if the Constitution were expanded in that
manner, action taken by a private employer against its employee would not, as a general rule,
violate the constitutional rights of the employee because of the absence of state action. By con-
trast, if a government employee is monitored by the government, the employee may potentially
have a claim that his constitutional rights have been violated. In addition, although the Privacy
Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988), applies primarily to records maintained by the federal
government, it does apply to certain government contractors. See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOL-
OGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, PUB. No. 296, ELECTRONIC RECORD SYSTEMS AND INDIVIDUAL
TECHNOLOGY (1986) (concluding that the federal government is not adequately monitoring Pri-
vacy Act compliance).
173. See DECKER, supra note 36, at 108 (discussing the various sources of the right of privacy
in the Constitution and pointing out that "almost no private sector employer is bound by these
constitutional privacy restraints"); Martin N. Flics, Comment, Employee Privacy Rights: A Pro-
posal, 47 FORDHAM L. REV., 155, 159-64 (1978); Furfaro & Josephson, supra note 1, at 3 n.l
(pointing out that the Supreme Court has interpreted this state action requirement "conserva-
tively"); Note supra note 18, at 1906 ("Federal Constitutional privacy claims, available only to
public employees, have not been extended to protect workers from monitoring.") (citations omit-
ted)). Note also that federal employees receive in addition to the protections provided by the
Constitution, statutory protections not generally applicable to private sector employees. For exam-
ple, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 protects federal employees who disclose certain infor-
mation concerning criminal or other behavior of fellow employees. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (1988).
174. Protections against intrusions on privacy are provided by many foreign countries. See
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not limited by the Constitution, are a greater threat to the privacy of individu-
als than the government.
Cases interpreting the application of these constitutional protections to gov-
ernment employees are discussed below 75 because they are relevant, by anal-
ogy, to the determination of whether private sector employees have a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in the workplace. That inquiry concerning
reasonableness is central to common law privacy claims as well as Fourth
Amendment claims by government workers.
In addition to the protection given to government workers by the Constitu-
tion, a number of states have privacy guarantees in their own constitutions.
17 6
Additionally, violation of privacy is, in certain limited circumstances, a viola-
tion of state criminal statutes. 177
Although the United States and state constitutions do not ordinarily limit
artificial monitoring and surveillance activity by private employers, there is a
plethora of federal and state protections from artificial monitoring and surveil-
lance, but only in certain limited circumstances. A significant portion of em-
ployee protections is created by state statutes. In some cases, federal law may
have a preemptive effect. 78 In other cases, the state statute may be expressly
or impliedly the exclusive remedy of the employee for the particular alleged
violation. 79
Markoff, supra note 50, at 7.
175. Infra part lll.B.2.a.
176. See DECKER, supra note 36, at 130 n.254; 2 JOSEPH D. LEVESQUE, PEOPLE IN ORGANIZA-
TIONS SERIES: MANAGING EMPLOYEE PRIVACY RIGHTS AND WRONGFUL DISCHARGE PROBLEMS
11.1.8 to 11.1.9 (1989) (listing state constitutional and statutory provisions about privacy); SHEP-
ARD, supra note 132, at 30-32; ROBERT E. SMITH, COMPILATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY
LAWS 1984-85, at 28-29 (1984) (listing various state and federal laws concerning privacy stat-
utes). As a general rule, these state constitutional provisions are interpreted consistently with the
privacy guarantee under the United States Constitution in that they only limit the action of gov-
ernment employers. See, e.g., Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska
1989) (holding that the Alaska Constitution's guarantee of the right to privacy is not applicable to
the actions of private parties). But see Porten v. University of San Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (extending California Constitution's guarantee of privacy to private employ-
ees); Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 200 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
government action is not required to trigger state constitutional guarantee of privacy). Although
the employee drug testing program involved in Wilkinson was upheld, the court stated:
Common experience with the ever-increasing use of computers in contemporary soci-
ety confirms that the amendment was needed and intended to safeguard individual
privacy from intrusion by both private and governmental action. That common experi-
ence makes it only too evident that personal privacy is threatened by the information-
gathering capabilities and activities not just of government, but of private business as
well. If the right of privacy is to exist as more than a memory or dream, the power of
both public and private institutions to collect and preserve data about individual citi-
zens must be subject to constitutional control.
Id.
177. 2 LEVESQUE, supra note 176, at 11.1.11 (listing four areas of invasion of privacy that
create a cause of action under certain state statutes).
178. See DECKER. supra note 36, at 97-99.
179. Id. at 99.
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The federal and state statutes are discussed below, but not in an attempt to
provide a comprehensive analysis of all provisions presented. Instead, the pur-
pose is to demonstrate that these provisions, viewed in their entirety, do not
provide a comprehensive solution to the problems addressed by this Article.
1. Occupational Safety and Health Act and Similar State Statutes
Worker safety laws alone do not provide a comprehensive solution to the
problems associated with artificial monitoring and surveillance in the work-
place. First, they do not provide for advance employee notice or opportunity to
inspect records. 180 Second, they generally have ignored long-term stress as a
safety factor. 8'
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 ("OSHA") 182 could, in
limited circumstances, restrict particular employer monitoring and surveillance
practices. For example, it is conceivable that scientific studies will at some
point in the future irrefutably establish that video display terminals used in
the monitoring and surveillance process pose a serious health hazard. OSHA
mandates that each employer 8 ' provide each employee' 8 with a place of em-
ployment free from "recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause
death or serious physical harm."' 85 Based on current research, however, it is
unlikely that the common -artificial monitoring and surveillance devices dis-
cussed above would fall into this category except in the most unusual of
circumstances.
OSHA does, in fact, recognize the possibility of psychological damage from
workplace conditions.186 But the statutory mandate to employers concerning
workplace safety ordinarily would not apply, either because the hazard is not
one that is recognized or because the type of damage it is likely to cause is not
180. See, e.g., The Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 657(a)(3) (1988)
("OSHA"). OSHA provides employees with the opportunity to inspect records in limited circum-
stances. Id. However, this limited opportunity to inspect does not provide employees with signifi-
cant protection from the myriad forms of monitoring and surveillance available to employers.
181. Id. § 652(a)(6).
182. Id. §§ 651-78.
183. Id. § 652(5) (defining "employer" as any person with employees engaged in a business
affecting interstate commerce, excluding federal and state government).
184. Id. § 652(a)(6).
185. Id. § 654(a)(1). Note also that OSHA requires employers to disclose certain medical
records about their employees to the federal government upon demand. Id. § 657(c)(2)-(3); see
also 29 C.F.R. § 1910.20 (1991) (discussing access to employee exposure and medical records).
186. The congressional statement of purpose notes that the Act is to foster research in the field
of occupational health and safety, "including psychological factors involved." 29 U.S.C. §
651(b)(5). In fact, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health is currently con-
ducting research, as discussed above, concerning the relationship between stress and artificial
monitoring and surveillance in the workplace. See Robert A. Bohrer, Fear and Trembling in the
Twentieth Century: Technological Risk, Uncertainty and Emotional Distress, 1984 Wis. L. REV.
83, 120 n.168 ("Although OSHA has not, to date, considered in any systematic way the problem
of workplace-induced psychological stress, that problem has begun to attract considerable atten-
tion in the closely related context of worker's compensation law." (citations omitted)).
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
"death or physical harm." 8 '
Many states and some municipalities have enacted legislation regulating
health and safety in the workplace 88 in a manner similar to OSHA. For ex-
ample, the question of the long-term health effects of video display terminals
("VDT's") upon employees is currently a matter of significant debate. A sig-
nificant amount of attention in the popular press has been given to an ordi-
nance enacted by the city of San Francisco placing restrictions upon the use of
VDTs in the private workplace. 88
2. State Worker's Compensation Statutes
In a manner similar to workers' safety laws, workers' compensation laws are
an inadequate remedy for the problem of monitoring and surveillance because
of their emphasis on physical injury and injury caused by sudden events. The
states are currently split on the question of whether to permit recovery of mon-
itoring-induced stress.'8 0 Most states, however, will not permit any recovery
under this theory unless the stress can be characterized as "unusual."''
3. Antidiscrimination in Employment Legislation
Various statutes prohibiting employment discrimination would provide relief
from artificial monitoring and surveillance in the workplace when it is used for
illegitimate purposes, for instance as a tool to hide discrimination on an im-
proper basis. Those statutes are not, however, a protection in most cases when
the artificial techniques are being used for legitimate reasons.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,12 for example, prohibits employ-
187. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (stating the central mandate of OSHA-that every employer must
provide a workplace "free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or
serious physical harm" to employees).
188. DECKER. supra note 36, at 83 nn.424-25.
189. See San Francisco Mayor Signs Revolutionary VDT Ordinance; Mayor Art Agnos Moni-
tor, PC WK., Jan. 7, 1991, at 137 (reporting that these restrictions apply only to employers with
15 or more employees and that, after a four-year phase-in period, employers will be required to
provide detachable keyboards, height-adjustable monitors, adequate lighting, and breaks).
190. See generally Anthony M. Stiegler, Comment, Worker's Compensation: Compensating
Claimants Who Suffer Psychological Disabilities Caused Solely by Job-Related Mental Stress,
60 TUL. L. REV. 651, 651 (1986) ("A split in the laws of the states exists on the issue of whether
an employee who suffers a psychological disability caused solely by job-related mental stress
should be awarded benefits under the applicable worker's compensation statute."); Donald M.
Zupanec, Annotation, Mental Disorders As Compensable Under Workmen's Compensation Acts,
97 A.L.R.3D 161 (1980). Courts more frequently grant recovery to a worker's compensation
claimant in a "sudden shock" case. Stiegler, supra, at 655. Compare Mettes v. Transamerica Ins.
Corp., 521 N.E.2d 1138 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (holding that absent a showing of physical injury,
worker's compensation does not extend to psychological disability resulting from conditions of
employment) with McKinstry v. Industrial Indem., 742 P.2d 671 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
that worker's compensation covers an employee's stress-related mental disorder mainly caused by
employment conditions).
191. THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 111-12.
192. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988), amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, P.L.
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ment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Em-
ployee monitoring and surveillance techniques that are used to discriminate
intentionally or that have a disparate impact' 93 on members of a protected
class might give rise to a Title VII claim. A similar claim might arise under
other federal statutes that, correspondingly, prohibit employment discrimina-
tion for various other reasons. For example, the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967194 prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of
age, and section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973195 prohibits certain
discrimination in employment by certain federal contractors on the basis of a
recognized handicap. Recently, the Americans With Disabilities Act 96 be-
came law. Title 1197 of that new law, which will take effect for employers with
twenty-five or more employees on July 26, 1992, and on July 26, 1994, for
employers with fifteen to twenty-four employees, vastly expands the prohibi-
tions against employment discrimination on the basis of disabilities. 98 In addi-
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. See generally Julia C. Ross, New Civil Rights Act: Law Reverses Sev-
eral Recent High Court Decisions, 78 A.B.A. J. 85 (1992) (discussing effects of the 1991 Civil
Rights Act amendments); see also The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988),
amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, P.L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (providing remedy for
race-based employment discrimination on the job).
193. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that a facially neutral employ-
ment policy violates Title VII if discriminatory in effect); see, e.g., Johnson v. Pike Corp., 332 F.
Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (holding that discharging employees whose wages had been garnished
violated the 1964 Civil Rights Act because of the discriminatory impact on members of minority
groups); Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), modified, 472 F.2d 631
(9th Cir. 1972) (holding that use by the employer of information about arrests, not convictions,
for a number of offenses other than minor offenses was impermissible). See generally Pamela L.
Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 523 (1991) (discuss-
ing the differences between the "fault theory" of disparate impact and the "effects theory," the
latter of which was generally adopted by the Civil Rights Act of 1991); Russell J. Davis, Annota-
tion, Employer's Consideration of Background or "Character" Investigation of Applicant for
Employment, Including Inquiry into Credit Record, Military Service Record, and the Like, as
Unlawful Employment Practice Violative of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, as Amended
(42 USCS secs. 2000e et seq.), 40 A.L.R. FED. 473 (1978); Annotation, Consideration of Arrest
Record as Unlawful Employment Practice Violative of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42
USCS secs. 2000e et seq.), 33 A.L.R. FED. 263 (1977).
194. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
195. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1988); see, e.g., Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(holding that a blanket policy prohibiting employment of former drug addicts was violation of the
1973 Rehabilitation Act). Note also that certain employers covered by this statute or by the Viet-
nam Era Readjustment Act, 38 U.S.C. § 2012 (1988), are limited in the disclosure of medical
information concerning employees. See Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir.
1990) (upholding the dismissal of suit brought by former nurse against local government hospital
claiming that his discharge for failure to submit to his employer results of an HIV antibody test
violated his rights under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as well as under various
other state and federal laws).
196. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
197. Id. §§ 12111-12117.
198. See Novack, supra note 34, at 98. Novack, referring to the development of medical
databases by employers to control medical expenses and inquiries asks, "Will employers use the
data they are accumulating to weed out less healthy workers and malingerers?" Id. He concludes:
19921
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 41:739
tion to the provisions of this new law generally prohibiting employment dis-
crimination on the basis of disability, it will severely curtail the use of medical
examinations by employers. 99 Similarly, many states limit the use of tests by
private employers to determine whether an employee is infected with or is a
carrier of a communicable disease. 200
In addition to these federal statutes, which are generally labeled as antidis-
crimination-in-employment laws, other federal statutes, such as OSHA, con-
tain anti retaliation provisions designed to protect employees against adverse
personnel decisions based on the exercise of federally created employee rights.
For example, both Title VII and OSHA prohibit retaliation against an em-
ployee for exercising her rights under those laws.20' Other federal statutes pro-
tect employees from adverse personnel decisions based on their exercise of
other rights that are not necessarily related to the employment relationship.
For example, the right of an employer to discharge an employee because of
wage garnishments is limited by the Consumer Credit Protection Act.2 2
For better or worse, they can't. In July 1992 the Americans With Disabilities Act,
passed last year, will come into force, making it illegal for employers to refuse to hire
people who have had health problems. The law might well also bar employers from
rejecting people because they filed worker compensation claims.
Id. See generally Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans With Disabilities Act: An Overview, 1989 U.
ILL. L. REV. 923, 926-31 (discussing the employment discrimination section of the ADA); Laura
A. Candris & George J. Wallace, Understanding the New Disabilities Act, in ISSUES IN BANK
REG., Winter 1991, at 9 (explaining the Act with a step-by-step analysis of each pertinent sec-
tion); Lisa A. Lavelle, Note, The Duty to Accommodate: Will Title I of the Americans With
Disabilities Act Emancipate Individuals With Disabilities only To Disable Small Businesses?, 66
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1135 (1991) (discussing the effect of the ADA on small businesses).
199. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (c). Final regulations under the Americans With Disabilities Act were
adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on July 26, 1991. 29 C.F.R. § 1630
(1991). These regulations specifically prohibit employment tests or other selection criteria that
screen out or tend to screen out individuals with disabilities unless a job-related business necessity
is established. Id. § 1630.10. In the case of medical examinations, these are permissible after an
employment offer is made (even if the offer is conditional on the outcome of the test) if all em-
ployees in that same job category are subjected to the test. Id. § 1630.14(b). Such exams may not
be used to screen out disabled persons for reasons that are not justified by a job-related business
necessity. Id. § 1630.14(b)(3). Employees may also be required to take a medical examination. Id.
§ 1630.14(c).
200. See SHEPARD. supra note 132, at 166 (pointing out that some states expressly limit the
right of employers to administer blood tests to detect the presence of HIV antibodies while other
states have laws prohibiting handicap discrimination that may limit that right); DECKER, supra
note 36, at 94-95 (pointing out that testing is required for certain occupations and prohibited in
other circumstances by various state laws).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1988) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1988) (OSHA); see
also Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a) (1988); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7622(a) (1988); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1988); Railroad
Safety Act, 45 U.S.C. § 441(a), (b)(1) (1988). In addition, the False Claims Act would protect
an employee in certain circumstances for exposing the fraudulent activities of his employer if that
employer were a federal contractor. 42 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (1988).
202. 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1988); see also Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1875(a) (1988) (protecting employees called to serve on jury duty); 11 U.S.C. § 525(b) (1988)
(protecting employees from adverse action by private employers because of debtor status under
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Many states have antidiscrimination-in-employment statutes that, in a man-
ner similar to Title VII, prohibit discrimination in employment based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 0 Similarly, many state statutes outlaw
employment discrimination based on handicap. 0 4 Some states specifically pro-
hibit discrimination in employment based upon genetic testing results. 20 5 A
substantial number of states prohibit lifestyle discrimination 200 and at least
one state is considering a law to prevent discrimination against off-duty
smokers. 20
7
In a manner similar to the federal statutes discussed above, it is not uncom-
mon for state statutes to protect employees against retaliation for the exercise
of state-created employment rights. Nor is it uncommon for state statutes to
protect employees against retaliation for the exercise of other state-created
rights not necessarily related to the employment relationship. 20 8 But, like the
federal statutes, state statutes in this area do not prohibit the use of monitor-
ing or surveillance techniques, except where such techniques are used to retali-
ate against employees.
4. National Labor Relations Act and Similar State Labor Statutes
Reliance on federal and state labor laws and the collective bargaining pro-
cess is not the long-term solution to the problems of artificial monitoring and
surveillance in the workplace. Due primarily to the small and declining per-
centage of unionized workers, 20 9 this simply would not provide a comprehen-
sive solution to the problem. The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") 1 0
does not prohibit the use of artificial monitoring and surveillance. Similarly,
that activity ordinarily would not be expressly prohibited in the states statutes
similar to NLRA.21
Despite the absence of an express prohibition, artificial monitoring and sur-
veillance may well violate the prohibition in NLRA against employer activities
designed to prevent employees from exercising their rights under the federal
labor law. 21 2 Furthermore, it is possible that artificial monitoring and surveil-
Bankruptcy Code or because of association with debtor).
203. DECKER, supra note 36, at 82 n.418.
204. Id. at 83 nn.420-23.
205. See Swoboda, supra note 61, at H3 (describing New Jersey statute prohibiting employ-
ment discrimination based upon "atypical hereditary cellular or blood trait").
206. See Stop Bosses' Invasion of Workers' Privacy, supra note 69, at 6A (reporting that Colo-
rado, Kentucky, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia all have statutes
banning employment discrimination based on lifestyle).
207. See Mauro & Lawlor, supra note 36, at IA.
208. See DECKER, supra note 36, at 86 n.443 (discussing the state whistleblowing statutes).
209. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text (discussing the decrease in the number of
unionized workers in the United States).
210. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1988).
211. See DECKER, supra note 36, at 81 nn.408-09.
212. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (making it an unfair labor practice for an employer to restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of their rights under NLRA); see, e.g., NLRB v. J. Weingarten,
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lance would violate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement under cer-
tain circumstances. 13 As discussed above, the relatively small unionized por-
Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975) (holding that employer violated section 8(a)(1) of NLRA by denying
an employee's request for union presence at investigatory interview to determine whether discipli-
nary action should be taken against the employee for theft). Compare NLRB v. R.C. Mahon Co.,
269 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1959) (holding that employer observations of employee activities carried out
in employer's plant on company time was not violation of NLRA section 8(a)(l), even in absence
of company rule permitting such observation) with Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. NLRB, 536
F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1976) (holding that employer's surveillance of union organizer's attempts to use
pay telephone at plant was violation of section 8(a)(1)).
Arguments of this nature have often arisen in labor-arbitrations decisions involving searches of
employees. For example, one arbitration involved the employer's insistence that it be allowed to
search the lunch box of an employee suspected of conducting gambling activities on the employer's
premises. The arbitrator ruled that the fact the employees were asked to purchase their own locks
for tool boxes gave those employees a "half-private" and "half-company" property characteriza-
tion, with the result that the employer could not search the boxes at any time for any reason.
However, the arbitrator found that the employer had a reasonable basis in this particular situa-
tion. In re Kawneer Co., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 297 (Dec. 27, 1985) (Alexander, Arb.).
In In re Boone Energy, 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 27 (July 2, 1985) (O'Connell, Arb.), the employer
observed a nonclassified employee under the influence of a controlled substance and used that
observation as the primary basis to conduct a search of all employees. The employer required the
workers to submit blood and urine samples and to sign an authorization sheet. The arbitrator
ruled that the employer could search for contraband in this manner as long as it was done in a
nondiscriminatory fashion, but the employer could not use a positive blood or urine test to conclu-
sively determine that the employee was under the influence of controlled substances while work-
ing. Id.; see also In re Daniel Int'l Corp., 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 109 (Nov. 20, 1984) (Thornell,
Arb.) (halving back pay when employee refused to submit to second lunch box search upon enter-
ing nuclear power plant was too severe a punishment); In re Lake Park, 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 27
(July 6, 1984) (Griffin, Arb.) (discharge of food service worker who refused to allow inspection of
purse at end of shift was proper when done in response to reports of incidents of theft on em-
ployer's premises). See generally Charles B. Craver, The Inquisitorial Process in Private Employ-
ment, 63 CORNELL L. REV. I, 61-63 (1977) (discussing partial restrictions on use of surveillance
techniques by employers under NLRA).
213. See, e.g., In re Eico, Inc., 44 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 563 (Apr. 14, 1965) (Delaney, Arb.). In
Eico, the employer installed and operated a closed circuit television system on the production floor
in one of its plants. Although there were 19 floor supervisors, this system allowed the plant man-
ager to maintain continual video surveillance in the plant manager's office. The union claimed that
this surveillance was a violation of the right to privacy; that it was illegal "spying"; and that it
violated the collective bargaining agreement, which required the employer to continue in force any
"conditions of employment which are not covered by this agreement which are beneficial to em-
ployees." Id. at 564. The arbitrator's favorable ruling for the union was based solely on the con-
tractual argument. The arbitrator found that the surveillance imposed an "appreciable and intol-
erable" burden on employees, stating:
The device at hand is not only personally repugnant to the employees, but it has such
an inhibiting effect as to prevent the employees from performing their work with con-
fidence and ease. Every employee has occasion to pause in the course of his work, to
take a 'breather', to scratch his head, to yawn, or otherwise be himself without affect-
ing his work. An employee, with reason, would hesitate at all times to so behave, if his
every action is being recorded on TV.
Id.
In In re FMC Corp., 46 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 335 (Mar. 23, 1966) (Mittenthal, Arb.), the em-
ployer installed a closed circuit television, with the employees' knowledge, in a plant to observe a
receiving room from where the employer was losing property due to theft. That television received
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tion of the United States labor force renders this a relatively ineffective overall
method of regulation.
5. Fair Credit Reporting Act and Similar State Statutes
The statutes regulating credit reports are examples of device-specific stat-
utes not providing a comprehensive solution to the workplace privacy issue.
Viewed narrowly, they represent an important protection against a specific
technique. Viewed broadly, they regulate one technique while, correspond-
ingly, encouraging use of alternate techniques to accomplish the same end
result.
The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 197 0 "' requires that employers obtain
consumer credit reports on applicants and employees only for legitimate rea-
sons, 2 1 requires notice of adverse action taken as a result of such reports,"'6
and requires advance notice21 7 to the subject of the report in the case of cer-
tain investigative consumer reports.2 18 Some states have enacted statutes that
are similar to the Fair Credit Reporting Act.2 19
only a picture, not sound. Id. at 336 nl. The arbitrator declined to address the union's argument
that this violated human dignity and ruled strictly upon an interpretation of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. Id. at 337 n.6. The arbitrator distinguished this situation from Eico because the
collective bargaining agreement in this case had no "present conditions" clause. Id. In ruling
favorably for the employer, the arbitrator found that the employees' privacy rights could not have
been violated because the employees' actions simply were not private. Id. at 338.
Similarly, in In re Casting Eng'rs, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 939 (May 20, 1981) (Petersen, Arb.),
the employer installed a videotape camera system to monitor the punch-in clock on a continual
basis. Id. Notice to employees was given in advance. The arbitrator ruled that the employer was
justified in discharging certain employees under the "just cause" provision of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, because when some of the employees punched in more than one card upon
arrival, and other employees used those pre-punched cards upon their later arrival, their actions
constituted theft of the employer's time. Id.
214. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681--1681t (1988). Note that Congress is now considering several proposals
to strengthen the Fair Credit Reporting Act. See Gerri E. Detweiler, Congress Takes Aim at
Credit Reporting, AM. BANKER, Sept. 10, 1991, at 6A (discussing legislative proposals);
Rothfeder, supra note 66, at 77 (discussing the multiple loopholes in this law and its many
abuses). See also the following proposals to amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act: H.R. 3596,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 421, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 670, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991); H.R. 1751, 102d Cong., 1st sess. (1991). See generally Bonnie G. Camden, Com-
ment, Fair Credit Reporting Act: What You Don't Know May Hurt You, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 267
(1988) (arguing that legislative intent has been circumvented, as a practical matter, by allowing
reports to be delivered to individuals without a legitimate need for the information).
215. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (specifically providing that a report may be obtained for "employment
purposes"); see Peller v. Retail Credit Co., 359 F. Supp. 1235 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (holding that
employer who terminated clerk after learning she had been arrested for shoplifting as child was
not liable under Fair Credit Reporting Act), affd, 505 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1974).
216. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (such as denial of an employment offer based on information in the
credit report).
217. Id. § 1681(d)(1).
218. Id. § 1681a(e).
219. See DECKER, supra note 36, at 79-80; 2 LEVESQUE, supra note 176, at 11.1.8 to 11.1.9;
SMITH. supra note 176, at 10-11.
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6. Polygraph Protection Act and Similar State Statutes
Perhaps the best examples of the long-term inadequacy of device-specific
regulatory schemes are the federal and state statutes regulating use of
polygraphs. The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988220 severely limits
the use of polygraph examinations by private employers. 21 As a practical mat-
ter, it has virtually eliminated the use of polygraphs in day-to-day employment
decisions but has driven many employers to use alternative techniques to
achieve the same goals.
222
In addition to the federal law limiting polygraph examinations discussed
above, many states have statutes limiting the use of those exams by employ-
ers."' In some cases, they are broader in scope and more strict than the fed-
eral statute. Some states have enacted legislation limiting the use of what are
commonly referred to as paper and pencil honesty tests or integrity tests. 2
24
7. Unauthorized Opening of Mail
Another technique specifically addressed by federal law is mail opening. It
is a federal crime to take a piece of mail from any mail carrier before it has
been delivered to the person to whom it was directed if the person doing the
taking has the intention to pry into the business or secrets of another.225 This
would apply, for example, if an employer, wishing to know whether an em-
ployee were pursuing alternative employment opportunities, and with the re-
quired mens rea, 226 opened mail delivered at the employer's place of business
220. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1988). See generally Ching W. Chin, Note, Protecting Employ-
ees and Neglecting Technology Assessment: The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 55
BROOK. L. REV. 1315 (1990) (providing an overview of employee protections in Polygraph Protec-
tion Act). Note also that the drug and genetic testing programs of private employers present
issues similar to those raised by polygraph examinations. The Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988
imposes affirmative duties on certain government contractors in this regard. 41 U.S.C. §§ 701-707
(1988). However, there is no comprehensive federal statute regulating drug testing in the private
workplace in the manner the Employee Polygraph Protection Act regulates polygraph administra-
tion. Also, there is no comprehensive statutory regulation of genetics testing.
221. Terry M. Dworkin, Protecting Private Employees from Enhanced Monitoring: Legislative
Approaches, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 59, 72 (1990). Dworkin provides an in-depth discussion of the spe-
cific prohibitions of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988. Id. at 61-72.
222. Id. at 72.
223. DECKER, supra note 36, at 92-93 (listing statutes regulating polygraphs and truth-eliciting
devices); 2 LEVESQUE, supra note 176, at 11.1.8 to 11.1.9; SMITH, supra note 176, at 26-27; see
also Moniodis v. Cook, 494 A.2d 212 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 500 A.2d 649 (Md.
1985) (holding that employee terminated for refusal to take polygraph has cause of action against
employer under state statute).
224. See DECKER, supra note 36, at 93 (discussing Maryland statute limiting use of inquiries
into psychological matters); Arnold et al., supra note 14, at 65 (discussing legislation in Massa-
chusetts and Rhode Island); see also SHEPARD, sup'ra note 132, at 156 (listing states in which it
may be argued that state law limiting polygraphs also extends to written honesty tests).
225. 18 U.S.C. § 1702 (1988) (imposing a maximum punishment of $2000 fine and five years
imprisonment).
226. Id. ("design to obstruct the correspondence, or pry into the business or secrets of
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but addressed personally to the employee.227 Again, this is an example of an
activity-specific prohibition that applies only in certain circumstances and that
does not address the technological problems of today.
8. Privacy Acts and Similar State Statutes
Federal statutes, often considered to constitute comprehensive privacy legis-
lation, are in fact quite limited in scope. Generally, it is intrusion by the gov-
ernment, not private parties, that is limited by these statutes.
The Privacy Act of 197428 is an example. That statute provides a limited
degree of privacy protection to private sector employees by limiting the dis-
closure Of certain information maintained by federal agencies. For example, if
information concerning an employee of a private employer were in the files of
a federal agency because federal law required the employer to report that in-
formation, the Privacy Act would limit the ability of the federal agency to
disclose that information to a new employer. Other federal statutes similarly
limit the disclosure of private information in the hands of the federal
government.22 9
The Privacy Act also established a Privacy Protection Study Commission.22 0
That commission issued a report in 1977 that contained many recommenda-
tions applicable to employers in the private sector.21 For example, it recom-
mended severe restrictions on the use of polygraph examinations.
Many states have enacted legislation similar to the Privacy Act. Those stat-
utes are generally intended to limit the disclosure of information in state-gov-
ernment employee records. 12 Many states, in a manner similar to the Right to
Financial Privacy Act, limit the access of government agencies to bank
records.23
9. The Right to Financial Privacy Act and Similar State Statutes
The approach taken by federal and state statutes to financial privacy is sim-
ilar to the approach taken by the Privacy Act. Generally government, not pri-
another").
227. See Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1340 (9th Cir. 1987) (stat-
ing the general rule but finding employer not liable there because the letters in question had either
not been mailed or had already been received by the employee, and because of doubts about
existence of private cause of action).
228. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988); see also Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (compel-
ling disclosure of certain information maintained by the federal government).
229. Access is limited to federally funded criminal justice information systems. 42 U.S.C. §
3735 (1988). Disclosure of school records is limited by 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1988 & Supp. II
1990), and disclosure of tax records is limited by 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
230. See generally PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN IN-
FORMATION SOCIETY (1977) The purpose of the commission was to examine individual privacy
rights and recordkeeping practices in many environments.
231. Id. at 37 (summarizing recommendations throughout report).
232. DECKER. supra note 36, at 78 n.393.
233. SMITH. supra note 176, at 5-6.
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vate, intrusions are regulated. The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 197824
regulates the federal government in this respect.
These statutes are not a significant limitation on the efforts of employers to
obtain information concerning the financial affairs of employees and prospec-
tive employees. The federal statute limits only the federal government 236 in
any attempt to review the "financial records"23 of customers"' maintained by
financial institutions. 28 The Act does not completely deny access of the fed-
eral government to those records; it simply limits the circumstances under
which access is permissible and provides procedural protections for the cus-
tomer when the federal government seeks access.23 9 For example, a request by
a private employer to a bank to review the records of one of its employees
would not be limited by the Right to Financial Privacy Act. Instead, the em-
ployee's primary protection against a disclosure of that type would be the em-
ployee's common law privacy rights and any rights under state banking
statutes.
10. The Video Privacy Protection Act
The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988,40 often referred to as the "Bork
Bill,' 21 is an example of a statute implemented in reaction to a particular
234. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). The provisions of the Electronic Fund
Transfer Act require that financial institutions offering electronic banking services inform custom-
ers when information about that electronic banking will be disclosed to third parties in the ordi-
nary course of business. 15 U.S.C. § 1693c(a)(9) (1988). See generally Roy E. Huhs, Jr., To
Disclose or Not To Disclose Customer Records, BANKING L.J., Jan./Feb. 1991, at 30 (discussing
common law duties of confidentiality owed by a bank to its customers).
235. "Government authority" is defined to include only agencies and departments of the federal
government or an officer, employee, or agent of such department or agency. 12 U.S.C. § 3401(3).
236. Id. § 3401(2) (information pertaining to customer's relationship with financial institution).
237. Id. § 3401(5). Due to the definition of person in the statute, the term "customer" includes
only individuals and partnerships of five or fewer individuals. Id. § 3401(4).
238. Id. § 3401(1).
239. A government authority is denied access to the financial records of a customer in a finan-
cial institution unless one of the specific exceptions in the Right to Financial Privacy Act applies.
Id. § 3402. Correspondingly, a financial institution may not release those financial records to a
government authority unless the provisions of the Right to Financial Privacy Act have been satis-
fied and the government authority has certified its compliance in writing. Id. § 3403. This limita-
tion on the financial institution does not apply to notifying the federal government of information
concerning possible violations of the law, or to protection of the bank's own interests, such as the
filing of a proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding or the processing of a customer application
for a government-sponsored program. Id. § 3403(c)-(d). For the exceptions to these general
prohibitions on disclosure, see id. § 3404 (customer authorization); id. § 3405 (administrative
subpoena or summons); id. § 3406 (search warrant); id. § 3407 judicial subpoena); id. § 3408
(formal written request); and id. § 3413 (general exceptions).
240. 18 U.S.C. § 2701-2711 (1988).
241. See Janlori Goldman, Where the Public Draws the Line; Consumers Are Learning They
Can Say 'No' to Invasions of Privacy, COMPUTERWORLD, Apr. 15, 1991, at 25; W. John Moore,
When To Let Them Alone, NAT'L J., Oct. 14, 1989, at 2518 (describing the enactment of this
legislation in response to the public disclosure of video preferences of then Supreme Court nomi-
nee Robert H. Bork, and questioning the policy behind making video records harder to obtain
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misuse of information. The Video Privacy Protection Act limits the access of
third parties to information privately maintained in an "electronic communica-
tion service" or a "remote computing service."242 Similarly, it limits the access
of third parties to "personally identifiable information 243 in the files of a
"video tape service provider."24  For example, it would prevent an employer
from gaining access to the personal computer files of an employee maintained
in a "remote computing service. ' 24 5 The act also prohibits a Video rental store
from disclosing its records of what titles were rented by a customer without
thecustomer's consent. 46 Similar restrictions are imposed upon cable televi-
sion companies, limiting their ability to disclose personally identifiable infor-
mation about a customer, such as her viewing choices.2 47
11. ERISA
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") 2 8 may
provide remedies for employees subjected to artificial monitoring and surveil-
lance in very limited circumstances. Specifically, section 510 of ERISA pro-
hibits employers from discriminating against a participant in any employee
benefit plan for exercising her rights under the plan and from depriving an
employee of benefits under the plan.2 9 For example, it would likely be a viola-
tion of this protection if an employer used artificial monitoring to discover that
an employee suffered from a serious medical condition, then discharged the
employee in order to save the costs of funding benefits. 250
12. The Wiretap Act and Similar State Statutes
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("Wiretap Act")2"1 demon-
than more sensitive insurance data). The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 enacted 18 U.S.C.
§ 2710 (1988) and renumbered the former § 2710 as § 2711.
242. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3).
243. Id.
244. Id. § 2710(a)(4).
245. Id. § 2702(a)(2) (prohibiting the provider of that service from knowingly divulging the
information). Divulging employee information through a "remote computing service" is described
as "provision to the public of computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic
communications system." Id. § 2711(2).
246. Id. § 2710.
247. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c) (1988).
248. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
249. Id. § 1140. See generally Joan Vogel, Containing Medical and Disability Costs by Cut-
ting Unhealthy Employees: Does Section 510 of ERISA Provide a Remedy?, 62 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1024, 1061 (1987) ("[Slection 510 of ERISA provides relief if the employees or family
members can establish that the adverse employment action was taken, in substantial part, to inter-
fere with existing or future rights under an employee benefit plan.").
250. See, e.g., Donohue v. Custom Management Corp., 634 F. Supp. 1190, 1197 (W.D. Pa.
1986) (noting that cost savings alone would not be a defense); Folz v. Mancott Corp., 594. F.
Supp. 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (holding that a manager had a claim against his employer when he
was terminated to avoid employer liability under several benefit plans).
251. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988), as amended by Electronic Communications Privacy Act
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strates the manner in which exceptions potentially devour a rule. This statute,
at first glance, provides significant protection against some of the most com-
mon artificial monitoring and surveillance devices. However, as the following
analysis shows, statutory exceptions make the protection virtually meaningless
in the case of day-to-day monitoring and surveillance by employers in the pri-
vate sector. An analysis of the Wiretap Act is also useful in that it provides an
illustration of the problems of implementation.
The Wiretap Act252 makes it illegal to "intercept" willfully any "wire or
oral or electronic communication."2 3 Since this prohibition applies to private
parties as well as the government, wiretapping by an employer to intercept an
employee's phone call made at work would be an illegal "interception" of a
"wire communication 2 54 in some cases. Furthermore, recording by an em-
ployer of an employee's oral communications in the workplace would be an
illegal "interception" of an "oral communication "255 in some cases.
There are criminal penalties for violation of the Wiretap Act.256 If the inter-
ception is illegal, the person whose communication is intercepted is addition-
ally given the right to bring a civil action to remedy the unlawful intercep-
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 101, 100 Stat. 1848, 1851.
252. See generally Kastenmeier et al., supra note 7 (discussing extensively the reasons for the
enactment of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986). The Wiretap Act prohibits
only content eavesdropping, not eavesdropping solely to determine the existence of the communi-
cation. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4), (8). Further, it applies only to the specific kinds of communications
listed in the statute. See United States v. Gregg, 629 F. Supp. 958 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (holding that
Wiretap Act, as in effect at the time of the communications interceptions (1984), was inapplicable
to telex communications because telexes did not constitute oral communications), afl'd, 829 F.2d
1430 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988). In part as a result of Gregg, which
demonstrated that the Wiretap Act had failed to keep pace with technological development, the
Wiretap Act was amended in 1986. S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555-57. The 1986 legislation added "electronic communications" to
the types of protected communications and defined the term to mean "any transfer of signs, sig-
nals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by
a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photo-optical system." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4),
(12). Furthermore, the Wiretap Act was extended to apply to certain private communications
systems, and the definition of "wire communication" was broadened to include digitized voice
transmissions and voice transmissions made by radio or fiber-optic cable. Id. § 2510(l). For an
extensive discussion of the Wiretap Act, see generally Jonathan J. Green, Note, Electronic Moni-
toring in the Workplace: The Need for Standards, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 438 (1984).
253. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1).
254. Id. § 2510(l). As noted above, applying this statutory prohibition to the interception of
electronic mail of an employee is unclear. See THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at
108-09 n.85; Note, supra note 18, at 1911 ("The ECPA precludes government agents and third
parties from intercepting electronic mail without the authorization of one of the parties to the
communication, but it has not been held to cover interception of business electronic mail messages
by private parties." (citation omitted)); articles cited supra note 85 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing uncertainty of employer's right to intercept employee's electronic mail).
255. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2). This could apply, for example, if the employer used a video camera
with audio capabilities to film employee activity at work.
256. Id. §§ 2511-2512.
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tion.2 57 For example, in Awbrey v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 8 there
was evidence that the defendant employer installed wiretaps on business
phones in stores where the plaintiff employees worked and during the times
that they worked at those locations.269 The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia held that the employees could maintain a
cause of action under the Wiretap Act even though they could not produce
evidence of wiretapping of specific phone calls made by the individual
plaintiffs.26 °
Despite the relative ease with which the Awbrey plaintiffs were able to bring
their action, the protection given to employees by these statutory prohibitions
is quite limited for a number of reasons. First, the Wiretap Act is intended to
apply only to content interception and not to transactional monitoring. 1
Therefore, although there is uncertainty concerning the application of the
Wiretap Act to certain forms of transactional monitoring, 62 it does not reach
the situation in which the employer activity is merely undertaken to determine
whether a telephone call was made, as opposed to determining the substance
of that call.
Second, the Wiretap Act contains a critical distinction between wire com-
munications and oral communications. The definition of "oral communication"
requires that it be "uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such
communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying
such expectation."2 There is no such expectation-of-privacy requirement for
a wire communication. The distinction between the two can be the difference
between winning and losing a case. Kemp v. Block 2 " was a civil action in
257. Id. § 2520 (reasonable attorneys fees, litigation costs, punitive damages, and the greater of
actual damages, $100 per day of violation or $1000). See generally Michael J. Kaplan, Annota-
tion, Construction and Application of Provision of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1986 (18 U.S.C.S. sec. 2520) Authorizing Civil Cause of Action by Person Whose Wire or Oral
Communication is Intercepted, Disclosed, or Used in Violation of the Act, 25 A.L.R. FED. 759
(1975).
258. 505 F. Supp. 604 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
259. Id. at 606.
260. Id. at 607.
261. See SHEPARD, supra note 132, at 232-33 n.57.
262. Id.
263. Id.; see, e.g., Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d. 1573 (1lth Cir. 1990). In that case, a letter
carrier brought an action against certain of his supervisors under section 2520 of the Wiretap Act
alleging that unspecified activities had violated his rights under that statute. The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama granted summary judgment for the defend-
ants on the grounds that the record was devoid of any evidence supporting the necessary elements
of a state law privacy claim or a claim under the Wiretap Act. Walker v. Darby, 706 F. Supp.
1467 (N.D. Ala. 1989), rev'd, 911 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1990). By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff could raise a question of fact and thereby survive a motion
for summary judgment without proving the contents of the specific conversations allegedly inter-
cepted. Darby, 911 F.2d at 1578. Furthermore, the court of appeals emphasized that a plaintiff
may have subjective and reasonable expectations of noninterception, even though he may not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the workplace generally. Id. at 1578-79.
264. 607 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Nev. 1985).
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which the plaintiff alleged a violation of the Wiretap Act and an invasion of
the plaintiff's privacy by a former co-worker.265 The plaintiff alleged that the
co-worker had recorded the plaintiff's argument with a shop foreman at
work." 6 The place of the argument and the fact that it was conducted in loud
voices defeated the plaintiff's claims on both theories because he had no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.267
Kemp may be contrasted to the result in United States v. McIntyre."' The
defendants in McIntyre were convicted of violations of the Wiretap Act.269
The defendants were the chief of police and a lieutenant in the police depart-
ment who suspected another police officer of leaking political information
damaging to the chief and of engaging in criminal activity.2 70 As a result, they
placed a microphone and a transmitter in a briefcase in the suspect's office and
attempted to monitor his conversations. 27' The court recognized that an estab-
lished regulatory scheme or a specific office practice may, at times, diminish a
reasonable expectation of privacy.27 2 However, a police officer does not give up
all protections by virtue of his chosen profession and does not have to expect
that random monitoring of oral communications would occur. 27
Third, the Wiretap Act contains two important exceptions to the intercep-
tion prohibition. One or both of these exceptions often will apply to employee
monitoring and surveillance. The first is the consent exception. 274 Private per-
sons generally are not prohibited from intercepting a wire or oral communica-
tion when the person making the interception is a party to the communication
or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to
the interception.2 75 Accordingly, if the employee is speaking with a nonem-
ployee, the Wiretap Act will not prohibit the interception if there is express or
implied employee consent. Further, if one employee is speaking with another,
265. Id. at 1263-64.
266. Id. at 1263.
267. Id. at 1264-65.
268. 582 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1978).
269. Id. at 1223.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1224,
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. 18 U.S.C. § 251 ](2)(d). See generally Glenn A. Gauravino, Annotation, Interception of
Telecommunication by or with Consent of Party as Exception, Under 18 USCS 2511(2)(c) and
(d), to Federal Proscription of Such Interceptions, 67 A.L.R. FED. 429 (1984). This consent may
be given expressly by the employee. However, such consent is not to be interpreted as a "talisman
that automatically legitimates" all monitoring of an employee following the consent. Epps v. St.
Mary's Hosp., Inc., 802 F.2d 412, 417 n.I (11th Cir. 1986) (Kravitch, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581 (1I1th Cir. 1983)
(stating that "[clonsent under title III is not to be cavalierly implied"). Correspondingly, the
consent can be implied. Cf. Jandak v. Brookfield, 520 F. Supp. 815, 824-25 (N.D. III. 1981)
(holding that although police officer did not consent to the taping of personal call, officer should
have known he was on "monitored" line).
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interception of the call is not prohibited if one of the two has consented.2 76
The second exception is commonly known as the "business extension exemp-
tion" or the "ordinary course of business exception. 2 77 The definition of "in-
terception" in the Wiretap Act expressly excludes any telephone furnished to
the user by a communications common carrier in the ordinary course of busi-
ness and operated by that user in the ordinary course of business. 278
A series of federal cases construing this business extension exception created
substantial uncertainties about its exact parameters. For example, in United
States v. Harpe1279 the defendant was convicted of disclosing an unlawfully
intercepted wire or oral communication under the Wiretap Act.280 The defend-
ant argued that the government had the burden to prove that the interception
did not occur through the use of a telephone extension. 8 ' The Tenth Circuit
agreed, but held that it is not just any telephone extension that falls under this
rule, rather the extension used in the ordinary course of business. 282 The court
stated, "We hold as a matter of law that a telephone extension used without
authorization or consent to surreptitiously record a private telephone conversa-
tion is not used in the ordinary course of business. ' 283
United States v. Christman2 84 was another prosecution for an alleged viola-
tion of the Wiretap Act. In that case, the regional security chief of a depart-
276. State laws concerning eavesdropping are frequently more stringent than the Wiretap Act.
DECKER. supra note 36, at 84-85; see also Furfaro & Josephson, supra note I (contrasting the
one-party consent rule in New York to the stricter rule in Maryland). See generally Russell G.
Donaldson, Annotation, Construction and Application of State Statutes Authorizing Civil Cause
of Action by Person Whose Wire or Oral Communication Is Intercepted, Disclosed or Used in
Violation of Statutes, 33 A.L.R.4TH 506 (1984); Eric H. Miller, Annotation, Permissible Surveil-
lance, Under State Communications Interception Statute, by Person Other than State or Local
Law Enjrcement Officer or One Acting in Concert with Officer, 24 A.L.R.4TH 1208 (1983). For
example, state laws often require the consent of both parties to a conversation before it may be
recorded or intercepted. See Becker v. Computer Sciences Corp., 541 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Tex.
1982); Morris & Bagby, supra note 2, at 176.
277. See Epps v. St. Mary's Hosp. of Athens, Inc., 802 F.2d 412, 415 (11 th Cir. 1986).
278. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i). See generally Todd R. Smith, Annotation, Eavesdropping on
Extension Telephone as Invasion of Privacy, 49 A.L.R.4TH 430 (1986); Janet B. Jones, Annota-
tion, Application to Extension Telephones of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 (18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq.), Pertaining to Interception of Wire Communica-
tions, 58 A.L.R. FED. 594 (1982). There is also an exception under the Wiretap Act that exempts
the operators of switchboards and communications common carriers when engaged in any activity
incident to the rendition of service or the protection of the rights or property of the carrier as long
as it does not amount to random monitoring. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i). This exception is not
considered in depth here because it is not of general applicability. However, it was the basis for
dismissing a civil action by a former telephone company employee against the telephone company
alleging that his private telephone calls had been monitored. Simmons v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 452 F. Supp. 392 (W.D. Okla. 1978), ad per curiam, 611 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1979).
279. 493 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1974).
280. Id. at 348.
281. Id. at 351.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. 375 F. Supp. 1354 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
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ment store chain became concerned about a large number of improprieties,
including solicitation of prostitution, theft, and improper telephone use, arising
from a particular men's shoe department. 85 The store had a closed-dial tele-
phone system to be used only for calls within the store or to other stores in the
chain.28 6 It was possible to make calls outside that system but it was forbidden
except in unusual circumstances.28 7 The defendant arranged for an extension
phone to be installed in the department in question and proceeded to intercept
and record conversations using that extension. The court found various
grounds to allow the discharge of the defendant.28 First, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California emphasized that a phone
system is designed to be a private system not within the scope of the Wiretap
Act.28 9 Second, the court pointed out that oral communication must be made
with a legitimate expectation of privacy in order to be protected by the Wire-
tap Act because "[i]t is doubtful that employees misusing a private telephone
system are entitled to a reasonable expectation that the communication is not
subject to interception as required by section 2520(2).1129o Third, the court
held expressly that an extension telephone may not be an intercepting device
under the Wiretap Act.2"1 Finally, the court held that random monitoring by
communications common carriers is prohibited by the Wiretap Act but not by
private system operators.1 2
The business extension exception was considered again by the Tenth Circuit
in James v. Newspaper Agency Corp." In James, a former employee sued
her former employer alleging sex discrimination and violation of the Wiretap
Act. The defendant employer had installed a telephone monitoring device on
the telephones in certain of its departments. All of the employees were notified
in advance and supervisory personnel then used the system to assist in training
and instruction and to protect employees from abusive calls. The Tenth Cir-
cuit reconciled its holding here with its prior holding in Harpe2 94 by ruling
that the monitoring in this case was not surreptitious and was for a legitimate
business purpose.2 95
The First Circuit later had an opportunity to consider the business exception
in Campiti v. Walonis.2" In that case, the plaintiffs were inmates at a correc-
285. Id. at 1335.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1355.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. 591 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1979).
294. United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1974); see also supra notes 279-83 and
accompanying text (discussing Harpel).
295. James, 591 F.2d at 581-82.
296. 611 F.2d 387 (1st Cir. 1979).
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tional facility.2 9 7 The defendants monitored a call to which they were parties
by the use of an extension telephone wired to the main switchboard.2"8 The
First Circuit "flatly reject[ed]" the reasoning of the court in United States v.
Christman.2" The court held that there is no general extension-telephone ex-
ception. The court found that the exception is based on the nature of the use
of the extension and not on the nature of the equipment (i.e., an extension
phone or not).30 Accordingly, the exception was not available to the defend-
ants in Campiti.30'
Similar reasoning was then used by the Fifth Circuit in Briggs v. American
Air Filter Co.31 2 to uphold the application of the business extension exception
in another context. In that case, the branch manager of a business had partic-
ularized suspicions about the disclosure of confidential information by an em-
ployee to a competitor.303 Therefore, it was within the scope of the exception
for the manager to listen in on an extension phone to the suspect employee's
calls. First, the court rejected the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in Harpel to
the extent that it may be construed to mean that listening in surreptitiously on
a phone conversation without the consent of either party may never be in the
ordinary course of business.3 0' Second, the court found that the exception was
available because the branch manager listened in only long enough to verify
that business matters were the subject of the call.308 In its holding, the court
declined to determine the exact point at which a violation would occur for
listening in on personal matters or whether random monitoring can ever be
justified under the exception. 06 However, the court expressed skepticism that
the interception of a nonbusiness call could ever be in the ordinary course of
business, then pointed out that a limited interception of those calls might be
appropriate if the employer was having difficulty controlling nonbusiness calls
by employees.30 7
The application of the Briggs reasoning is illustrated by Watkins v. L.M.
Berry & Co.3"8 In Watkins, the plaintiff had been employed as a sales repre-
sentative by the defendant. The plaintiff was aware of the defendant's policy
of monitoring calls as part of its regular training program through the use of
extension phones.0 9 The employees had been informed that personal calls
297. Id. at 389 (rejecting the holding in United States v. Christman, 375 F. Supp. 1354 (N.D.
Cal. 1974)).
298. Id. at 390.
299. Id. at 392.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. 630 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1980).
303. Id. at 420.
304. Id. at 419.
305. Id. at 420.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 420 n.8.
308. 704 F.2d 577, 581 (11th Cir. 1983).
309. Id. at 579.
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were permissible and would be monitored only as long as necessary to deter-
mine their business or personal nature.310 The plaintiff received a call from a
friend and discussed plaintiff's plans to consider another job. The plaintiff was
fired the next day.31 I The Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff had not con-
sented to the interception of the particular call in question. 1 ' The court stated
first that Briggs does not stand for the proposition that a personal call may be
in the ordinary course of business.' Second, the court held that
a personal call may not be intercepted in the ordinary course of business
under the exemption in section 2510(5)(a)(i), except to the extent necessary
to guard against unauthorized use of the telephone or to determine whether
a call is personal or not. In other words, a personal call may be intercepted
in the ordinary course of business to determine its nature but never its
contents.""4
The reasoning of Briggs was again applied in Abel v. Bonfanti.313 In Abel, a
former employee alleged that his former employer had installed a voice acti-
vated recorder to continuously record all calls on one of four lines at a certain
place of business. The court held that, despite the defendant's assertions that
there was a business purpose for this activity and that it was done in a way so
as to minimize the intrusion on personal calls, an issue of fact sufficient to
defeat the defendant's motion for summary judgment existed. 816
Finally, the decision in Epps v. St. Mary's Hospital, Inc.,"1 7 further con-
fused the issues in this area. In that case, two employees of the defendant
employer had a telephone conversation on a "ringdown line" connecting a dis-
patch office to a substation. 8 Another employee overheard part of the conver-
sation that dealt with a supervisor. That employee then went to the dispatch
console and recorded the call.3 19 The court, in applying the rationale of Wat-
kins and Briggs, stated:
[W]e hold that this was not a personal call. It occurred during office hours,
between co-employees, over a specialized extension which connected the
principal office to a substation, and concerned scurrilous remarks about su-
pervisory employees in their capacities as supervisors. Certainly the poten-
tial contamination of a working environment is a matter in which the em-
ployer has a legal interest. Accordingly, we hold that this case falls within
the "telephone extension exception. 3 20
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 582.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 583 (citations omitted).
315. 625 F. Supp. 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
316. ld. at 270.
317. 802 F.2d 412 (11th Cir. 1986).
318. Id. at 413.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 416-17 (footnotes omitted).
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In summary, these cases construing the business extension exception make it
likely that unlimited monitoring by employers of employee calls on work
phones is impermissible. The likely result is that employers may listen in on
employee phone calls as is necessary for business purposes. Longer periods of
listening to employees' personal calls are probably outside the exception. Yet
the law in this area is far from certain. No standard for distinguishing per-
sonal from business calls has been established. Rather, such decisions are left
to the discretion of the judge. The protections offered by the Wiretap Act are
limited. The Act only applies to content interception."' Furthermore, the ex-
ceptions to the prohibition on interception may indeed swallow the rule. 2
Congress, in its proposals for legislation, must take into account the failings of
device-specific prohibitions. In addition, any bill must have well-defined stan-
dards and exceptions to minimize interpretations by the courts that are detri-
mental to the privacy rights of employees.
13. State Personnel Records Statutes
Many states have laws that provide an employee access to his own personnel
records upon request.323 For example, Connecticut statutes grant employees
the right of access to their "personnel files" and the right to correct erroneous
information in these files. 24 The term "personnel file" excludes "medical
records,"3 2 5 "separately maintained security files," 826 and certain test informa-
tion. 3217 Therefore, an employee who is discharged as a result of information
obtained by the employer through artificial monitoring and surveillance infor-
mation might well have the right to see that information and correct it if
erroneous.
28
Obviously, this right is severely limited as a practical matter. First, the em-
ployee may not even be aware that information of this type is in her file be-
cause of the very nature of the information-gathering process. No notice of the
fact that the monitoring and surveillance will be or was carried out is required
by the statute. Second, the information may be exempt from disclosure if it
qualifies as a separately maintained security file. Despite these obvious limita-
321. See supra notes 251-55 and accompanying text (discussing the subject matter of the Wire-
tap Act).
322. See supra notes 274-320 and accompanying text (discussing the two exceptions).
323. DECKER, supra note 36, at 87-88; 2 LEVESQUE, supra note 176, at 11.1.8 to 11.1.9.; SMITH,
supra note 176, at 17-165. See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity and Construction of
Statute Giving Employee the Right to Review and Comment upon Personnel Record Maintained
by the Employer, 64 A.L.R.4TH 619 (1988).
324. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-128(b), (e) (1987).
325. "Personnel file does not mean ... medical records." Id. § 31-128a(3).
326. "Personnel file does not mean ... security files." Id. § 31-128a(5). A record identifiable
with a particular employee is not a security file. Since a security file must be maintained sepa-
rately and not used in an adverse personnel action, it consists of information relating to miscon-
duct or suspected crimes. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. § 31-128(b), (e).
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tions, this area of the law potentially provides the greatest degree of protection
to employees. But the lack of a significant number of appellate court decisions
considering the rights of employees to challenge the records of an employer
concerning the artificial monitoring and surveillance of employees would indi-
cate that very few employees are yet pursuing this avenue.8"9
In addition to these general personnel record protections, confidentiality of
medical records is protected by many state statutes.330 Some states, such as
Maryland, go further and limit the medical information that an employer may
request from a job applicant or employee.381 In addition, employer inquiries
concerning arrest records and personnel decisions based on arrest records with-
out convictions are limited in many states.83 2 Similarly, many states limit ac-
cess to information in the criminal justice information system, such as convic-
tion records.3 8
14. Drug Testing Statutes
Current federal statutes do not pervasively regulate the use of substance
abuse tests in the private sector, although the Drug-Free Workplace Act of
198813' imposes drug-free workplace requirements upon certain federal con-
tractors and grantees. By contrast, some states statutorily limit the use of
urinalysis and blood tests by employers.385
329. See generally Zitter, supra note 323 (discussing cases considering the validity, construc-
tion, and effect of statutes requiring employers to allow employees to inspect, review, and com-
ment on personnel records).
330. DECKER, supra note 36, at 88-89; SMITH, supra note 176, at 14-17.
331. DECKER, supra note 36, at 88 n.452.
332. DECKER, supra note 36, at 89-90; 2 LEVESQUE, supra note 176, at 11.1.8 to 11.1.9; SHEP-
ARD, supra note 132, at 132-33; SMITH, supra note 176, at 3-4.
333. SHEPARD, supra note 132, at 142-43; SMITH. supra note 176, at 8-10.
334. 41 U.S.C. §§ 701-707 (1988); see, e.g., Georgia Power Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, Local 84, 707 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (overturning arbitration decision to rein-
state hazardous electrical equipment worker who failed drug test partly on public policy grounds
found in the Drug-Free Workplace Act), affid per curiam, 896 F.2d 507 (1990).
335. See generally Jonathan V. Holtzman, Drug Testing in the Workplace: Applicant Testing
for Drug Use: A Policy and Legal Inquiry, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 47 (1991) (arguing that the
distinction between applicants and current employees in drug testing law is incorrect); [Law Firm
of] Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Drug Testing in the Workplace: State-by-State Drug and Alcohol
Testing,Survey, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 190 (1991) (providing "a state-by-state summary
of the various statutory, regulatory, constitutional, and common law developments that affect drug
testing and the treatment of substance abusers in the workplace"). Municipal drug testing statutes
are also prevalent. Holtzman, supra, at 50 n.17. Note that a drug test is not a medical examina-
tion for the purposes of the Americans With Disabilities Act. 29 C,.F.R. § 1630.16(c)(1) (1991).
However, the regulations do not encourage, prohibit, or authorize those tests. Id.; see Patricia A.
Hunter, Note, Your Urine or Your Job: Is Private Employee Drug Urinalysis Constitutional in
California?, 19 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1451 (1986) (discussing the limits that the California state
constitution places on mandatory urine testing in the workplace).
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15. Miscellaneous Statutory Limitations
Limited protections are available through a few state statutes that specifi-
cally target monitoring and surveillance activities. 36 Connecticut has adopted
a statute that, although providing significant protection, still is quite limited in
scope. That statute prohibits employers from installing any electronic device or
system in areas designed for personal health or comfort of employees or for
the safeguarding of their possessions.83 7 West Virginia has adopted a statute
regulating the use of telephone service observation. 8" That statute makes it a
misdemeanor to intercept a telephone conversation between an employee and a
customer unless there has been advance notice to the employee and a phone
not subject to such monitoring is provided to employees for personal use.
There are a multitude of other state laws that limit in some manner the
ability of employers to collect or obtain other specific information about em-
ployees and prospective employees. Some states limit the use of fingerprints.839
Similarly, employers in some states are limited in their ability to test for sickle
cell anemia. ' 0 Some states have limitations upon the disclosure by cable tele-
vision companies of information concerning their subscribers.84' Other states
limit the disclosure of information by state agencies-for example, libraries,
voting registration offices, and motor vehicle registration offices--of data bank
information, such as the names of library subscribers. " Taken as a whole,
however, this patchwork quilt of state protection inadequately addresses the
problems of employee monitoring and surveillance.
336. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653 (West 1988) (prohibiting two-way mirrors in
washrooms and similar facilities); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-41a (1989) (prohibiting surveillance
devices in department and clothing store dressing rooms available to the public); see also 2 LE-
VESQUE, supra note 176, at 11.1.8 to 11.1.9.; SMITH, supra note 176, at 71-93 (reflecting Texas'
1983 Electronic Surveillance Act). Some states regulate the use of "spotters." E.g., CAL. PUB.
UTIL. CODE § 8251 (West 1965) (limiting use of spotters by public service corporations unless
certain notice and hearing rights are provided to employees); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.160
(Michie 1989) (prescribing that notice and hearing shall be afforded an employee prior to discipli-
nary action when such action is based on information gathered by a spotter); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4999.17 (Baldwin 1991) (limiting the use of spotters by railroad companies).
337. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48b (1987). The Massachusetts House of Representatives consid-
ered a broader prohibition of employer monitoring in 1969. In response to questions posed by the
House, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rendered an opinion that the statute likely
violated both the United States and Massachusetts constitutions on the grounds of overbreadth.
However, a concurring justice stated that it was likely that the legislature could adopt another
statute that would "protect an employee's private and personal deportment and yet preserve the
rights of the employer so as to pass constitutional muster." In re Opinion of Justices, 250 N.E.2d
448, 450 (Mass. 1969) (Spiegel, J., concurring). To date, no such legislation has been enacted.
See also Dworkin, supra note 221, at 81-83 (noting other state legislative proposals).
338. W. VA. CODE § 61-3-24(a) (1989).
339. DECKER, supra note 36, at 91 n.473; 2 LEVESQUE, supra note 176, at 11.1.8 to 11.1.9.
340. DECKER, supra note 36, at 95.
341. SMITH, supra note 176, at 5-6.
342. Id. at 14-16. Note the limits on bank records disclosure, id. at 5-6, the limits on disclosure
of records in the criminal justice information system, id. at 8-10, the limits on disclosure of school
records, id. at 21-23, and the limits on disclosure of tax records, id. at 23-24.
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B. Common Law Remedies Available to Employees
In addition to these statutory remedies, an employee may assert that an
employer's monitoring and surveillance is tortious. Although the protections
given to employees by the tort law of privacy provide appropriate remedies in
extreme cases, common law principles do not deal adequately with the practi-
cal issues raised by day-to-day legitimate uses of artificial monitoring and sur-
veillance in the workplace. s43 For example, any right of privacy is too easily
bargained away. 3" The essence of the tort is a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy. If the employer simply makes it clear as a condition of employment that
the employee has extremely limited expectations, then the employee has bar-
gained away her right. In a situation of unequal bargaining power, this will
certainly become the norm in the United States workplace.
1. Miscellaneous Tort and Contract Theories
The employment-at-will doctrine has been substantially eroded. 3" As a re-
sult of this erosion and the enactment of various state and federal statutes,
employees face a smorgasbord of theories of recovery if they are harmed by
allegedly improper artificial monitoring and surveillance. 3 6
For example, an employee or applicant adversely affected by employer mon-
.itoring or surveillance might successfully bring an action for wrongful dis-
charge if the particular activity were shown to violate public policy." Alter-
natively, that activity by the employer might be in violation of the terms of an
express employment contract or might violate a contract implied-in-fact by,
for example, a written personnel policy.34 8 Similarly, an employee might claim
that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment
relationship has been breached by the employer. 34 9 If information about that
343. THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 89-90. As stated in that report, "[I]f there
is no real basis in doctrines of privacy for objecting to the proverbial supervisor with a clipboard,
there seems to be none to using a computer to do much the same thing." Id. at 90.
344. Rothfeder & Galen, supra note 9, at 75 (describing techniques commonly used by employ-
ers for this purpose, including waivers by employees, advance notification of surveillance to em-
ployees, and display of employer policies concerning surveillance). "For the most part, a company
must be sloppy to get cornered." Id. For example, a recent article reports that a service, in ex-
change for a fee, will provide employers with arn "all-purpose job application and waiver form"
with which the prospective employee, among other things, purportedly waives all privacy rights.
Kirsten A. Corbett, A Databank on Injured Employees, PRIVACY J., May 1990, at 4.
345. See Dworkin, supra note 221, at 59-60.
346. See generally Brossman, supra note 131 (providing an overview of the various theories of
recovery available).
347. SHEPARD, supra note 132, at 330-31.
348. Id. at 331-33.
349. Id. at 333-37; see also Hineline v. Stroudsburg Elec. Supply Co., 559 A.2d 566 (Pa.
1989). In that case, the plaintiff alleged he had been wrongfully discharged after he disconnected
the employer's surveillance system, a video system with audio capabilities. Id. at 567. The court
refused to determine whether the system violated the Pennsylvania statute and upheld the dismis-
sal of the plaintiff's complaint, which alleged wrongful discharge, intentional interference with
contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, punitive damages, and breach of
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activity is conveyed to a third person in a manner that creates a false impres-
sion about the employee, there is potentially a defamation action against the
employer.350 In some cases, employer activity might be so egregious as to rise
to the level of outrageous conduct or the negligent or intentional infliction of
emotional distress, 51 or perhaps even false imprisonment.3 5 2 In most cases,
however, the claim by the employee will be an invasion of privacy.
2. Privacy Invasion
There are four distinct types of privacy invasion. These are: (1) intrusion,
(2) false light invasion of privacy, (3) appropriation, and (4) public disclosure
of private facts.353
In some cases involving the monitoring or surveillance of employees by their
employers, "public disclosure" or "intrusion" provide a potential claim for re-
lief. Generally, the public disclosure theory is available only when the em-
ployer transmits private information that arose out of its monitoring or surveil-
lance activities to a third party. 54
Intrusion claims by employees are most common. The immediately follow-
ing cases, based on the constitutional issues that arise when the government is
the employer, demonstrate how employee expectations determine the reasona-
bleness of the intrusion. Subsequently, the private employer cases demonstrate
the limited scope of those expectations in the private workplace.
a. Government employees
The central issue in a case alleging that an employee's privacy rights have
fiduciary duty. Id.
350. DECKER, supra note 36, at 91 n.475. Note that some states provide statutory remedies to
persons injured by misrepresentations in connection with employment references. Id. at 99-101.
351. See Leahy v. Federal Express Corp., 609 F. Supp. 668 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (plaintiffs able to
state a claim for relief under false imprisonment, assault, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress theories after employer discharged plaintiffs
following security investigation of theft); Kaminski v. United Parcel Serv., 501 N.Y.S.2d 871
(App. Div. 1986) (employee falsely accused of crime and threatened with criminal prosecution by
employer).
352. See De Angelis v. Jamesway Dep't Store, 501 A.2d 561, 566-67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1985) (damages awarded to supermarket employee who was interrogated by employer and
not allowed to leave employer's premises until confessing).
353. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B, 652C, 652D, 652E (1977); see also SHEP-
ARD. supra note 132, at 26-30 (discussing the elements of these torts).
354. See Bratt v. IBM Corp., 785 F.2d 352, 359 (1st Cir. 1986) (material issues of fact existed
concerning invasion of plaintiff's privacy by disclosure to defendant's agents of plaintiff's mental
problems by defendant's physician). For a related view, see Leggett v. First Interstate Bank, 739
P.2d 1083, 1087-88 (Or. Ct. App. 1987). In Leggett, the appellate court refused to overturn a jury
award in favor of an employee based on invasion of privacy and wrongful discharge by the em-
ployer. The gravamen of the plaintiff's complaint was that her employer had wrongfully sought
and obtained confidential information from a clinical psychologist to whom her employer had
referred her. The plaintiff's theory of recovery was wrongful intrusion, not disclosure of private
facts. Id.
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been violated by an employer's monitoring or surveillance activities will be the
plaintiff's expectations of privacy. Has there been an "intrusion" upon that
expected privacy? The intrusion will generally be actionable only if the plain-
tiff in fact has a subjective expectation of privacy under those circumstances
and if that expectation is reasonable as judged by societal norms.
Accordingly, criminal and civil cases involving searches of government
workers at work are important. 50 They are not, however, direct authority in
support of a private employee's violation-of-privacy claim. The state action in
a government worker's case raises the issue to a constitutional level. That state
action is normally absent in the private worker's case. However, the same issue
is central in both the case of the government and the private worker: Does the
employee have a reasonable expectation of privacy while at work? The govern-
ment worker cases, by analogy, establish both that workers may under certain
circumstances have an expectation of privacy while at work and that such an
expectation is easily bargained away by the employee.
United States v. Blok356 was a review of a government worker's conviction
for petty larceny. Evidence of the crime had been seized through a warrantless
search of the defendant's desk. The court found that the search in this case
violated the defendant's constitutional right to privacy. However, the limited
nature of that right is made clear by the following statement of the court:
We think appellee's exclusive right to use the desk assigned to her made
the search of it unreasonable. No doubt a search of it without her consent
would have been reasonable if made by some people in some circumstances.
Her official superiors might reasonably have searched the desk for official
property needed for official use. But as the Municipal Court of Appeals said,
the search that was made was not "an inspection or search by her superiors.
It was precisely the kind of search by policemen for evidence of a crime
against which the constitutional prohibition was directed." In the absence of
a valid regulation to the contrary appellee was entitled to, and did, keep
private property of a personal sort in her desk. Her superiors could not rea-
sonably search the desk for her purse, her personal letters, or anything else
that did not belong to the government and had no connection with the work
of the office. 857
The decision of the Supreme Court in Mancusi v. De Forte"5 8 reinforces the
conclusion that, although an employee may in certain limited circumstances
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the workplace, that right may eas-
ily be given away or diminished. In Mancusi, a union official was convicted of
355. See supra part Ill.B.2.a (discussing invasion of privacy suits brought by government em-
ployees). See generally Ralph V. Seep, Annotation, Warrantless Search by Government Employer
of Employee's Workplace Locker, Desk, of the Like as Violation of Fourth Amendment Privacy
Rights-Federal Cases, 91 A.L.R. FED. 226 (1989).
356. 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
357. Id. at 1021.
358. 392 U.S. 364 (1968); see also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (recog-
nizing the potential for a legitimate expectation of privacy in offices and commercial buildings).
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crimes arising out of his misuse of union funds to organize juke-box owners
and to compel them to pay "tribute." Evidence was seized through a warrant-
less search of an office that the defendant shared with other union officials.
The defendant was present during the search and objected. The Court held
that the union official had standing to object to the search and that it was
unreasonable and in violation of his constitutional rights. " 9 However, the opin-
ion suggests that the consent to the search could appropriately have been given
not only by the defendant but by those with whom he shared the office, or by
"higher-ups" in the union organization.3 60
The possibility that a government worker's expectation of privacy at work
may be given away is demonstrated by the case of United States v. Bunkers.861
In Bunkers, a postal worker's locker was searched in connection with an inves-
tigation of theft by that worker. The Ninth Circuit found that while the postal
worker may have had a subjective expectation of privacy,"6 2 she did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy.3"3 The union agreement in force specifically
contemplated searches in the case of suspected criminal activity. The court
stated:
Furthermore, we believe that Bunkers' voluntary entrance into postal ser-
vice employment and her acceptance and use of the locker subject to the
regulatory leave of inspection and search and the labor union's contractual
right of search upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity amount to an
effective relinquishment of Bunkers' Fourth Amendment immunity in her
work connected use of the locker.3 6
The first case to extend to the civil context the concept of reasonable expec-
tations of privacy of a government worker was O'Connor v. Ortega.3 6 A for-
mer chief of professional education at a state hospital brought an action
against certain officials at the hospital. Those officials had become concerned
about alleged improprieties in management by the plaintiff and about allega-
tions of sexual harassment of female employees by the plaintiff. While the
plaintiff was on administrative leave, the officials entered the plaintiff's office,
searched it, and seized items from his desk and file cabinet. Ultimately, the
seized items were used as evidence in an administrative proceeding that re-
sulted in the plaintiff's discharge.366 The Supreme Court rejected the conten-
tion that a public employee may never have a reasonable expectation of pri-
359. Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 372.
360. Id. at 369.
361. 521 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 989 (1975); see also American Postal
Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 871 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1989) (policy of employer,
waiver signed by employees, and collective bargaining agreement negated reasonable expectation
of privacy in lockers of employees).
362. Bunkers, 521 F.2d at 1220.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 1221 (citations omitted).
365. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
366. Id. at 717.
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vacy in his place of work . 67 However, the Court pointed out that those
expectations, in both the public and the private sector, may be reduced by
office practices, procedures, and legitimate regulations. 3" Nonetheless, in this
particular case, the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in at least
his desk and file cabinets.869
Despite this reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court in O'Connor de-
clined to hold the search automatically unreasonable and in violation of the
government worker's Fourth Amendment constitutional rights8 70 The Court
found neither a warrant requirement 71 nor a probable cause standard 72 to be
appropriate, choosing instead to impose a standard of reasonableness. The rea-
sonableness will depend upon a case-by-case balancing of the employee's legit-
imate expectations against the government's need for supervision, control, and
efficient operation of the workplace 878 The case was remanded to make that
determination.
b. Private employee searches
Employer searches of employees in cases of suspected theft have been a rel-
atively frequent basis of privacy litigation. 74 For example, an employee of K-
Mart Corporation sued her employer for invasion of privacy in K-Mart Corp.
Store No. 7441 v. Trotti.8 7' Employees of a local K-Mart store were provided
with lockers at work but were not assigned a specific locker. They were also
given a lock upon request, but the employer kept either the combination or a
master key to the lock. Due to a shortage in locks, some employees were al-
lowed to purchase their own locks. The plaintiff had done this, and the em-
ployer did not require her or the others purchasing their own locks to provide
the employer with a key or the combination. Apparently, locker searches took
place at the plaintiff's place of employment from time to time. However, this
was not a policy that the employer had announced to its employees.
The complaint in Trotti arose out of the theft of a watch at the K-Mart
store. The plaintiff was not suspected in the theft but a general locker search
was conducted. After the search, the plaintiff found the lock on her locker
hanging open and found the contents of her purse, which was in the locker at
the time of the search, in considerable disorder. The plaintiff confronted her
manager about this problem, and the fact of the search was initially denied.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 718-19.
370. Id. at 719.
371. id. at 722.
372. Id. at 725.
373. Id. at 725-26.
374. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (discussing labor arbitration decisions in em-
ployee-search cases); see also Hall v. May Dep't Stores Co., 637 P.2d 126, 135-36 (Or. 1981)
(holding that attempt by employer to force confession of theft out of employee was sufficiently
outrageous to give employee cause of action against employer).
375. 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
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About one month later the search was admitted although there was conflicting
testimony about whether the plaintiff's purse had been searched.376
The plaintiff was awarded $8000 in actual damages and $100,000 in puni-
tive damages at trial.3 7 On appeal, the case was reversed and remanded be-
cause the trial judge had improperly instructed the jury.781 Specifically, the
judge failed to specify that in order for an invasion of privacy to occur the
intrusion must be "highly offensive" to a reasonable person.3 79 Despite order-
ing a new trial, the court held that the plaintiff had manifested, and the em-
ployer had recognized, a reasonable expectation that the contents of the plain-
tiff's locker would be free from intrusion and interference.38 The court,
however, indicated that the result would have been different if the plaintiff had
used a lock provided by her employer.38"
The appellate court also found that the jury instruction concerning damages
had been improper. 38 2 The instruction improperly conveyed the impression
that the plaintiff could recover damages for mere embarrassment. Applicable
state law required, however, actual mental anguish or physical suffering. 8 3
The defendant also asserted that the award of punitive damages had been im-
proper. The appellate court refused to find the award of punitive damages to
be improper when the plaintiff's locker had been searched without any justifia-
ble suspicion that she had stolen the watch. 384
While the Trotti case exemplifies a willingness of courts to protect the pri-
vacy rights of employees, the holding is limited and cannot be applied to every
invasion of privacy. The employee must have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, and such expectations are easily bargained away.
c. Movies of worker activity
Taking movies of employees with a camera having audio capability may
violate the Wiretap Act.3" 5 Still photographs or videos of employees without
sound will generally be analyzed under common law privacy principles.386 In
Thomas v. General Electric Co.,38 7 for example, the employer had for thirty
376. Id. at 635.
377. Id. at 634.
378. Id. at 637.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 639.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 640.
385. See supra note 253 and accompanying text (stating that it is illegal to intercept any wire,
oral, or electronic communication).
386. See De Lury v. Kretchmer, 322 N.Y.S.2d 517, 518-19 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (holding that
municipal corporation did not violate privacy rights of sanitation workers by requiring workers to
have photos taken at place of work). See generally Phillip B. Hassman, Annotation, Taking Un-
authorized Photographs as Invasion of Privacy, 86 A.L.R.3D 374 (1978).
387. 207 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Ky. 1962).
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years engaged in the practice of taking motion pictures of its employees for
the purpose of promoting safety and efficiency. The plaintiff, an employee,
made a request to the defendant that his picture not be taken. The company
nonetheless continued its practice of taking the motion pictures of its employ-
ees, including the plaintiff. The court characterized the case as a balancing of
two conflicting rights-the managerial rights of the employer and the privacy
rights of the employee. 88 In carrying out this balancing process, the court held
that this was not a violation of the plaintiff's right to privacy inasmuch as
there was no showing that the plaintiff's health, welfare, or domestic situation
was adversely affected or that the photographs had made him nervous or sub-
jected him to undue or unfair criticism by fellow workers.38 9
d. Monitoring of activities away from the workplace
Surveillance of employees away from their primary place of work may also
give rise to a claim of a violation of the employee's right of privacy. 390 For
example, the plaintiff in McLain v. Boise Cascade Corp.891 injured his back
while at work. In the course of a dispute concerning the termination of the
plaintiff's workmen's compensation payments, Boise Cascade hired a private
investigation firm to conduct surveillance of the plaintiff away from work to
check on the validity of the plaintiff's injury claim. The private investigators
took a number of photographs of the plaintiff. The activities filmed were those
that a neighbor or passerby could have viewed, and the plaintiff testified that
the contents of the film did not embarrass or upset him. Despite the fact that
the investigators may have trespassed upon the plaintiff's property to take the
films, the court found that the intrusion was not sufficient to give rise to a
valid claim for violation of the plaintiff's right of privacy., The court recog-
nized the interest of the defendant in determining the validity of the claim and
held that the surveillance was not conducted in a manner that would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person.39 3
In International Union v. Garner 9" subjects of the surveillance were union
officials. In the course of attempts to unionize a plant in middle Tennessee,
certain city officials conducted surveillance of the plaintiffs at or near union
meetings. License plate numbers of persons attending the meetings were noted
and traced, and the names of the attendees were transmitted to the plaintiff's
employers. The plaintiffs then brought this invasion of privacy action against
388. Id. at 794.
389. Id. at 799.
390. See generally Annotation, Investigations and Surveillance, Shadowing and Trailing, as
Violation of Right of Privacy, 13 A.L.R.3D 1025 (1967). But see Ellenberg v. Pinkerton's, Inc.,
202 S.E.2d 701, 704 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973) (employer surveillance of employee reasonable under
circumstances).
391. 533 P.2d 343 (Or. 1975).
392. Id. at 347.
393. Id. at 346.
394. 601 F. Supp. 187 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
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the city officials involved. The court held that there was no "false light" inva-
sion of privacy because the information conveyed was not misleading.8 5 There
was no public disclosure of private facts invasion of privacy because the mat-
ters disclosed were neither highly offensive to a reasonable person nor matters
not of a legitimate concern to the public."9 6 There was no appropriation inva-
sion of privacy for the obvious reason that there was no commercial use of the
plaintiffs' names or appearances. 97 Finally, there was no intrusion invasion of
privacy because the actions of the plaintiffs were public in nature and did not
create a reasonable expectation of privacy. 98
Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.399 once again involved the surveillance
of a union official away from the workplace. In Pemberton, the plaintiff sued
his employer because the surveillance was conducted under its direction. The
plaintiff alleged claims of relief for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
interference with the plaintiff's marriage, conspiracy, and invasion of privacy.
Bethlehem Steel had become aware of the plaintiff's criminal record and
mailed information about that conviction to various union members. The com-
pany also placed the plaintiff under surveillance and mailed information about
the plaintiff's marital infidelity to his spouse. Ultimately, this led to a divorce.
First, the court upheld a summary judgment for the defendant upon the
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress due to the absence of proof
of actual emotional distress.4 00 Second, the court distinguished the separate
legal grounds upon which the plaintiff based his invasion of privacy
claim-intrusion and unwarranted publicity of the plaintiff's private life.' 01
The court found that transmitting the information to other union members
and to the plaintiffs wife was not actionable because the plaintiff simply had
failed to introduce any credible evidence establishing the involvement of the
defendants in the circulation of the plaintiffs criminal history and details of
the detective reports.' 2 However, the court found that the surveillance itself
was significant enough to sustain a claim for relief based on the intrusion the-
ory. The court indicated that surveillance conducted from public places would
not be actionable. However, the surveillance went beyond that because listen-
ing devices were placed on motel room doors and surveillance was conducted
from secret locations, such as stairwells.'0 8
395. Id. at 189-90.
396. Id. at 190-91.
397. Id. at 190.
398. Id. at 191-92.
399. 502 A.2d 1101 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 508 A.2d 488 (Md.), and cert. denied,
479 U.S. 984 (1986); see also Shuman v. Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (involv-
ing a violation-of-privacy claim by police officer after investigation into his allegedly adulterous
conduct).
400. Pemberton, 502 A.2d at 1115.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 1116.
403. Id. at 1116-17.
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e. Mail opening
The plaintiff in Vernars v. Young'0 ' was a twenty-seven-percent share-
holder, an officer, and a director of a corporation. The defendant, a fifty-per-
cent shareholder and the principal officer of that corporation, had allegedly
opened and read the plaintiff's mail delivered to the corporation's office but
addressed to the plaintiff and marked personal. The court held that these alle-
gations, if proven, would constitute the tort of invasion of privacy on an intru-
sion theory.406
f. Questionnaires
In Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co.,40 6 the plaintiffs, three sales representatives for
the defendant employer, refused to answer certain confidential questions on a
questionnaire sent to them by their employer. The grant by the trial judge of a
motion for a directed verdict by the defendant on the plaintiffs' claims for
invasion of privacy and bad faith termination of employment were upheld.
0 7
The plaintiffs had refused to provide the type of information that they consid-
ered to be confidential or personal. Therefore, the court reasoned, there was at
most an attempted invasion of privacy."0 8
g. Computer-based monitoring
Employee suits claiming a privacy invasion based upon ordinary (day-to-
day) computer-based monitoring are also difficult to prove because of the
courts' focus on the reasonableness of employees' expectations. The plaintiffs
in Barksdale v. IBM Corp.'0 9 were hired on a short-term basis by an employ-
ment agency to participate in a study. The study concerned the legibility of
various video display terminals to be used by bank tellers. The plaintiffs'
claims based on fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation
of privacy were dismissed. 10 The privacy claim was based upon intrusion. The
court observed that "[t]he Defendant's observation and recording of the num-
ber of errors the Plaintiffs made in the tasks they were instructed to perform
can hardly be considered an intrusion upon the Plaintiffs' 'solitude or seclusion
• . . or their private affairs and concerns.' """ Again, the fact that the intru-
sion took place in the course of employment swayed the court to decide in
404. 539 F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1976).
405. Id. at 969.
406. 431 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. ,1982).
407. Id. at 914.
408. Id. at 910.
409. 620 F. Supp. 1380 (W.D.N.C. 1985).
410. Id. at 1383.
411. Id.; see also Valencia v. Duval Corp., 645 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (finding
"extreme and outrageous" conduct a prerequisite to claim based on employer monitoring); Nader
v. General Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 769 (N.Y. 1970) (denying that simple collection of
data on individual invades privacy).
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favor of the employer.
h. Wiretapping
In addition to potential violations of the Wiretap Act, it is possible that
nonconsensual wiretapping of telephone conversations will constitute a tortious
invasion of privacy." 2 Several jurisdictions have recognized this potential in
cases outside the employer-employee relationship."" A claim of this type was
raised against the former employer of the plaintiff in Oliver v. Pacific North-
west Bell Telephone Co."' The plaintiff sought general and punitive damages
on the basis that his former employer had secretly monitored his telephone
calls, both during and immediately following the termination of his employ-
ment. The plaintiff had first become aware of that activity in the course of
prior litigation between the same parties." 5 In that prior litigation, the Su-
preme Court of Oregon rejected the argument that the employer was barred
from enforcing the noncompetition agreement between the parties due to these
alleged monitoring activities."" The Supreme Court of Oregon, however, af-
firmed the trial court's dismissal of the employer's complaint on separate
grounds. '" 7 The Oregon Court of Appeals, in the later privacy invasion action,
upheld the summary judgment ruling in favor of the defendant. The court
recognized that other jurisdictions had found telephone conversation intercep-
tions to be tortious under certain circumstances." 8 However, in this case, the
former employee had been unable to come forward with any evidence of the
monitoring of his conversations in particular. The only evidence proffered was
of monitoring activities of the defendant generally. The court relied on that
absence of proof to reject both the tort claim and the claim under the Wiretap
Act." 9 The Oregon court rejected the reasoning of an Ohio court in LeCrone
v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co.""0
In LeCrone, an Ohio court held that a prima facie case of invasion of pri-
vacy by wiretapping could be established where the means to intercept were
412. See generally Annotation, Eavesdropping as Violating Right of Privacy, 11 A.L.R.3D
1296 (1967).
413. See Fowler v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 343 F.2d 150, 156-57 (5th Cir. 1965) (ap-
plying Georgia law and holding that tapping of telephone without consent may be actionable
intrusion upon privacy even without publication of surreptitiously obtained information); LeCrone
v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 201 N.E.2d 533, 540-41 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963) (holding that telephone
company and husband could be liable to wife for invasion of privacy after telephone company
attached extension to wife's private telephone line during divorce proceeding). But see Schmukler
v. Ohio-Bell Tel. Co., 116 N.E.2d 819, 826 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1953) (finding no invasion of privacy
for telephone company to monitor customer's calls to determine whether customer was violating a
limited-use agreement).
414. 632 P.2d 1295 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 642 P.2d 310 (Or. 1981).
415. Id. at 1297.
416. North Pacific Lumber Co. v. Oliver, 596 P.2d 931 (Or. 1979).
417. id. at 943-44.
418. Id. at 946.
419. Id.
420. 201 N.E.2d 533 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
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proven, those means were in existence for a substantial time, and a person
with motive to intercept and physical access to those means was identified. At
present, however, Ohio appears to be the only state providing such a liberal
prima facie burden for privacy intrusion plaintiffs.
C. Summary
In summary, the current legal limitations do not adequately address the
problems created by artificial monitoring and surveillance in the workplace." 1
In addition to the limitations illustrated above, the statutory protections con-
tain large gaps in coverage. For example, there is virtually no limit on collec-
tion of transactional information in the workplace. That transactional informa-
tion can be used, for example, to construct personality profiles.
Further, the existing statutes simply fail to address issues unique to artificial
monitoring and surveillance. For example, does the employee have a right to
know the activity is taking place? Does the employee have access to the infor-
mation collected so as to verify its accuracy?
There is, of course, the argument that normal market forces will naturally
solve the problem. In other words, if it is true that workers become less loyal,
more frequently ill, and less customer-sensitive in an environment in which
artificial monitoring and surveillance devices are used, employers will natu-
rally tend to limit or eliminate the use of these devices. However, the increased
competitive pressures of a worldwide marketplace, the increased availability of
the technology, and the increasing concerns of employers concerning substance
abuse and employee theft make the use of the technology nearly irresistible.42 2
Recent news reports indicate that awareness of the problem is already taking
place in some major United States businesses. 42 3 In other situations, businesses
are voluntarily adopting ethical codes to regulate internally the manner in
which they deal with personal information.424 Although these market forces,
and corresponding moves toward self-regulation, may well serve as a signifi-
cant limiting factor, it is not safe to assume that these factors alone will pro-
vide an appropriate balance of employer and employee rights concerning this
difficult issue.
421. See Gandy, supra note 7, at 62.
422. See THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 21. The report concluded that market
forces will not curb the employer's use of monitoring because "many routine jobs are routine work
that is subject to and indifferent to a high turnover rate. Thus it is not clear that 'natural' checks
will be sufficient to ensure that monitoring is not abused." Id. But see Ronald Rosenberg, Most
Workers in Survey Think Employers Use Electronic Means To Spy on Them, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 9, 1989, at 10 (reporting view of vice president and general counsel of Associated Industries
of Massachusetts that electronic monitoring issues can be resolved without legislation).
423. See Bernstein, supra note 122, at 56 (reporting that many large U.S corporations are
discovering that monitoring has adverse effects on service and therefore are beginning to reduce
monitoring and emphasize quality); Markoff, supra note 50, at 7 (same).
424. Bernstein, supra note 122, at 56 (reporting the adoption of a "strict privacy code" by a
major United States corporation to regulate its own use of personal information).
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IV. PENDING LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
Some experts are calling for a constitutional amendment to guarantee the
right to privacy free from surveillance by private parties.425 However, it seems
more likely that a legislative approach will be taken.
State legislatures over the past several years have periodically considered
legislative proposals to regulate artificial monitoring and surveillance in the
workplace."" State proposals now under consideration take a variety of
forms.42 Three bills are now pending in Congress that are intended to regu-
late "electronic monitoring" in the workplace. In the Senate, Senator Paul
Simon introduced the Privacy for Workers and Consumers Act."2" In the
House of Representatives, a substantially identical bill was introduced by Rep-
resentative Pat Williams, and a similar bill was introduced by Representative
Douglas Bereuter. "'29 These federal legislative proposals are receiving both
strong support"2 and strong opposition.' A legislative fact sheet prepared by
425. Id.; Pamela Mendels, Making Room for the Bill of Rights Inside the Workplace; ACLU
Expands Reach into Employee Rights, but Meets Opposition from Several Quarters. NEWSDAY,
June 17, 1990, at 58 (indicating opposition to this approach, even within the ACLU itself).
426. Curbs on Electronic Monitoring of Workers Debated Before Massachusetts Labor Panel,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at A-2 (March 15, 1989).
427. See, e.g., Ga. H.B. 798, 141st Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (1991) (introduced Feb. 14,
1991, proposing to amend existing Georgia statutes to specifically permit monitoring of telephone
calls between employees and customers under certain circumstances); Ill. H.B. 1533, 87th Gen.
Assem., 1991-92 Reg. Sess. (1991) (introduced April 3, 1991, proposing to limit employment
discrimination based on lawful activities of employees off premises during nonworking hours); Ind.
H.B. 1214, 108th Leg., 1991 Reg. Sess. (1992) (introduced Jan. 9, 1991, proposing to require
disclosure of and place limits upon electronic monitoring); Mass. H.B. 4457, 177th Gen. Ct., 1991
Reg. Sess. (1991) (introduced Feb. 15, 1991, to prevent potential abuses of electronic monitoring
in the workplace); Mass. H.B. 5569, 177th Gen Ct., 1991 Reg. Sess. (1991) (introduced May 10,
1991, relating to electronic monitoring-in the workplace); Mass. H.B. 1693, 177th Gen. Ct., 1991
Reg. Sess. (1991) (introduced Feb. 5, 1991, relating to the monitoring of employees); Okla. H.B.
1520, 43d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (1991) (introduced Feb. 6, 1991, and titled the Privacy for Con-
sumers and Workers Act); Pa. H.B. 2148, 175th Gen. Assem., 1991-92 Reg. Sess. (1991) (intro-
duced Nov. 12, 1991, requiring notice to employees of employer monitoring in certain situations);
R.I. H.B. 5766, 1991 Reg. Sess. (1991) (introduced Feb. 12, 1991, relating to electronic monitor-
ing in the workplace); RI. H.B. 8455, 1991 Reg. Sess. (1991) (introduced Feb. 26, 1990, propos-
ing to make it a misdemeanor to spy on employees under certain circumstances); N.J. A.B. 210,
204th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1990) (introduced Jan. 9, 1990, to prohibit certain abuses of electronic
monitoring); Wis. A.B. 598, 89th Leg., 1989-90 Reg. Sess. (1990) (introduced Oct. 11, 1989,
proposing to make court surveillance of employees an unfair labor practice under certain circum-
stances). See generally Susan R. Boyle, Legislative News, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Mar. 11, 1991, at
2; Hugh Bronstein, Bills Target Nosy Employers, UPI, Oct. 29, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File (reporting proposed Pennsylvania law); Tina Cassidy, Monitoring Electronic
Surveillance; Bill Would Require Employees Be Told, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 5, 1991, at 21.
428. See supra note I (discussing the Senate Bill).
429. See supra note 2 (discussing the House Bill and the Revised House Bill).
430. Karen Nussbaum, Workers Under Surveillance, COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 6, 1992, at 21.
431. See Richard A. Barton, It's Time To Monitor the Bills, DIRECT MARKETING NEWS, Nov.
25, 1991, at 16 (noting that the senior vice president for government affairs of Direct Marketing
Association opposes the proposals); Meg Fletcher, Bill Would Limit Surveillance of Comp.
Claimants, Bus. INS., Sept. 23, 1991, at 3; Evelyn Gilbert, Insurers Battle To Eliminate WC
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the Communication Workers of America describes, albeit in fairly hyperbolic
terms, the problems that the proposed legislation seeks to remedy:
Secret monitoring is the merciless electronic whip that drives the fast pace
of today's workplace in the service industry.
In essence, concealed surveillance combines the worst features of 19th
century factory labor relations with 20th century technology, creating an
electronic sweatshop.
In assembly-line environments, wage earners must produce at top speed
under the unwinking eye of the computer taskmasters. These ever-vigilant
machines "watch" every work activity that an employee performs, even
counting the number of keystrokes per second he or she makes. The com-
puter sets arbitrary work rules and then tracks the employee unceasingly to
ensure that the standards are met. Standards are frequently ratcheted up,
and evaluations become based on the minute details rather than on the final
product or service.
The relentless assault of secret monitoring impels employees to care more
about meeting a numerical standard measured by a lifeless computer than
about meeting the service needs of a customer. 32
The major elements of the proposed legislation"" now pending in the House
and Senate are as follows.
(1) Broad definition of "electronic monitoring".-
the collection, storage, analysis and reporting of information concerning an
employee's activities by means of computer, electronic observation and su-
pervision, remote telephone surveillance, telephone call accounting, or other
form of visual, auditory, or computer-based surveillance conducted by any
transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of
any nature transmitted in whole or part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic, or photo-optical system.4 84
Claims Fraud. NAT'L UNDERWRITERS PROP. & CASUALTY (Risk & Benefits Mgmt. ed.), Nov. 18,
1991, at 15 (asserting that proposals would hamper worker-compensation fraud investigation);
Ellen Messmer, Vendors Assail Privacy Bill's Curbs on Work Monitoring; Clause Would Require
Signals for Workers, NETWORK WORLD, Aug. 5, 1991, at 7; Ken Rankin, Chains' Anti-Shrink
Efforts Face Legal Curbs, DRUG STORE NEWS, Sept. 9, 1991, at 4; Industry-Opposed Employee
Monitoring Measure Moves Forward, AVIATION DAILY., Nov. 25, 1991, at 344 (asserting that
Air Transport Association believes proposal will cut into safety and security of air carriers).
432. COMM. WORKERS OF AM., LEGIs. FACT SHEET No. 101-2-2, SECRET MONITORING 1-2
(1990).
433. For summaries of the proposed legislation, see Catherine Collins, Bill Would Require No-
tices When Bosses Snoop on Employees, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1991, at D2; H.F. Cummins, Em-
ployee Monitoring Bills Aim To Put Blinders on Big Brother, NEWSDAY, Nov. 10, 1991, at 111;
House Subcommittee Clears Measure on Workplace Electronic Monitoring, Gov't Employee Rel.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1441, at 1518 (Nov. 25, 1991).
434. House Bill, supra note 2, § 2(1). Because the pending proposals in the House and Senate,
in their original form, are substantially the same, only the House Bill version is described here.
Presumably the drafters do not intend the House Bill to require that information be collected,
stored, analyzed "and" reported before the activity constitutes "electronic monitoring." For exam-
ple, video surveillance probably is intended to be covered if carried out, even if the tapes are
destroyed (not "stored"), reviewed ("not analyzed"), or put into an employee's file ("not re-
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(2) Broad definitions of "employer" and "employee." The definition of em-
ployee includes former employees.4 5 Also, there is a separate definition of
"prospective employee" designed to provide protection to employment appli-
cants.436 The definition of employer includes all forms of entities, labor organi-
zations, and federal and state governments.437 In addition, a minimum number
of employees is not specified.
(3) Notice. If an employer engages in electronic monitoring, that employer
must give all "affected" employees prior written notice of the form the moni-
toring will take, the "personal data" to be collected, the type of data that can
be readily associated with a particular employee,' 38 the frequency of each
form of monitoring, and the use of the personal data collected. The employer
must also give notice of the interpretation of records that will be collected, the
existing production standards and work performance expectation, and the
methods for determining production standards and work performance expecta-
tions based on statistics generated through the monitoring process.43 9 In addi-
tion to this notice to currently affected employees, prospective employees must
be informed "at any personal interview or meeting" of the potential electronic
monitoring that may "directly affect" that person if hired, and the applicant
must receive a copy of the notice given to currently affected employees upon
ported"). Also, it is likely that the drafters intend to include activities that constitute "electronic
observation" even if they are not also "supervision." The Revised House Bill replaces the "and"
immediately preceding "reporting" with "or," replaces the term "remote telephone surveillance"
with "telephone service observation," and broadens the description of methods falling within the
general definition by referring to "conducted by any method other than direct observation by
another person." Revised House Bill, supra note 2, § 2(l)(A). A definition of "telephone call
accounting" is added in Revised House Bill § 2(l)(B) while a definition of "telephone service
observation" appears in Revised House Bill § 2(6).
435. House Bill, supra note 2, § 2(2). The Revised House Bill adds "any leased employee" to
the definition of "employee." Revised House Bill, supra note 2, § 2(2).
436. House Bill, supra note 2, § 2(5).
437. Id. § 2(3). The Revised House Bill includes a requirement that a person be engaged in
interstate commerce as a condition to being an "employer." Revised House Bill, supra note 2, §
2(3)(A). It also includes provisions covering the situation in which an employee contracts with a
third party to perform electronic monitoring. Id. § 9(c).
438. House Bill, supra note 2, § 2(4). However, "personal data" as defined does not appear to
include images of an employee or sound recordings of an employee's voice.
439. Id. § 3(a). See section 3(c) concerning the initial notice to be given within 90 days after
the Act's effective date. The Revised House Bill adds a requirement that the secretary of labor
prepare and distribute a standard form of notice to be conspicuously posted by all employers who
engage in electronic monitoring. Revised House Bill, supra note 2, § 3(a)(1). It also creates an
exception to the general notice duty when an employer has a reasonable suspicion that an em-
ployee is engaged in conduct that violates a criminal or civil law and adversely affects the em-
ployer's interests or the interests of its employees. Id. § 3(a)(3)(A). However in that instance the
employer would be required to execute and retain a written statement before engaging in such
protected activity in order to qualify for the exclusion. Id. § 3(a)(3)(B). This provision is ambigu-
ous in many respects. For example, it appears only to create an exception for monitoring of the
suspected employee but, in most cases, surveillance of that employee (e.g., video surveillance)
would necessarily require monitoring of other employees as well.
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request." 0
(4) Periodic warnings. A "beep" device or other notice that electronic moni-
toring is taking place must be given at periodic intervals unless the monitoring
is continuous.44 A separate requirement is included for "telephone service ob-
servation." In that limited case, the customer must also receive notice that the
monitoring is taking place.'"
(5) Records access. If personal data is collected, an employee must have
access to that data." 3 This does not apply to prospective employees or
customers.
(6) Relevance. Any personal data collected must be relevant to work
performance.'
4
4
(7) Disclosure limitations. Unless the employee consents in writing, any
personal data collected by electronic monitoring may not be disclosed to third
parties other than law enforcement authorities and the courts.""
440. House Bill, supra note 2, § 3(b). The Revised House Bill would require this notice at the
"first personal interview" (as opposed to notice at "any personal interview or meeting") and would
require the notice to any employee who would be "affected" (as opposed to "directly" affected) if
hired. Also, it would require that the general written notice be given not only upon request but
whenever an offer of employment is extended. Revised House Bill, supra note 2, § 3(a)(4).
441. House Bill, supra note 2, § 3(b)(3). The Revised House Bill would substantially alter this
provision. First, the requirement of a "beep" or similar notice would apply only to monitoring that
is "periodic or random." Revised House Bill, supra note 2, § 3(a)(5). A separate notification
provision would apply to "continuous" monitoring. Id. § 3(a)(6). The notice in that event, i.e., the
"beep" requirement, would apply only when the employer on a periodic or random basis "reviews
data" (excluding data obtained via an "electronic card access system" or "data appearing simulta-
neously on multiple television screens"). Additionally, the right of an employer to later review
data obtained by "continuous electronic monitoring" would be limited to data "relevant" to an
employee's work. Id. § 3(a)(6)(B). Finally, the employer would be prohibited from using "beeps"
and similar devices unless authorized by the statute. Id. § 3(c).
442. House Bill, supra note 2, § 3(b)(4). A bill was introduced in the House in July 1989 by
Representative Ronald Dellums that would have required the consent of all parties to a telephone
conversation before it could be intercepted. The bill also would have required all voice-activated
tape recorders to include a "beep" warning and a warning label and would have prohibited the
sale or advertising of those devices under certain circumstances. H.R. 2551, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989) (discussed supra note 2); see Dworkin, supra note 221, at 77-78 (concerning "beep" pro-
posals in the states). See generally Nancy Blodgett, Employer Eavesdropping: Spurs Federal
"Beep" Bill, 73 A.B.A. J. 24 (1987) (discussing "beep" proposal).
443. House Bill, supra note 2, § 4. The Revised House Bill contains an exception to this gen-
eral requirement of access by employees. Specifically, employees would not have a right of access
until the completion of either the investigation or the disciplinary action, whichever were sooner.
Revised House Bill, supra note 2, § 4(b).
444. House Bill, supra note 2, § 5(a). The Revised House Bill would abandon the "relevant"
standard, instead prohibiting intentional collection of personal data via electronic monitoring not
"confined to the employee's work." Revised House Bill, supra note 2, § 5(a). It also would create
an exception for the inadvertent collection of other data. Id. In addition, it would specifically
prohibit electronic monitoring in traditionally private areas, such as dressing rooms (except in
limited situations). Id. § 5(c).
445. House Bill, supra note 2, § 5(b). The Revised House Bill contains an additional exception
permitting public disclosure of information bearing on illegal conduct by a public official or on
public health and safety. Revised House Bill, supra note 2, § 5(b)(2).
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(8) Limited use of results. In the case of performance evaluations and disci-
plinary action, personal data collected through electronic monitoring may not
be the exclusive basis for the action, unless the employee is given the opportu-
nity to review the data within a reasonable time after it is collected. " 6 Under
no circumstance may any data obtained through electronic monitoring be the
sole basis for setting production quotas or work performance expectations. " 7
With limited exceptions, an employer is prohibited from collecting or dissemi-
nating any personal data obtained through electronic monitoring that describes
the manner in which an employee exercises "rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment" to the United States Constitution." 8
(9) Remedies. The secretary of labor4 " is given the power to adopt adminis-
trative regulations 50 and the right to bring injunctive proceedings and assess
civil penalties. 451 Private civil actions are also authorized in state or federal
court within three years of the alleged violation." 2 Furthermore, rights under
the legislation cannot be waived except in settlement of a bona fide dispute.'8 3
446. House Bill, supra note 2, § 6(a). The Revised House Bill would additionally prohibit any
action against an employee based on personal data obtained by electronic monitoring unless the
required notice were given and the data collected were confined to the employee's work. Revised
House Bill, supra note 2, § 6(a). Also, it contains antiretaliation provisions. Id. § 8.
447. House Bill, supra note 2, § 6(b). The House Bill referred to the "exclusive" basis for
evaluations and disciplinary action, and the "sole" basis for production quotas. The Revised House
Bill uses the "sole" basis in both cases. Revised House Bill, supra note 2, § 6(b).
448. House Bill, supra note 2, § 6(c). The Revised House Bill prohibits only "intentional" use
in this manner and deletes the exceptions to the prohibition appearing in the House Bill. Revised
House Bill, supra note 2, § 6(c).
449. House Bill, supra note 2, § 2(6).
450. Id. § 8.
451. Id. § 7(a)-(b). The Revised House Bill clarifies that the $10,000 maximum civil penalty is
for each violation. Revised House Bill, supra note 2, § 7(a)(l).
452. House Bill, supra note 2, § 7(c). The prevailing parties would be entitled to recover rea-
sonable costs, including attorney's fees. The Revised House Bill would clarify that the statute of
limitations begins to run on the date the employee knows or reasonably could be expected to have
known of the employer's violation. Revised House Bill, supra note 2, § 7(c)(3). Also, the Revised
House Bill deletes language referring specifically to the right of an employee to bring an action on
behalf of others similarly situated. Id. § 7(c)(2).
453. House Bill, supra note 2, § 7(d); see Kirsten A. Corbett, A Databank on Injured Employ-
ees, PRIVACY J., May 1990, at 4. That article reports that Employers Information Service ("EIS")
will provide employers with a report on job applicants that includes a history of prior job injuries,
a record of workers compensation claims, and a notation of whether former employers would
rehire the subject of the report (without stating a reason for that conclusion). Id. EIS also pro-
vides employers with an application form that includes a waiver of all personal privacy rights, an
agreement to submit to various types of tests, an agreement that the prospective employer may
obtain various credit and background reports on the employee, and an agreement that employ-
ment, if extended, may be terminated without cause. Id. Note, however, that the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission has interpreted the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1988 & Supp. II 1990), to prohibit employer inquiries about worker's
compensation history at the pre-offer stage. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630-1631 (1991).
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V. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
The time is now ripe for a solution to the problem of an inadequate legal
structure protecting employees in the workplace. Due to the increased com-
puterization of office work in the last fifteen years,""' the computerization of
communications, and the rise of employee expectations concerning workplace
rights, the problem must now be addressed legislatively.""
First and foremost, this proposal for legislation must not be viewed as a
complete solution to the issue of employee autonomy. It is simply one element
of that overriding issue.' 6 For example, there is the possibility in the future of
adopting a comprehensive "quality of work life" legislative package with cov-
erage of artificial monitoring and surveillance of employees as just one of its
many elements. This approach has already been taken in some foreign coun-
tries but does not appear to be a viable solution in the United States at this
time. 457 Nevertheless, Congress should not lose sight of the fact that it is time
to begin studying such approaches carefully.
Furthermore, legislation at the federal level is the appropriate approach.
The potential financial impact on a state due to lost business resulting from
the enactment of such controversial legislation makes it unlikely that a com-
prehensive solution will be achieved in the states.'9 8 Also, this is an area in
which nationwide uniformity is critical to aid business compliance without un-
due hardship." 9
Additionally, it is critical not to view the question of the appropriate regula-
tion of the artificial monitoring and surveillance of employees in a vacuum. If
"device-specific" legislation is enacted, little will be accomplished. Employers
will simply shy away from the regulated device and turn to other devices that
may present even greater concerns. In some cases a particular device may be
so dangerous that it warrants legislation which regulates that device specifi-
cally. For example, genetic screening in the workplace may well be appropri-
ately regulated by a separate statute. However, the experience with polygraph
examinations provides a lesson in this area. A comprehensive, device-specific
statute was enacted at the federal level to cure the problems created by
polygraphs. It has substantially curtailed polygraph use by most private em-
ployers, but it has driven employers to an arguably less reliable testing device,
the "paper and pencil honesty test."' 60
454. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, PUB. No. 287, AUTOMATION OF
AMERICA'S OFFICES 8 (1985).
455. See Note, supra note 18, at 1913-16 (arguing for a legislative solution). The author states
that a "leap from current privacy doctrine to one protecting workers would involve considerable
judicial activism." Id. at 1914.
456. See THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR, supra note 6, at 23.
457. Id. at 22 app. A.
458. See Furfaro & Josephson, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing the problems encountered by
West Virginia in this area).
459. See supra note 427 (listing some of the legislative proposals now pending in the states).
460. Inwald, supra note 59, at 52.
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It is, in fact, unlikely that even the most committed opponents of workplace
monitoring and surveillance would argue that technology is the culprit. 461 The
solution obviously is not to prohibit the manufacture or sale of the technology
except in the most unusual of cases. Rather, the solution is appropriate regula-
tion of its use. Therefore, the legislation should focus on what might be labeled
"due process in the private sector." Such due process would provide advance
notice to employees of the monitoring, grant access to employee records con-
cerning the monitoring, and create a procedural mechanism for employees to
correct errors in the information collected. There are simply too many poten-
tial benefits for employers and employees to approach this issue from the
standpoint of banning technology.
In arguing for a due process legislative approach, the counterargument will
be made that any regulation is an undue interference with the basic employer-
employee relationship. Of course the very essence of the employer-employee
relationship is the employer's promise to compensate the employee in exchange
for the employee's promise to perform services subject to the employer's con-
trol. This element of employer control necessarily implies that the employer
will closely monitor the employee's activities on the job to ensure that the
purpose of the agreement is being carried out. For example, it is common for
an employer to monitor its hourly employees by requiring them to punch in
and punch out on the time clock. Despite the fact that this type of monitoring
may, at times, be annoying to the employees, most recognize it as necessary,
and the argument cannot seriously be made that monitoring is inherently evil.
Therefore, some employers may argue against legislation limiting the right to
artificially conduct monitoring and surveillance, even if that legislation is nar-
rowed to the modest scope proposed in this Article. Is there something unique
about artificial monitoring and surveillance that should cause us to treat it in a
manner different from other types of employee monitoring?
The answer is yes. The problem arises from the fact that the pace of techno-
logical development has simply outstripped the pace of change in employees'
expectations about the type of monitoring to which they have agreed to subject
themselves. Monitoring and surveillance techniques are potentially more intru-
461. See Marx, supra note 53, at 12. As stated by one of the experts evaluating the policies of
the hypothetical employer in that article, "Technology itself is not to blame for this state of af-
fairs. In fact, information technologies, which represent a radical discontinuity in industrial his-
tory, could well lead to more reciprocity in the workplace, not less." Id. (comments of Shoshana
Zuboff). In her book, In the Age of the Smart Machine: The Future of Work and Power (1988),
Professor Zuboff makes the same argument.
She agrees that computers may end up being used mainly to routinize, subdivide and
control jobs. But she argues that using them this way would be a mistake for the
companies themselves: it would mean sacrificing the potential that computers offer for
improving the products and services those computers help produce. To fulfill that po-
tential, jobs will have to be redesigned to give employees the opportunity for more, not
less, initiative-to allow them to interpret information the computer provides, and to
make decisions based on that information.
Steven Kelman, The Lash of the Computer, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 29, 1988, at 52.
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sive today, even though they may be physically less intrusive in many re-
spects.461 Today, the intensity of monitoring is extremely high, even continu-
ous, and can more easily be hidden. Furthermore, it is difficult, if not
impossible, for an employee who does not have access to the technology or
records of its operation to refute the results. Finally, there is greater capacity
to retain and retrieve records of the monitoring and surveillance through the
use of computers.
As a result, the same employee who accepts the necessity to punch in and
punch out might well be incensed to discover that her words and acts of the
day have been recorded secretly on a hidden video monitor. Should the em-
ployee simply modify her expectations and learn to cope with these new moni-
toring techniques in much the same way that we have all learned to cope with
other high-technology changes in our everyday life, such as radar guns in the
hands of police officers monitoring traffic and hidden cameras monitoring the
automatic teller machine?
Of course, the employee who is unwilling to modify her expectations always
has the theoretical option to terminate the employment relationship or to as-
sert pressure on the employer to cease the monitoring as a condition of main-
taining the employment relationship. These theoretical alternatives are un-
likely to be practical alternatives to the vast majority of workers, who do not
have the luxury of quitting based on a difference in principle with the em-
ployer and who stand in an inferior bargaining position to the employer.
Therefore, we must identify the point at which employer monitoring and sur-
veillance crosses the line and becomes an unacceptable intrusion into private
employee affairs that society is unwilling to tolerate.
The difficulty of this issue is well summarized in a recent article:
Most workplace privacy issues pose these kinds of difficult questions. They
pit the needs of the company against the worker's feelings of dignity and
worth. To sacrifice much of the latter would make work life untenable. So
the United States must decide which rights of a citizen in society should
extend to an employee in the corporation-and in what form. If employers
don't voluntarily start this process, the courts or the legislatures will do it
for them.""
Once Congress decides that regulation is appropriate, it will be important in
the regulatory scheme to differentiate among the various stages of the employ-
ment process. As stated in the Conference Board Report, "More than four-
fifths of the survey participants in all three regions think that thorough solici-
tation of information from job applicants is the key to avoiding the need for
more intrusive practices such as surveillance and monitoring." And according
to one of the respondents to the survey described in the Conference Board
Report, "You hire your own problems. Prevention remains the key. Monitor-
ing and searching employees may deter theft, but such practices are unneces-
462. Gandy, supra note 7, at 62.
463. Hoerr, supra note 28, at 61.
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sary if proper attention is paid to the hiring process. '"464 Obviously, these com-
ments overstate the case somewhat. Thorough hiring practices do not
eliminate the need for careful supervision. But a regulatory climate that pro-
vides employers relatively greater flexibility at the front end might well make
less flexibility at later stages seem more reasonable and palatable.
Specifically, much of the need for employers to rely upon various preem-
ployment screening tests and posthiring monitoring and surveillance may arise
from the employer's inability to obtain candid evaluations from prior employ-
ers. As reported in the Conference Board Report, the survey respondents were
reluctant to give out salary history, performance appraisals, disciplinary and
absentee reports, and psychological test scores about current employees to pro-
spective employers. In fact, three-quarters of the survey respondents reported
that they would not divulge information about current employees to prospec-
tive employers under any circumstances. 65 A primary reason appears to be
the threat of defamation or negligent referral litigation. Therefore, considera-
tion should be given to legislation regulating the process of reporting on con-
sumer credit history under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. This would provide
employers disclosing information with a safe harbor in appropriate circum-
stances as well as provide employees with the right to challenge and correct
inaccurate or outdated information.
Bearing these general principles in mind, a critical first element in any new
federal legislation should be a definition of the regulated activity. Specifically,
the statute should include a broad definition of the types of artificial monitor-
ing and surveillance techniques covered in order to capture techniques now in
use and to prevent circumvention by new technological developments. Al-
though the definition of "electronic monitoring" in the Revised House Bill4 66
provides a good starting point for analysis, it needs to be improved in two
respects.
First, the definition in the Revised House Bill would include many of the
surveillance techniques currently employed in the American workplace, includ-
ing systems for telephone call accounting and telephone service observation,
video and still photos, sound recordings, interception of electronic mail and fax
messages, computer-based monitoring, computerized time management, and
biometric identification. Under the definition in the Revised House Bill, many
information-gathering techniques used in the American workplace that should
be exoluded from the scope of this proposed legislation are in fact excluded.
Nevertheless, the definition of electronic monitoring is both overbroad and un-
derbroad. This results from two elements of the proposed definition: (1) the
definition does not limit its scope to storage, analysis, and reporting of infor-
mation originally collected by surveillance; (2) the definition refers only to
"activities," not characteristics of the employee.
For example, assume that an employer requires employees to manually com-
464. BERENBEIM, supra note 6, at 5.
465. Id. at 8.
466. Revised House Bill, supra note 2; see supra note 2 (discussing the Revised House Bill).
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plete an employee information form but enters the data into a computer for
purposes of management analysis. This is, arguably, the "storage" and "analy-
sis" of "information concerning an employee's activities by means of com-
puter." Similarly, assume that an employer uses a modem to obtain access to
an employee-owned computer, located in the employee's home, that contains
personal data about the employee. If the information relates to the employee's
personal characteristics, as opposed to activities, it arguably would not be cov-
ered by the proposed legislation. Furthermore, the proposed legislation proba-
bly would not include any methods used to promote employee behavior, such
as subliminal suggestion.
Second, the regulated activity should be labeled "artificial monitoring and
surveillance" rather than "electronic monitoring." This more accurately de-
scribes the nature of the activity regulated and reduces the possibility that
judicial interpretation will cause the statute to apply more narrowly than in-
tended by its drafters.""
467. This Article proposes the following definition of "artificial monitoring and surveillance."
SEC. I DEFINITIONS.
(I) Artificial monitoring and surveillance includes but is not limited to:
(a) The collection by an employer of "personal data" concerning an em-
ployee on the activities of that employee by "artificial means"; or
(b) The transmission by an employer of "artificial sensory messages" to an
employee; or
(c) The storage, analysis, or reporting of personal data when that "per-
sonal data" was originally collected as provided in subparagraph (l)(a)
above.
(2) An activity shall be considered to be "artificial monitoring and surveillance"
even if the employer does not retain a record of the information collected. However,
the following shall not constitute "artificial monitoring and surveillance" when con-
ducted or obtained with the knowledge of the employee:
(a) Substance abuse testing;
(b) Integrity screening; commonly known as "pen and pencil honesty test";
(c) Genetic screening;
(d) Medical testing, including brain wave tests; and
(e) Skill testing.
(3) "Artificial monitoring and surveillance" shall not include the following: ob-
taining, maintaining, or analyzing any "consumer credit report" or "investigative re-
port" subject to the Fair Credit Reporting Act or any polygraph examination subject
to the Polygraph Protection Act.
(4) "Artificial means," as used in sec. I(1)(a), refers to any method of collection of
personal data concerning an employee by any method other than direct human obser-
vation. "Artificial means" includes, but is not limited to, any method by which infor-
mation is received or transmitted, in whole or part, by wire, radio, electro-magnetics,
photoelectric, or photo-optical system. "Artificial means" includes, but is not limited
to, the following:
(a) Telephone call accounting;
(b) Telephone service observation;
(c) Computer-based monitoring;
(d) Review of electronic mail or computer files;
(e) Sound recordings;
(f) Video surveillance;
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A new statute also should strengthen and clarify the Wiretap Act. Specifi-
cally, the Wiretap Act should be amended to require the consent of both par-
ties to a telephone call before it may be intercepted. In addition, the Wiretap
Act should be made expressly applicable to electronic mail, thus subjecting
such activity to regulation by the new federal legislation and by the Wiretap
Act.
The heart of a new statute should be a requirement of employee awareness
that the monitoring and surveillance is taking place, unless there is particular-
ized suspicion of the commission of a crime or similar circumstances. The ad-
vance notice requirement should be flexible and should apply to all persons
who might be affected, including prospective employees, customers, and cur-
rent employees. In other words, a specific written form of notice to employees
by the employer should not be required nor should the statute focus on tele-
phone monitoring as the only potential source of interference with customer
rights. The statute should simply require advance notice to the persons af-
fected in a manner reasonably calculated to apprise that person of the poten-
tial for artificial monitoring and surveillance of a particular type.
The notification provisions in the Revised House Bill, by contrast, are not
sufficiently specific. For example, does a written notice posted on an employee
bulletin board satisfy the requirement of "prior written notice?" Also, the no-
tification provisions as proposed are unduly onerous in some respects. As pres-
ently drafted, the Revised House Bill would appear to require a new notice to
all "affected employees" each time that one of the seven required elements of
the notice is charged in any respect.
In addition to making employees aware that monitoring will take place, how
it will be carried out, and what data might be collected that will be identified
with the particular employee, the proposed notification to employees goes
much further. It would require the employer to notify the employee concerning
"existing production standards and work performance expectations." A notice
concerning monitoring is not the appropriate method of informing employees
(g) Still photographs; and
(h) Computerized access or time control systems.
(5) "Artificial sensory message" means any message directed to the sense of sight,
sound, taste, or touch of an employee which is transmitted in a manner not intended
to appeal to the conscious thought process of that employee upon receipt by the em-
ployee. This includes, but is not limited to, the transmission of subliminal messages
upon computer screens.
(6) "Personal data" means any information concerning an employee which may be
readily associated with that particular employee for reasons including, but not limited
to, the following:
(a) physical likeness or a photo or video image or sound recording;
(b) name;
(c) description;
(d) number; or
(e) identifying mark.
This subsection includes, but is not limited to, video tapes, still photographs, sound
recordings, and computer printouts.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
about those matters. More importantly, it tells employers who monitor elec-
tronically that they must disseminate this information to employees while it
does not place a similar burden upon employers who choose not to monitor
electronically.
The customer notification provisions of the pending legislation apply only to
telephone call accounting. However, customers would understandably be con-
cerned about other forms of monitoring, such as video surveillance, to which
this notification provision does not apply.
The bills in Congress would limit the manner in which the data collected by
electric monitoring could be used by the employer. That data could not, in
most cases, be the "exclusive basis" for performance evaluation or discipline,
nor could it be the "sole basis" for setting quotas. Once again, a substantial
limit would be placed on employers who monitor electronically, while employ-
ers who choose not to do so would be unaffected. Further, the protection is
empty in the sense that it could be avoided by having any other basis for the
employer decision.
Any new federal statute should guarantee employees access to the records of
the monitoring and surveillance. This approach is similar to that taken by
many states with respect to personnel records generally. Particular procedures
for access should be specified, and access should be limited to the employees
affected and those other employees with a valid business reason for access to
the records. Even so, access alone will not be enough. Specific procedures
should be provided for challenging allegedly inaccurate or misleading data col-
lected. In this arena, mandatory arbitration of disputes would be a useful tool
to avoid unnecessary litigation while ensuring fairness of records maintained.
New legislation also should require maintaining confidentiality of the
records of the monitoring and surveillance. Within the collecting organization,
access should be limited to a discrete group with the need to know. Confidenti-
ality procedures that will guarantee this in-house confidentiality should be
mandated. Outside the collecting organization, disclosure should be made only
in exceptional circumstances, such as employee consent or judicial process.
Finally, new legislation should provide administrative enforcement mecha-
nisms, antiretaliation provisions, and civil remedies, including the right to re-
cover costs and attorney fees. These remedies should not be subject to waiver
before an alleged violation and should expressly be additional to any other
remedies provided by law, including state legislation. The statute of limitations
upon such a civil action should commence upon the date the employee knew,
or reasonably should have known, about the alleged violation should be rela-
tively short, perhaps one year.
CONCLUSIONS
Artificial monitoring and surveillance in the workplace should not be ana-
lyzed in narrow terms ignoring its broad potential. Nor should the likelihood
of rapid, future technological change be ignored by using a device-specific ap-
proach destined in advance to become a legal dinosaur. Instead, this issue
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should be approached as a key element of the overriding issue of the appropri-
ate nature of the relationship between the employer and the employee in a
society characterized by rapidly changing technology and values. In order to
make certain that the many improvements in that relationship are not seri-
ously diluted by technological innovations, federal legislation should now be
adopted with the goal of maintaining the role of American workers as innova-
tors and contributors at their places of work, not mere cogs in one of many
complex machines. At present, the practical approach is to adopt legislation
that does not cover all aspects of artificial monitoring and surveillance because
some aspects of that activity, such as polygraphs, have been the subject of
recent legislative activity. Instead, legislation should be enacted to fill the gaps
in the existing legislative framework, and it should be viewed as merely the
first step towards the long-term goal of enacting comprehensive worker-auton-
omy legislation.

